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ABSTRACT  
   
Time magazine called 1976 "the year of the evangelical" partly in response to the 
rapid political ascent of the previously little-known Georgia governor Jimmy Carter. A 
Sunday school teacher and deacon in his local church, Carter emphasized the important 
role of faith in his life in a way that no presidential candidate had done in recent memory. 
However, scholarly assessments of Carter's foreign policy have primarily focused on his 
management style or the bureaucratic politics in his administration. This study adds to the 
growing literature in American diplomatic history analyzing religion and foreign policy 
by focusing on how Carter's Christian beliefs and worldview shaped his policymaking 
and how his religious convictions affected his advisors. To better demonstrate this 
connection, this dissertation primarily discusses Carter's foreign policy vis-à-vis religious 
nationalist groups of the three Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, Islam).  
By drawing on archival materials from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, 
Carter's own voluminous writings, and memoirs of other administration officials, this 
dissertation argues that Carter's religious values factored into policymaking decisions, 
although sometimes in a subtle fashion due to his strong Baptist doctrinal commitment to 
the separation of church and state. Moreover, Carter's initial success in using his religious 
beliefs in the Camp David negotiations raised expectations among administration 
officials and others when crises arose, such as the hostage taking in Iran and the electoral 
threat of the Christian Right. Despite his success at Camp David, invoking religious 
values can complicate situations already fraught with sacred symbolism. Ultimately, this 
dissertation points to the benefits and limits of foreign policy shaped by a president with 
ii 
strong public religious convictions as well as the advantages and pitfalls of scholars 
examining the impact of religion on presidential decision making. 
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James Wall, editor of Christian Century and an avid supporter of President Jimmy 
Carter, once explained, “The president’s homilies, personal illustrations, and biblical 
allusions present the simple faith of a complex public man, but they provide no magical 
connection between a specific political decision and the president’s personal faith.”1 
Wall’s observation illustrates the difficulty of assessing the importance of religion or 
other cultural factors in the decision-making calculus of Carter or any other leader. 
Although Carter possessed an abiding belief in the separation of church and state, 
he did not relegate his personal faith to the private sphere of his life. During the 1976 
campaign, Carter remarked, “My religion is as natural to me as breathing.”2 Dan Ariail, 
Carter’s longtime pastor at Maranatha Baptist Church, clarified: “There has been an 
almost universal reading of Jimmy Carter’s faith as being a department of his life, an 
addendum with little relationship to the rest of him. But I have discovered that you can 
never adequately grasp Jimmy Carter himself unless you see his Christian faith, along 
with its standards and principles, as being the framework on which all the rest is built.”3  
Paradoxically, Carter’s faith seemed at the root of his political decision making, 
but very separate from his policymaking at the same time. On one occasion, he declared, 
“I try to utilize my own religious beliefs as a constant guide in making decisions as a 
                                                 
1 James M. Wall, “Words of Faith from Jimmy Carter,” Christian Century, January 17, 1979, 38. 
 
2 As cited in Howard Norton and Bob Slosser, The Miracle of Jimmy Carter (Plainfield: Logos 
Internaitonal, 1976), 11. 
 
3 Dan Ariail and Cheryl Heckler-Feltz, The Carpenter’s Apprentice: The Spiritual Biography of Jimmy 
Carter (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 46. 
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private or public citizen.”4 Later, he recalled how much his faith sustained him during his 
time in office, “I prayed more during those four years than at any other time in my life, 
just asking for God’s guidance in making the right decisions on behalf of the American 
people.”5  
Many others recognized the depth of Carter’s religious convictions and how they 
influenced his political outlook. Pope John Paul II declared, “You know, after a couple of 
hours with President Carter I had the feeling that two religious leaders were conversing.”6 
Press Secretary Jody Powell recollected, “I think almost everything he did was in a major 
way affected by his religious faith, because I think it is such an integral part of who he is 
and his view of life.”7 
During his presidency, Carter often invoked his own religious values to find areas 
for compromise among people of faith. Sometimes these expressions of faith succeeded 
in achieving their goals, such as finding a common ground for peace between Israel and 
Egypt. However, on other occasions, Carter’s use of religious language and symbolism 
backfired. When Carter used such language, he opened himself up to considerable 
criticism from not only the secular community, but also religious nationalists who had 
more rigid or literal understandings of doctrine than he did. Carter’s conflict with the 
Christian Right exemplified this problem.  
                                                 
4 As cited in Peter Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-Presidency 
(New York: Scribner, 1997), 178-179. 
 
5 Jimmy Carter, Living Faith, (New York: Times Books, 1996), 97. 
 
6 As cited in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-
1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1983), 27. 
 
7 Richard G. Hutcheson Jr., God in the White House: How Religion Has Changed the Modern Presidency 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co, 1988), 115-116. 
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Carter’s success in negotiating the Camp David Accords and selectively using 
religious rhetoric to achieve his goals raised expectations among many people about how 
the president would later react to crises with religious overtones. On several occasions, 
some world leaders and administration officials shared the pope’s perception of Carter as 
a religious leader rather than just a political leader. Thus, they overestimated his ability to 
reach religious audiences, as when one advisor recommended that Carter plead with 
Ayatollah Khomeini to release the American hostages held in Iran on religious grounds. 
Some of Carter’s staff even miscalculated how well he understood the emergence of the 
global religious nationalist phenomenon, assuming Carter’s personal devotion to 
Christianity could help him understand Islamic revivalist movements. 
The impact of Carter’s religion on his foreign policymaking often seemed subtle 
because of his diligence in guarding the line of separation between church and state. 
Religious scholar Richard Hutcheson wryly observed, “A day in the Carter Oval Office in 
no way resembled a prayer meeting.”8 He further explained: “Carter did not govern by 
revelation. He did not govern by seeking out appropriate passages in the Bible to cite as 
proof texts. He did not govern on the basis of authoritative rulings by the church—
Southern Baptist or any other church.”9 
 This work will address three interrelated questions about Carter and how his faith 
affected policymaking in situations involving religious nationalism. This study is 
primarily concerned with foreign policy because as political scientist Gary Scott Smith 
explained, “The philosophical commitments of a president can be seen most clearly in his 
                                                 
8 Hutcheson, God in the White House, 134. 
 
9 Hutcheson, God in the White House, 117-118. 
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foreign policy because it involves fewer constraints and greater latitude than domestic 
matters.”10 
First, how did Carter’s religious values influence his decision-making and rhetoric 
in foreign policy toward religious nationalists, both during and after his presidency? 
Carter’s decision-making calculus included considerations of elements such as national 
security, geopolitical strategy, economics, and domestic politics, so religion alone never 
drove any decision. Thus, the more important question is how and to what extent did 
Carter’s religious convictions affect policymaking? 
Second, how did Carter’s advisors’ understanding of the president’s faith affect 
their policy recommendations? Although presidents face fewer constraints in making 
foreign policy than in domestic policy, a wide range of regional experts, bureaucrats, 
diplomats, military officers, businessmen, and other interest groups shape the making of 
foreign policy. For instance, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, an anti-
Soviet hawk and international relations scholar who privileged geopolitical strategy over 
other concerns, possessed a significant amount of influence over Carter’s foreign policy 
thinking, especially by the end of his term. Thus, an individual president’s religious 
convictions or philosophical commitments would not be entirely unfiltered by other 
actors.  
Finally, what were the consequences of Carter invoking his faith or others 
understanding Carter’s actions in religious terms in conflicts with religious nationalist 
implications? Invoking religion can complicate already complex situations (such as 
                                                 
10 Gary Scott Smith, Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington to George W. Bush (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 315. 
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Middle East peace talks) or escalate conflicts between secular groups and religious 
groups (such as the evolution of the Afghan mujahidin). 
Sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer introduced the concept of religious nationalism 
to explain many of the conflicts in the post-Cold War world. He argued that the term 
“fundamentalism” was too imprecise because it was not cross-cultural enough due to its 
roots in conservative Protestantism and because it typically referred to religious 
movements not motivated by political conditions. Instead, Juergensmeyer offered the 
term “religious nationalism” as a substitute for fundamentalism because it fit the more 
explicitly political religious movements he studied. 
 According to Juergensmeyer, religious nationalists emerged in the late 20th 
century due to their dissatisfaction with the promises of progress through secular 
modernization, best exemplified by Western capitalism and Soviet communism. Rather 
than supporting a morally bankrupt secular state, religious nationalists looked to faith as 
the foundation of their nationalist feelings because the timeline for progress became 
eternal rather than temporal and earthly setbacks became just part of a larger context of 
cosmic warfare. 
 Despite their frustration with secular nationalism, Juergensmeyer explained that 
religious nationalists still embraced the modern structures of the state, but altered the 
basis of its existence. Rather than the state deriving its power from social contract theory, 
religious nationalists framed the origins of the power of the state in terms of God’s will.11 
                                                 
11 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), 4-8. For a broad overview of the arguments over defining 
nationalism, see Jonathan Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006) and Umut Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, second edition 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). For specific arguments about the varying origins of nationalism, 
6 
Carter faced a host of situations involving religious nationalist movements including the 
religious parties of the Likud coalition in Israel, Khomeini’s Islamic Republic in Iran, the 
Islamist fighters of the Afghan mujahidin, the Christian Right movement in the United 
States, and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. 
 Although sociologists and political scientists had studied the impact of religion on 
international relations and social movements for some time, the consideration of religion 
as a key variable in the history of American foreign relations only recently emerged.12 
Historian Andrew Preston speculated diplomatic historians underplayed religion until 
very recently because they feared the partisan and sectarian implications of discussing 
religion and questioned the methodological usefulness of assigning religion a role of 
causation in foreign policy decision making.13 Historian Leo Ribuffo echoed concerns of 
                                                                                                                                                 
see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1983) pointed to print culture as the 
source of nationalism; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) 
defined the transition to industrial society as the cause of nationalism; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic 
Origins of Nations (Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1986) identified historic ethnic communities as the 
root of nationalism. For discussions of the political implications of religious fundamentalist or revivalist 
movements, see Reza Aslan, Beyond Fundamentalism: Confronting Religious Extemism in the Age of 
Globalization (New York: Random House, 2010); N.J. Demerath III, Crossing the Gods: World Religions 
and Worldly Politics (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003); Mark Juergensmeyer, Global 
Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to al Qaeda (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008); Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, 
Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1994); Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); and Malise Ruthven, Fundamentalism: The Search 
for Meaning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
12 See Andrew Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and US-South Asian Relations, 1947-
1954,” Diplomatic History 24:4 (Fall 2000): 593-613. Rotter’s article was the basis for a series of responses 
about the use of religion as an analytical tool in diplomatic history, ranging from the pessimistic, Robert 
Buzzanco, “Commentary: Where’s the Beef? Culture without Power in the Study of US Foreign 
Relations,” Diplomatic History 24:4 (Fall 2000): 623-632 and Patricia R. Hill, “Commentary: Religion as a 
Category of Diplomatic Analysis,” Diplomatic History 24:4 (Fall 2000): 633-640 to the more optimistic, 
Robert Dean, “Commentary: Tradition, Cause and Effect, and the Cultural History of International 
Relations,” Diplomatic History 24:4 (Fall 2000): 615-622. 
 
13 See Andrew Preston, “Bridging the Gap between the Sacred and the Secular in the History of American 
Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 30:5 (November 2006): 783-812. 
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the latter sentiment, “although religious interest groups at home and religious issues 
abroad have affected foreign policy, no major diplomatic decision has turned on religious 
issues alone.”14 However, since 2000, historians of American foreign relations have 
increasingly examined religion in their work on a wide range of topics and eras as 
cultural explorations of foreign relations focused on race and gender gained more 
prominence in the field.15 
 Even as scholarly output linking religion with American diplomatic history 
increased, none of that work focused on Carter’s presidency, a curious development 
given Carter’s deep Christian faith. However, students in other disciplines had devoted 
some attention to the topic. In the mid-1980s, a pair of theology graduate students at 
Baptist seminaries wrote dissertations using Carter’s public speeches to demonstrate the 
                                                 
14 Leo P. Ribuffo, “Religion in the History of US Foreign Policy,” in The Influence of Faith: Religious 
Groups and US Foreign Policy, ed. Elliott Abrams (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2001), 
21. 
 
15 Works exemplifying this literature incorporating religion into the history of American foreign relations 
include Andrew Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India 1947-1964 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2000); Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Religion, Race, and US 
Intervention in Southeast Asia 1950-1957 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Matthew F. Jacobs, 
“The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War,” 
Diplomatic History 30:4 (September 2006): 705-739; Angela Lahr, Millennial Dreams and Apocalyptic 
Nightmares: The Cold War Origins of Political Evangelicalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007); David Zietsma, “‘Sin Has No History’: Religion, National Identity, and US Intervention, 1937-
1941,” Diplomatic History 31:3 (June 2007): 531-565; Malcolm D. Magee, What the World Should Be: 
Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008); 
William Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008); Paul Chamberlin, “A World Restored: Religion, Counterrevolution, 
and the Search for Order in the Middle East,” Diplomatic History 32:3 (June 2008): 441-469; Mark 
Edwards, “‘God Has Chosen Us’: Re-Membering Christian Realism, Rescuing Christendom, and the 
Contest of Responsibilities during the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 33:1 (January 2009): 67-94; Andrew 
Preston, “The Politics of Realism and Religion: Christian Responses to Bush’s New World Order,” 
Diplomatic History 34:1 (January 2010): 95-118; Milan Babik, “George D. Herron and the Eschatological 
Foundations of Woodrow Wilson’s Foreign Policy, 1917-1919,” Diplomatic History 35:5 (November 
2011): 837-857; and Jonathan P. Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s Religious Battle 
against Communism in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). For a synthetic 
work examining religion across the entirety of American diplomatic history, see Andrew Preston, Sword of 
the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). 
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relationship between his religious rhetoric and his accomplishments such as his human 
rights policy, the Panama Canal Treaties, and the Camp David Accords.16 More recently, 
D. Jason Berggren, a political science graduate student, proposed Carter demonstrated an 
“evangelical style” of presidential leadership in his foreign policy, especially toward the 
Middle East.17 
 Since the Carter administration was relatively recent history and Carter continued 
to be active as a former president, the larger body of scholarship on Carter’s foreign 
policy remained in flux. Gaddis Smith wrote one of the earliest studies of the foreign 
policy of the Carter administration, a balanced assessment that placed Carter in a 
Wilsonian framework. Smith’s book was the authoritative work on Carter’s foreign 
policy for a long time because it treated the subject in a more evenhanded manner 
compared to more critical accounts written by neoconservative scholars. Scholars such as 
Joshua Muravchik and Donald Spencer criticized Carter on issues such as his human 
rights policy, claiming it directly contributed to the fall of American-friendly 
dictatorships in Iran and Nicaragua. However, Smith defended Carter’s foreign policy as 
                                                 
16 Michael Leroy Allen, “The Human Rights Policy of Jimmy Carter: Foundations for Understanding” 
(PhD dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1984); Clyde DeLoach, “Jimmy Carter: The 
Effect of Personal Religious Beliefs on His Presidency and Their Relationship to the Christian Realism of 
Reinhold Niebuhr” (PhD dissertation, Baylor University, 1985). 
 
17 D. Jason Berggren, “I Had a Different Way of Governing: The Evangelical Presidential Style of Jimmy 
Carter and His Mission for Middle East Peace,” (PhD dissertation, Florida International University, 2007). 
See also D. Jason Berggren and Nicol C. Rae, “Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, 
and an Evangelical Presidential Style,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36:4 (December 2006): 606-632 and 
D. Jason Berggren, “I Had a Different Way of Governing: The Living Faith of President Carter,” Journal of 
Church and State 47:1 (2005): 43-61. 
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a fresh break from the typical Cold War mindset, but concluded the United States was not 
ready for such a drastic philosophical change in foreign policy.18  
 The opening of archival materials at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in 
Atlanta led to a wave of studies primarily focused on Carter’s management style and the 
bureaucratic politics in making American foreign policy. Many of these scholars argued 
that on the one hand, Carter was a micromanager and on the other hand, he permitted too 
much bureaucratic fighting with his “spokes of a wheel” management style, especially 
between Brzezinski and Vance.19 However, a few revisionist scholars working with the 
same archival materials pointed to the benefits of Carter’s attention to detail such as his 
handling of the Camp David negotiations.20 
Carter’s career as an activist former president garnered scholarly interest because 
he expanded the possibilities of what former presidents could accomplish in their 
retirements. Many Carter biographers devoted portions of their books to Carter’s post-
presidential achievements or viewed Carter’s time in office through the lens of his post-
                                                 
18 See Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1986). Contemporaneous neoconservative accounts included Joshua Muravchik, 
The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy (Washington: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988); Donald Spencer, The Carter Implosion: Jimmy 
Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1988). 
 
19 See Burton Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter Jr, second edition 
(Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2006); Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy 
of the Carter Administration (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Jean Garrison, Games 
Advisors Play: Foreign Policy in the Nixon and Carter Administrations (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1999); Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the 
Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). For more on Carter’s 
leadership style, see Erwin C. Hargrove, Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the 
Public Good (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988). 
 
20 See John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (New York: Manchester University Press, 
1993) and Robert Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).  
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presidential accomplishments.21 As part of his prolific writing career and to follow up his 
presidential memoir Keeping Faith, Carter even wrote a post-presidential autobiography, 
largely focused on his work at the Carter Center.22 
 Douglas Brinkley set the standard in his work on Carter’s post-presidential years 
(1981-1996), arguing, “What Carter really wanted was to find some way to continue the 
unfinished business of his presidency.”23 Brinkley’s work on Carter will not likely be 
rivaled for some time because he spent a lot of time interviewing and traveling with 
Carter for the book and had access to Carter’s post-presidential papers (which are still 
unavailable to researchers at the time of this writing).24  
 This work not only adds to the growing literature on religion and American 
foreign relations, but also makes a unique contribution to the historiography of Carter’s 
foreign policy through its focus on religion. While the second chapter will explore the 
background of Carter’s faith, the rest of the chapters will highlight how Carter and his 
                                                 
21 Peter G. Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-Presidency, (New 
York: Scribner, 1997), 474-508; Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist, (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1996), 289-321; Julian E. Zelizer, Jimmy Carter, (New York: Times Books, 
2010), 129-150; Frye Gaillard, Prophet from Plains: Jimmy Carter and His Legacy, (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2007), 46-104; and Itai Nartzizenfield Sneh, The Future Almost Arrived: How Jimmy Carter 
Failed to Change US Foreign Policy, (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2008), 182-227. 
 
22 Jimmy Carter, Beyond the White House: Waging Peace, Fighting Disease, Building Hope, (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2007). 
 
23 Douglas Brinkley, The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter’s Journey Beyond the White House, (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1998), xvi; See also Brinkley’s SHAFR Bernath Lecture, “The Rising Stock of 
Jimmy Carter: The ‘Hands On’ Legacy of Our Thirty-Ninth President,” Diplomatic History 20:4 (Fall 
1996): 505-529.  
 
24 Marion Creekmore had similar advantages in his book about Carter’s negotiations with North Korea in 
1994 because he worked at the Carter Center as an advisor to the former president. See Marion Creekmore 
Jr, A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions, 
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2006). Researching and writing at about the same time as Brinkley, Rod 
Troester relied on publicly available documents from the Carter Center and newspaper accounts to craft his 
biography of Carter’s post-presidential years. See Rod Troester, Jimmy Carter as Peacemaker: A Post-
Presidential Biography, (Westport: Praeger, 1996). 
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advisors responded to conflicts with religious overtones, focusing on how much the 
president’s faith did or did not come into play and how perceptions of his religion shaped 
the course of events. 
 The third chapter will discuss how Carter’s faith-based interest in Israel as the 
land of the Bible drove his determination to secure peace between Israel and Egypt. 
During the extensive negotiations that culminated in the Camp David Accords and the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, Carter frequently invoked religious language to call the 
other leaders to a higher purpose and had intensive religious conversations with Israeli 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, both deeply 
committed to their respective faiths. 
 The fourth chapter will address how Carter and his advisors did not fully 
understand the religious character of the Islamic revolution in Iran because it was unique 
at that point in world history. Later, after radical Iranians students took a number of 
American diplomats hostage, Carter tried to resolve the crisis through a variety of 
religious pleas to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 
 The fifth chapter will consider Carter’s decision to authorize American support 
for Islamic mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion. The president and 
other administration officials, especially Brzezinski, underestimated the potential future 
threat posed by Islamism, preferring to prioritize the American-Soviet conflict over other 
regional developments. Carter’s support of the mujahidin followed past precedents of 
American support for Islamist forces opposing communist, socialist, and secular 
nationalist in the Middle East and Central Asia during the Cold War. 
12 
 The sixth chapter will explore the concurrent rise of the Christian Right in the 
United States and its campaign to defeat Carter in his bid for re-election in 1980. Rather 
than attacking Carter purely on domestic issues such as abortion, prayer in schools, and 
gay rights, the Christian Right criticized Carter for foreign policy stances such as arms 
limitation treaties and military spending as well as the global implications of Communist 
subversion through the weakened moral fiber of traditional American values. Although 
Carter himself was an evangelical, he did not comprehend how different his brand of 
evangelicalism was from that of the Christian Right. 
 The seventh chapter will describe Carter’s post-presidential involvement in the 
Middle East process and the controversies it created. The former president’s religious 
rhetoric frequently seemed to compromise his status as an impartial mediator, sometimes 
even causing accusations of anti-Semitism. 
 This examination of Carter, his faith, and the religiously-tinted conflicts he faced 
illustrates the benefits (the Camp David Accords) and limits (Iranian hostage crisis, the 
Christian Right) of foreign policy shaped by a president with strong public religious 
convictions as well as the advantages and pitfalls of scholars examining the impact of 
religion on decision making. It also illuminates how religious nationalism gradually 
replaced the American-Soviet ideological contest as the principal cause of conflict, 
especially after the end of the Cold War.  
13 
Chapter 2 
THE FAITH OF JIMMY CARTER: A BACKGROUND 
 Hendrik Hertzberg, one of President Jimmy Carter’s speechwriters, once mused 
about the president’s deep Christian convictions, “In the speech-writing office we used to 
say it was no coincidence that the man’s initials are ‘J.C.’”1 Hertzberg’s quip represented 
the intense interest that Carter’s religious beliefs generated because of the novelty of his 
“born-again” faith in the American political scene. Understanding the background of 
Carter’s faith and its historical context helps explain how he interacted with the various 
religious nationalist groups during and after his presidency.  
Many scholars and commentators have discussed Carter’s religion. Journalist 
Wesley Pippert, seeking to make sense of his faith, followed Carter after he secured a 
hold on the Democratic nomination, listening to his speeches and Sunday School classes 
until a year after the election. Based on his observations, Pippert explained that Carter’s 
underlying belief in the sinfulness and fallibility of humans and the possibility for 
redemption extended to nations as well, concluding “the core of his religious and 
personal faith seems to be the core of his political philosophy as well.”2 A Carter 
campaign volunteer concurred, saying that his policies represented “a fuller 
implementation of his religious beliefs, of doing what he believes as right to fulfill human 
needs.”3 
                                                 
1 As cited in Dan Ariail and Cheryl Heckler-Feltz, The Carpenter’s Apprentice: The Spiritual Biography of 
Jimmy Carter (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 35. 
 
2 Wesley G. Pippert, The Spiritual Journey of Jimmy Carter: In His Own Words (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co, 1978), 14-15. 
 
3 As cited in Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1996), 157. 
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Others commented on the historical context of Carter’s faith. Historian Leonard 
Sweet argued, “In historic perspective, Carter is a classic, pre-Civil War evangelical, and 
for him, the personal and social gospel are one and the same. Carter is cut from the same 
cloth as Charles G. Finney.”4 During the 1976 campaign, historian E. Brooks Holifield 
wrote an article for The New Republic describing the candidate’s faith, explaining, “as a 
religious man Carter embodies a form of Southern evangelicalism with roots in the 
Puritan era, an 18th-century variety of religious pluralism, and a sophisticated ‘Christian 
Realism.’” Despite the sometimes contradictory nature of these three elements, Holifield 
expressed hope that “such an internal system of checks and balances could turn out to be 
a presidential virtue,” especially in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate.5 
This background chapter will consider the different roots of Carter’s faith: 
southern evangelicalism, a firm commitment to the separation of church and state and the 
freedom of conscience, and a Christian realism influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr. In 
addition, it will explore the impact of the civil rights movement and the role of Israel in 
Carter’s religious background. Finally, it will conclude by briefly discussing the pre-1977 
trajectory of some evangelicals and fundamentalists who had seemingly similar beliefs as 
Carter. However, there were significant theological and political differences between 
them, so these evangelicals and fundamentalist later formed the Christian Right.  
Southern evangelicalism was the first major influence on Carter’s faith. Like 
many children of the rural South at that time, Carter attended an evangelical church and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Arial and Heckler-Feltz, The Carpenter’s Apprentice, 145. Charles Finney was a popular revivalist 
preacher during the Second Great Awakening who also supported the antislavery movement and greater 
participation among women in revival meetings. 
 
5 E. Brooks Holifield, “The Three Strands of Jimmy Carter’s Religion,” The New Republic, June 5, 1976. 
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had a gradual conversion experience typical of many children raised in church. His 
mother Lillian recalled that while “Jimmy was not religious when he was young, he took 
his role in the church seriously like everything else in his life.”6 
At age eleven, Carter accepted Jesus as his Savior at a revival service and was 
soon thereafter baptized at his home congregation, Plains Baptist Church. In retrospect, 
Carter did not consider his baptism as the point of his conversion, preferring to see his 
decision to follow Christ as an ongoing process. He later wrote: “Being born again didn’t 
happen to me when I was eleven. For me, it has been an evolutionary thing. Rather than a 
flash of light or a sudden vision of God speaking, it involved a series of steps that have 
brought me steadily closer to Christ.”7  
Carter’s parents raised him in the Southern Baptist tradition. His father was a 
staunch Baptist and his mother was a more theologically liberal Methodist (although both 
of Lillian’s parents converted to Methodism when they married because her father was a 
mainstream Baptist and her mother was a fundamentalist Baptist).8 However, Carter had 
a diverse denominational perspective because he, like most of the other families in Plains, 
attended the local Baptist and Methodist churches on alternating weekends because 
neither congregation had a full-time preacher.9  
Carter later commented on his experience attending both churches, noting there 
were “few detectable differences” between the Baptist and Methodist churches in Plains, 
                                                 
6 As cited in Peter Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-Presidency 
(New York: Scribner, 1997), 31. 
 
7 Jimmy Carter, Living Faith (New York: Times Books, 1996), 21-22. 
 
8 Bourne, Jimmy Carter, 17. Lillian also joined the Baptist church after marrying Earl. 
 
9 Carter, Living Faith, 195. 
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except for their method in selecting their preachers. He recalled, “the people of Plains 
seemed to prefer more moderate preaching, so we were not afflicted with the kind of 
harsh fire-and-brimstone sermons that we sometimes heard in other churches.”10 In fact, 
some of the preaching Carter heard as a boy seemed quite liberal compared to the 
contemporary theology of the Southern Baptist Convention. For example, Jesse Eugene 
Hall, the pastor at Plains Baptist for much of Carter’s teenage years, taught that Genesis 1 
did not necessarily imply a literal six, twenty-four hour day creation.11 
Church activities constituted the central feature of social life in Plains. During his 
boyhood, Carter participated in the local chapter of the Royal Ambassadors, the Southern 
Baptist version of the Boy Scouts, a group led by his father. During his teenage years, he 
and his siblings attended youth group events at the local Baptist and Methodist churches 
such as “prom parties” that encouraged closely chaperoned contact between boys and 
girls.12  
Later, during his time in the navy, Carter frequently presided over worship 
services on the submarines on which he served. Rather than attending the Episcopalian 
services offered at the Naval Academy, Carter often attended a nearby Baptist 
congregation where he taught a children’s Sunday School class.13 Although Carter 
enjoyed the many opportunities the navy offered, he felt that he and Rosalynn lacked the 
                                                 
10 Jimmy Carter, An Hour Before Daylight: Memoirs of a Rural Boyhood (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2001), 220. 
 
11 Leo P. Ribuffo, “God and Jimmy Carter” in Transforming Faith: The Sacred and Secular in Modern 
American History, ed. M.L. Bradbury and James B. Gilbert (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1989), 147. 
 
12 For more on Carter’s early spiritual development, see his spiritual autobiography, Jimmy Carter, Living 
Faith, especially chapters 1 and 2. 
 
13 Bourne, Jimmy Carter, 51. 
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sort of spiritual community they enjoyed in Plains. After returning for his father Earl’s 
funeral in 1953, the 28-year old Carter decided to leave the navy and return home to 
Plains. Carter felt that his father’s accomplishments in the small town proved that enough 
challenges existed there for him in the future.14  
Throughout his teenage and young adult years, Carter had doubts about his faith. 
The tragedy of his father’s death inspired Carter to think more deeply about religious 
questions, so he consulted the works of theologians such as Paul Tillich, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, Karl Barth, Martin Buber, and Hans Kung. He found Tillich’s work 
especially enlightening because in Carter’s words, Tillich argued “that doubt is an 
acceptable, even necessary aspect of faith—that faith implies a continuing search, not 
necessarily a final answer.”15 
Upon returning to Plains, Carter took over the family’s peanut warehouse 
business and served in many of the same community activities as his father whom he had 
idolized. At Plains Baptist Church, he taught the junior high boys’ Sunday school class, 
became the superintendent of the junior high department, helped build a youth camp for 
the Friendship Baptist Association, and even served as a deacon in the congregation 
despite his more liberal views on alcohol. Pastor Tommie Jones remembered Carter as 
“the best assistant I ever had.”16   
                                                 
14 Carter, Living Faith, 44-45. 
 
15 Carter, Living Faith, 24-25. 
 
16 Bourne, Jimmy Carter, 101. 
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After several years of becoming a prominent figure in the community, Carter ran 
for the Georgia state senate in 1962.17 Even at the earliest stages of his political career, 
Carter saw public office as a higher calling. After announcing his candidacy, a visiting 
pastor holding a revival meeting in Plains asked, “How can you, as a Christian, a deacon, 
and a Sunday school teacher, become involved in politics?” Carter quickly responded, “I 
will have 75,000 people in my senate district. How would you like to have a congregation 
that big?”18 Longtime friend and biographer Peter Bourne commented on Carter’s 
comparison, “As a member of the Baptist faith in which preachers are not appointed by a 
church hierarchy, but elected by the congregation they serve, the analogy seemed to 
[Carter] quite apt.”19 
Extremely ambitious, Carter decided shortly after entering the state senate to run 
for governor in 1966 as the moderate in a three-way Democratic primary against the 
relatively liberal former governor Ellis Arnall and the archsegregationist Lester Maddox 
who displayed an ax handle in his restaurant as a warning to potential black customers to 
stay out. In the initial primary, Carter placed third, but his candidacy weakened Arnall 
enough that Maddox ultimately won the nomination and the general election. He later 
recalled, “I could not believe that God would let [Maddox] beat me and become the 
governor of our state.”20 
                                                 
17 For more on his 1962 state senate race, see Jimmy Carter, Turning Point: A Candidate, A State, and A 
Nation Come of Age (New York: Times Books, 1992). 
 
18 Carter, Living Faith, 9. 
 
19 Bourne, Jimmy Carter, 113. 
 
20 Carter, Living Faith, 202. 
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Following his defeat in the gubernatorial election, Carter felt depressed because 
he was unsure how God’s providence was working in his electoral defeat to a 
segregationist like Maddox. In the midst of his angst over losing, Carter had a “born-
again” experience. Despite being baptized at age eleven, this moment marked a turning 
point in Carter’s commitment to his faith. He realized he had reached out to 300,000 
people across the state in his bid for governor, but he had only visited 140 families to 
provide his Christian witness since returning to Plains. About that same time, his sister 
Ruth Carter Stapleton, a charismatic pastor, came to Plains to encourage her brother. On 
a walk in the woods, they discussed his spiritual anguish and as a result of that 
conversation, he made a decision to commit his life fully to Christ and to keep his 
political ambitions secondary to God.21  
To demonstrate his newfound commitment to his faith, Carter went on a series of 
short-term mission trips to evangelize in poor communities in Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts. Following these trips, Carter later admitted,  
I began to realize that when I envisioned a supreme being, he was more 
like Muhammad, the founder of Islam, a patently successful man in 
earthly terms: a powerful warrior, political leader, founder of a great 
institutional church. This was in many ways the opposite of the Jesus of 
the Gospels, or the image of the “suffering servant” in Isaiah, whom 
Christians identify with Christ.22 
 
Carter had difficulty reconciling his ambitions for earthly success in politics and business 
with his realization that Jesus taught his followers to reject these worldly standards of 
                                                 
21 Ariail and Heckler-Feltz, The Carpenter’s Apprentice, 47-48. 
 
22 Carter, Living Faith, 226. 
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achievement. Thus, Carter poured himself into a number of Christian charitable and 
evangelistic works to compensate for his considerable secular aspirations. 
Years later, in 1976, during the North Carolina primary, Carter described his 
born-again experience, offering a disclaimer, “It was not a profound stroke, a miracle, a 
voice of God from heaven. It was not anything of that kind. It wasn’t anything 
mysterious. It was the same kind of experience that many who become Christians in a 
deeply personal way and it has given me a deep feeling of equanimity and peace.”23 After 
his testimony, a television news anchor explained, “incidentally, we’ve checked this out. 
Being ‘born again’ is not a bizarre experience or the voice of God from the mountaintop. 
It’s a fairly common experience known to millions of Americans—particularly if you’re 
Baptist.”24 
Carter’s faith quickly became a popular topic of conversation around the country 
during the election cycle. In multiple interviews, Carter described his conversion 
experience and explained he never prayed to God for victory.25 He highlighted his faith 
as an asset as president because it provided a “basis for calmness in the face of adversity 
or in the face of national crises.”26 
To reassure voters who found his born-again faith peculiar, Carter frequently 
emphasized his strong belief in the separation of church and state. Furthermore, he often 
                                                 
23 Ariail and Heckler-Feltz, The Carpenter’s Apprentice, 47. 
 
24 Pippert, The Spiritual Journey of Jimmy Carter, 2. 
 
25 The Presidential Campaign 1976, Volume One, Part One (Washington DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1978), 178; The Presidential Campaign 1976, Volume One, Part Two (Washington DC: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1978), 974. 
 
26 The Presidential Campaign 1976, Volume One, Part Two, 980. 
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highlighted the importance of the freedom of conscience to audiences wary of his faith 
while relating freedom of conscience to the Christian doctrine of the priesthood of all 
believers in church settings. 
Carter’s strong beliefs about the separation of church and state had deep roots in 
his family because his father faced those dilemmas as he served in the Georgia state 
legislature. He later reflected, “I inherited my own support for the separation of church 
and state from my father, I guess, but I came to realize while holding public office how 
ambiguous is the line between the secular and the sacred.”27 Carter’s public religiosity 
troubled some of the secular organizations hesitant to work with someone so open about 
his personal faith while his commitment to separation of church and state upset religious 
groups more interested in a role in politics. 
The historic Baptist commitment to the separation of church and state also heavily 
shaped Carter’s beliefs on the matter. In interviews and Sunday school classes, he 
frequently argued that the Baptist church originated in a desire to keep church and state 
separate, citing the example of Roger Williams and the founding of the colony of Rhode 
Island.28 As Michael Hammond, a former University of Arkansas doctoral student, 
perceptively observed, “When [Carter] discussed the separation of church and state, it 
was a familiar doctrine of his church. He was speaking of it not as a constitutional 
scholar, but as a Baptist layman committed to a principle.”29  
                                                 
27 Carter, Living Faith, 126-127. 
 
28 Robert Scheer, “The Playboy Interview: Jimmy Carter,” Playboy, November 1976; Pippert, The Spiritual 
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Carter’s commitment to the separation of church and state was apparent from the 
beginnings of his political career. During his time in the Georgia state senate, he acted 
proposed to add the freedom of religion language of the First Amendment to the state 
constitution because he felt the existing language required “that God be worshipped.”30 
In an interview with Bill Moyers, Carter told the 1962 story how he viewed his 
senate district as a congregation of 75,000 people, but then he declared, “I don’t look on 
the Presidency as a pastorate…I don’t look on it with religious connotations,” hoping to 
alleviate concerns among Americans suspicious of his evangelical faith.31  
During his presidency, in response to a question about whether he should repent 
for the sins of the United States as its president, Carter answered, “I don’t consider 
myself to be the spiritual leader of this country. But I am a political leader. I have a right, 
I think, and a duty, to be frank with the American people about my own belief; and I am 
not a priest nor a bishop, nor someone who fills a religious pulpit and is authorized nor 
asked to repent for the whole country.”32 
In addition to his firm convictions about the separation of church and state, Carter 
was equally committed to the longtime Baptist principle of freedom from creeds and the 
priesthood of all believers. During his presidency, in a Sunday school class at First 
Baptist Church in Washington, Carter taught that the Baptist church provided “a way to 
come together to exchange our personal, individualistic ideas about Christ and our 
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31 The Presidential Campaign 1976, Volume One, Part One, 179. 
 
32 As cited in Pippert, The Spiritual Journey of Jimmy Carter, 120-121. 
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relationship with Him.”33 Carter’s interpretation of the priesthood of all believers enabled 
him to espouse doctrinal beliefs outside of mainstream Baptist thinking. However, it set 
him up for later conflict with evangelical voters who believed they shared similar 
positions on specific theological matters with the president simply because of his 
Southern Baptist affiliation. 
Although Carter held more traditional evangelical positions on issues such as the 
virgin birth, Carter did not believe in the inerrancy or infallibility of Scripture. In a March 
1976 interview, John Hart of NBC News asked Carter about Pauline writings about the 
role of women in church and in the family. Carter replied, “I don’t agree with that 
concept of the husband’s being dominant over the wives. Although I hate to admit there’s 
part of the Bible with which I disagree, that’s a passage I’ve never been able to accept 
even though I’ve tried. My wife doesn’t accept it either.”34 Just a few weeks before the 
election, a group of reporters asked Carter about the creation story in between Sunday 
school and the worship service at Plains Baptist Church. Carter responded that he did not 
believe in a literal, seven 24-hour day creation, adding, “part of the Bible obviously was 
written in allegories.”35  
After his presidency, Carter was more blunt about his view on inspiration and the 
Bible in a Sunday school class at Maranatha Baptist Church in Plains. He taught,  
At the same time, it’s true that the Bible, though inspired by God, was 
written by fallible human beings who shared the knowledge and beliefs of 
their times. The science and astronomy of the Bible are inaccurate by 
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modern standards (speaking of the earth’s “four corners,” for example), 
and biblical writers in New Testament times still wrote as if slavery were a 
legitimate social institution that should not be questioned. So it is 
appropriate to consider the times in which the Bible was written when 
interpreting the meaning of Scripture and its message for us today.36 
 
Clearly, Carter was no fundamentalist, either before or after his presidency. Scholar 
Richard Hutcheson observed, “Carter believes strongly in the authority of Scripture, but 
without legalistic literalism of interpretation.”37 Carter preferred a Christocentric 
hermeneutic, interpreting scripture “by the words and actions of Jesus Christ.”38 
However, Carter did not entirely dismiss the supernatural or miraculous like some 
mainline Protestants, affirming his belief in the historicity of God creating Eve from 
Adam’s rib and the resurrection of Lazarus.39 Nevertheless, in the end, his more liberal 
doctrinal beliefs made him an easier target for the Christian Right in the 1980 election. 
Despite his experience as president, his study of the world’s foremost theologians, 
and his sometimes unorthodox beliefs, Carter believed he “never deviate[d] in any 
appreciable way from expressing the traditional Christian beliefs that I inherited from my 
father.”40 However, by 2000, he and Rosalynn decided to sever their ties to the 
increasingly fundamentalist Southern Baptist Convention due to its increasing emphasis 
on all-male leadership in the church and its movement away from the separation of 
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church and state. Still, they remained members of Maranatha Baptist Church in Plains.41 
To put the matter in Reaganesque terms, Carter believed he did not leave the Baptist 
church, the Baptist church left him. 
 To balance his evangelicalism and his strong belief in religious pluralism in his 
political decision-making, Carter made use of Christian realist theology. Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s writings inspired this pillar of Carter’s faith, especially in how Carter applied 
his faith in politics. Niebuhr wrote in the context of the Depression, World War II, and 
the onset of the Cold War, so his writings frequently warned readers of the brokenness of 
the world, especially in light of utopian ideas proposed by liberal Christians and 
secularists. Niebuhr’s most important concept to Carter was that while individuals could 
aspire to the biblical ideal of agape love, governments could only hope to provide justice 
because they inherently always pursued self-preservation.42 Carter later explained, “A 
nation cannot demonstrate sacrificial love. When I was president of the United States…I 
did not have the right to sacrifice the interests of American citizens for others.”43 
After his loss in the 1966 gubernatorial election, Carter read an edited collection, 
Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, which described Niebuhr’s thinking on the limits of the 
state’s ability to rectify the sinfulness of humanity through excerpts from his voluminous 
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writings. The book quickly became Carter’s “political bible” and the launching point for 
further exploration in Niebuhr’s theology.44 Over the next ten years, Carter read other 
works, including Niebuhr’s most famous book, Moral Man and Immoral Society, and 
June Bingham’s biography, Courage to Change.45 In fact, several of Niebuhr’s works 
appeared on the small bookshelf in Carter’s private study adjacent to the Oval Office.46 
Carter peppered many of his speeches, writings, and Sunday school classes with 
quotations from Niebuhr. In fact, his admonition, “The sad duty of politics is to establish 
justice in a sinful world,” appeared alongside lyrics from the musician Bob Dylan and the 
poet Dylan Thomas on the epigraph page of Carter’s campaign autobiography.47 In 
another instance, Carter quoted Niebuhr in his acceptance speech at the Democratic 
National Convention, “I have spoken a lot of times about love. But love must be 
aggressively translated into simple justice.”48 A Carter aide complimented him on the 
line. Carter quickly responded, “It ought to be. It’s Niebuhr.”49 
Despite his great affinity for Niebuhr, Carter downplayed his knowledge, telling 
audiences, “I don’t claim to be any expert on theology—not at all” or describing his use 
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of Niebuhr as “strictly amateurish.” Future White House religious liaison Robert Maddox 
recounted that Carter’s knowledge of Niebuhr was “not scholarly because he never 
pretended to be a scholar. But far, far more than the average layman.”50 Bourne rebutted 
critics claiming Carter’s knowledge of Niebuhr was superficial, explaining that Carter 
“was not looking to replicate the views of Niebuhr, but rather to take from them whatever 
would help him to achieve his own perfectibility as a Christian…and make him a better, 
more comfortable Christian in the political arena.”51 
However, Carter was more optimistic about the goodness of humanity than 
Niebuhr because he experienced the positive changes in the South during the Civil Rights 
Era. Carter never actively participated himself, but frequently took stands against 
discrimination in his local community. Journalist Frye Gaillard explained, “[Carter] was 
not a crusader in the mold of Clarence Jordan [founder of the interracial Koinonia Farms 
cooperative near Carter’s home in Plains]. He was more a real-life Atticus Finch—a 
prominent and respected citizen of his community who seldom went out of his way to 
cause a stir. But when events conspired to thrust him into controversy, he didn’t duck.”52 
Carter’s attitudes toward civil rights, and later human rights, had roots in his 
childhood. The most important source was his mother’s defiance of Jim Crow customs of 
the day.53 Lillian derived her liberal approach to religion and race relations from her 
father, Jim Jack Gordy, a local postmaster who frequently invited blacks to eat with him 
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in the post office’s back room.54 He later claimed that his mother and her unorthodox 
cultural and religious beliefs was the most important factor in the development of his 
personal Christian convictions.55 Even though Carter’s father Earl outwardly supported 
segregation, he secretly and generously supported many black families in the area.56 
Despite claiming Plains as his hometown, Carter grew up in the nearby small 
community of Archery, a predominantly black hamlet. He fondly remembered spending 
most of his boyhood playing with neighboring black children and not with other white 
children outside of school and church until his teenage years.57 At church, Carter rarely 
heard sermons giving God’s sanction to segregation. In fact, Pastor Jesse Eugene Hall’s 
preaching “exerted a moderating influence on racial attitudes” in the community.58 
Several examples existed of Carter’s principled stands against discrimination. 
Shortly after returning to Plains, his neighbors pressured him to join the local chapter of 
the White Citizens’ Council, but he politely declined. Not satisfied, a group of Carter’s 
best customers at the warehouse offered to pay his membership dues, but Carter believed, 
“It was not the payment of dues that was a problem; even with their money, I could not 
contribute to an organization in which I did not believe.” Carter’s refusal to join caused 
his family some financial hardship because many members of the Council boycotted his 
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business.59 Despite the boycott, he did business with Clarence Jordan without vocally 
supporting his interracial Koinonia Farms enterprise.60 
As a part of the Sumter County school board, Carter vocally supported the plan to 
consolidate the county’s smaller high schools (including the black one) into a larger one 
to offer more educational opportunities for all students.61 In 1965, Carter and his family 
were the only ones, aside from a person with a hearing problem, who voted to welcome 
black worshippers at Plains Baptist Church.62 However, the Carter family did not suffer 
as much as others who did not conform to local customs of race relations might have. 
Carter surmised, “In a way, our approach to the race issue was also excused because of 
my mother’s acknowledged ‘eccentricity’ and because we were known to have spent a 
number of years in the navy.”63 
Carter’s religious convictions and his experience growing up and living in the Jim 
Crow South later shaped one of the cornerstones of his presidency: his emphasis on 
human rights. Robert Maddox explained, “[Carter’s] religion shaped his human rights 
policies…[which] grew out of his own faith, his regard for human beings, out of his years 
of involvement in the civil rights struggle in Georgia.”64 Carter attributed his focus on 
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human rights “to the laws and the prophets of the Judeo-Christian traditions.”65 He later 
wrote, “As president, I tried to make human rights a core value of my administration. 
This emphasis was derived from my experience growing up in the South, and from the 
guilt I shared with others over the way we deprived our black neighbors of their human 
rights.”66  
Carter’s strong religious convictions about human rights, social justice, and 
equality in the Bible shaped his outlook toward Israel very differently from many 
evangelical and fundamentalist Christians who favored American policies supporting 
Israel based on what they interpreted as biblical commands. Some believed in a 
dispensationalist premillennial reading of scriptures where the second coming of Christ 
would occur after the Jews returned to their original homeland and a cataclysmic war 
erupted. Although Carter referred to the modern state of Israel as the “fulfillment of 
biblical prophecy” during the presidential campaign, he was not a proponent of 
dispensational premillennialism.67 Historian Leo Ribuffo speculated that Carter read 
Revelation in a post-millennial fashion, based on a Sunday School lesson he taught 
during the 1976 campaign on the second coming of Christ. Carter explained, “Jesus 
stands at the door and knocks…but he can’t break down the door. He doesn’t want to. It 
must be opened by our understanding.”68 
                                                 
65 Ariail and Heckler-Feltz, The Carpenter’s Apprentice, 154-155. 
 
66 Carter, Living Faith, 123-124. 
 
67 As cited in Paul Charles Merkley, American Presidents, Religion, and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus, 
(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 82. 
 
68 Ribuffo, “God and Jimmy Carter,” 148. 
 
31 
During his childhood, he had little exposure to premillennial thought, as the 
pastors at Plains Baptist Church typically did not teach dispensational doctrine, except for 
a few years when fundamentalist Royall Callaway served as the minister.69 Carter seemed 
skeptical of attaching prophetic significance to the current events, citing Jesus’ 
admonition that no one will know the hour or day of the second coming.70 In fact, he later 
condemned the “bizarre” influence of Christian Zionists on American foreign policy 
toward Israel.71  
On the other hand, some evangelicals justified their unconditional support for 
Israel by pointing to Genesis 12:3 where God tells Abraham, “I will bless those who bless 
you [the Jews]. And I will curse him who curses you” as a biblical command to support 
the state of Israel and the Jewish people in order to receive God’s favor.72 However, 
Carter’s affinity for Israel resulted from his appreciation of the land and the people that 
appeared throughout the history of the Bible rather than an interpretation of scripture 
commanding Christian support of the nation of Israel. 
 A 1973 trip to Israel with his wife Rosalynn marked one of Governor Carter’s few 
forays into the international arena to bolster his experience in foreign affairs, but his 
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religious background played an important role in shaping his perception of his trip. Carter 
recalled that, “this visit to the Holy Land made a lasting impression on me” due to his 
deep Christian faith and his experience of finally seeing the places he had long taught 
about in Sunday school classes. He also remarked, “like almost all other American 
Christians, I believed that Jewish survivors of the Holocaust deserved their own nation 
and had the right to live peacefully with their neighbors.” Furthermore, he said, “This 
homeland for the Jews was compatible with the teachings of the Bible.”73 
 In preparation for the trip, Carter extensively reviewed maps comparing ancient 
and modern Israel. He recollected, “I was torn between the pleasure of visiting the 
Christian holy places I had longed to see since I was a child and the knowledge that I 
should be preparing for a future career [in national politics].”74 During his trip, Carter 
made time for both pursuits as he met with American archaeologists doing an excavation 
in Jerusalem, visited the Israeli Holocaust museum Yad Vashem, presented Hebrew 
Bibles to graduates at an Israeli military base, hiked up Mount Carmel to see the place of 
the biblical contest between Elijah and the prophets of Baal, and even took a swim in the 
Jordan River near where he believed John the Baptist had baptized Jesus.75 
 During their trip, he and Rosalynn wanted to visit the synagogue at Ayelet 
Hashahar and attend the worship service on the Sabbath Day. When they arrived, the 
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Carters expressed shock after seeing only two other worshippers at the synagogue.76 
Later on that same trip, during a visit with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Governor 
Carter expressed his concern over the lack of religious interest among the Jews at Ayelet 
Hashahar on the Sabbath day service. Meir, the secular Labor Party leader, laughed at 
Carter’s observation, but the lifetime Sunday school teacher reminded her that “during 
biblical times, the Israelites triumphed when they were close to God and were defeated 
when unfaithful.”77 Carter’s later recollections of this story haunted him after his 
presidency because Israelis pointed to this statement as proof of anti-Semitism in the 
controversy over Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. 
 While in Israel, Carter had only a few opportunities to observe the lives of 
Palestinians still present in Israel and in the territories conquered in the 1967 war. Based 
on his limited experience, he drew some historical comparisons between the Palestinian 
situation and past treatment of minority groups in the United States. For instance, he 
associated the situation of the Palestinian refugees to the Native Americans forcibly 
relocated on the Trail of Tears.78 NSC Middle East expert William Quandt also 
speculated that Carter “saw in the Palestinian question parallels with the situation of 
American blacks” because of his experience living in the Jim Crow South.79 However, 
after seeing the changes produced by the civil rights movement in the United States, 
Carter left Israel optimistic that its government would dismantle the limited number of 
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settlements in the occupied territories and continue protecting the rights of the 
Palestinians.80 
 Prior to becoming president, Carter had extremely limited foreign policy 
credentials because he had always been a state politician. However, his religious 
background helped shape what little he knew about the world upon entering national 
politics. For example, Carter recalled an early conversation he had about China, 
Sometimes my visitors were amused at the way my Deep South Baptist 
ideas crept into discussions. Once when we were discussing the Far East, I 
remarked that the people of our country had a deep and natural affection 
for the people of China. When most of the group laughed, I was perplexed 
and a little embarrassed. It took me a few moments to realize that not 
everyone had looked upon Christian missionaries in China as the ultimate 
heroes and had not, as youngsters, contributed a penny or a nickel each 
week, year after year, toward schools and hospitals for the little Chinese 
children.81 
 
 To learn about countries other than Israel and further burnish his foreign policy 
credentials for his impending presidential campaign, Carter joined the Trilateral 
Commission, an international affairs think tank. As part of the commission, Carter rubbed 
elbows with many luminaries in the political, academic, and business world and 
discussed US-Soviet competition, American relations with Western Europe and Japan, 
and global issues such as energy consumption and economic development. Carter 
intensely studied the commission’s briefing books, impressing many of the other 
members with how familiar he was with the issues as an obscure southern governor.82  
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At one Trilateral Commission meeting, Carter drew on his experience in Israel 
and suggested that the United States should actively pursue a peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East by becoming a more impartial mediator, a comment that caught the attention 
of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Trilateral Commission’s Executive Director and Carter’s 
future national security advisor. Brzezinski advised Carter’s campaign on foreign policy 
issues and educated him on many of the regional issues he would have to handle as 
president.83 While his participation in the Trilateral Commission equipped him for the 
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, his experience did not prepare him for the crises he would 
later face in Iran and Afghanistan, two seemingly stable situations in the mid-1970s. 
While Carter prepared to run for president, evangelical and fundamentalists who 
had beliefs similar to those of the Democratic nominee began to get excited about the 
prospect of a “born-again” president. However, aside from some limited advocacy on a 
few select issues such as support for Israel or school prayer, evangelical and 
fundamentalist Christians were not involved in national politics in an organized manner. 
Carter’s campaign increased awareness among these Christians of the potential influence 
they could wield as an electoral bloc, a power they would exercise through the various 
organizations of the Christian Right in the 1980 election after being so disappointed with 
the first “born-again” president.  
Despite the similarities between some elements of the Christian Right and Carter, 
they had considerably different experiences on matters of race and civil rights, 
contributing to their divergent political worldviews and conflicting positions on a host of 
domestic and foreign issues. Whereas Carter took stands against segregation in his 
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community on a number of occasions, future Christian Right leader Jerry Falwell 
condemned civil rights activists as communist agitators, criticizing civil rights leaders 
who also served as pastors for protesting against segregation rather than preaching the 
gospel.84 In fact, the various groups of the Christian Right did not formally organize until 
midway through Carter’s term. An IRS decision to strip the fundamentalist Bob Jones 
University of its tax-exempt status hastened the political mobilization of many 
evangelicals and fundamentalists fearful of churches or other parachurch organizations 
being denied tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory practices.85 Thus, issues of 
race and civil rights played a formative role in fostering the later conflicts between Carter 
and the Christian Right over SALT II, defense spending, and other foreign policy issues. 
While the different elements of Carter’s religious background framed his 
policymaking outlook, his regular devotional and spiritual practices also shaped his 
decision making. During his presidency, he continued his daily habit of reading one 
chapter of the Bible each day in Spanish to help him maintain his second language and 
focus more on the words which were so familiar to him in English. On his way to the 
Oval Office each morning, he recited Psalm 19:14 to center himself on God for the day. 
He also occasionally taught the couples’ Sunday school class at Washington’s First 
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Baptist Church.86 Carter also spent a considerable amount of time in prayer in the small 
study adjacent to the Oval Office. He later explained how he asked three questions when 
he prayed for God’s guidance during his time in office, “Are my goals appropriate? Am I 
doing the right thing, based on my personal moral code, my Christian faith, and the duties 
of my current position? Have I done my best, based on the alternatives open to me?”87 
 Carter’s faith clearly played an important role in his personal and political life. 
However, his strong convictions about the separation of church and state and his 
Christian realism balanced his ambitions to transform the world in the name of God. In 
the varied and complex religious conflicts he encountered along the way in Israel, Egypt, 
Iran, Afghanistan, and even in the United States, Carter never used his own religious 
background lightly in policymaking. 
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"SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES": JIMMY CARTER'S QUEST TO FIND MIDDLE 
EAST PEACE 
Throughout his 1976 presidential campaign, Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter 
frequently declared his spiritual attachment to Israel. In an interview with Liberty 
magazine on the eve of the 1976 election, Carter told the reporter, “as a Christian, who’s 
visited extensively through Israel, I think that, yes, it was a fulfillment of Biblical 
prophecy to have Israel established as a nation.”1 On another occasion, speaking at an 
Orthodox Jewish synagogue, Carter explained, “The land of Israel has always meant a 
great deal to me. As a boy I read of the prophets and martyrs in the Bible—the same 
Bible that we all study together…The survival of Israel is not just a political issue, it’s a 
moral imperative.”2  
One should partially attribute Carter’s greatest achievement in office, the Camp 
David Accords and the subsequent peace treaty he negotiated between Egypt and Israel, 
to his religiously inspired commitment to Israel and his broader hope for peace in the 
land of the Bible. Carter’s deep Christian faith informed much of his policymaking in the 
Middle East, from his tenacious desire to forge a peace agreement regardless of the 
political consequences, to his negotiating tactics with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.3  
                                                 
1 The Presidential Campaign 1976, Volume One, Part Two (Washington DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1978), 977. 
 
2 The Presidential Campaign, 1976, Volume One, Part One (Washington DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1978), 216-217. 
 
3 For more on US-Israeli relations and US policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict prior to Carter’s presidency, 
see Ronald Radosh and Allis Radosh, A Safe Haven: Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel (New 
39 
The Bible was never far from Carter’s mind when he spoke about Israel and the 
Middle East in negotiating sessions, foreign policy meetings, or public addresses. After 
leaving office, Carter wrote, “For me there is no way to approach or enter Israel without 
thinking first about the Bible and the history of the land and its people. The names and 
images have long been an integral part of my life as a Christian, but many of them took 
on a new and entirely different significance when I became President of the United 
States.”4 National Security Council Middle East expert William Quandt echoed, “the 
president’s religious orientation led him to a concern with the lands he had read so much 
about in the Bible.”5  
Carter had little personal experience of the Middle East and its peoples other than 
a 1973 trip to Israel. Future Carter Center director and historian Kenneth Stein described 
the impact visiting Israel had on Carter. “By visiting Israel, Carter aligned his deep 
biblical knowledge with the geographic reality he witnessed. His religious background 
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had given him a special feeling for the Holy Land and for the Jewish contribution to 
Christian tradition.”6  
The president noted his “affinity” for Israel on multiple occasions during his 
presidential campaign and his time in office, declaring that “Jews who had survived the 
Holocaust deserved their own nation,” Israel as a “homeland for the Jews” was 
“compatible with the teachings of the Bible, hence ordained by God,” and “these moral 
and religious beliefs made my commitment to the security of Israel unshakable.”7 At 
other times, Carter strongly asserted, “I have an absolute, total commitment as a human 
being, as an American, as a religious person to Israel. Israel is the fulfillment of biblical 
prophecy.”8  
However, Carter’s senior political advisor Hamilton Jordan told him that Israelis 
and American Jews had a “fear of this unknown Baptist named Jimmy Carter who has no 
public record on Israel to reassure them.”9 During the campaign, one Jewish official 
encapsulated this reticence to embrace Carter, “For over 2,000 years it has never been a 
good thing for Jews to have mystically religious Christians around—the Crusaders, the 
Spanish inquisitors are examples. Jews know Carter is no anti-Semite. He just makes 
some of us nervous.”10 
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Political scientist Paul Charles Merkley, a Jewish scholar, criticized Carter for 
assuming his Sunday School knowledge of Israel and its biblical history was all he 
needed to know about the modern Jewish state and its people. He contrasted the close 
relationship between Carter and Sadat with the friction between Carter and Begin, 
reasoning Sadat represented an exotic culture while Begin came from a society very 
familiar to Carter (or at least so he believed). Merkley mockingly declared, “Anyone who 
paused to put on a turban could command [Carter’s] respectful attention forever.”11 
Furthermore, Carter had little experience with American Jews at that point in his 
political career. His sister Gloria married a Jew, but he did not have many close Jewish 
social connections. Stuart Eizenstat, Carter’s domestic affairs advisor and an American 
Jew himself, concurred, “I wouldn’t say Carter felt uncomfortable in the Jewish crowds, 
but it clearly was not his element. After all, he was not a northern or northeastern 
politician who had grown up in a heavily Jewish population. Yes, he knew Jews in 
Atlanta, but they were not part of his circle.”12  
Carter’s lack of Washington experience prior to becoming president also meant 
that he lacked familiarity with the pro-Israel and American Jewish lobbies, political 
forces absent in Georgia state politics. In a memo to Carter, Jordan compared the 
administration’s lack of understanding of the American Jewish lobby to the campaign 
team’s failure to grasp the power of the American labor movement among Democrats.13 
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However, Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, 
explained that Carter’s unfamiliarity with the American Jewish lobby helped him see new 
opportunities and try fresh approaches in the Middle East.14 
Carter’s limited experience in the region rested entirely with Israel and its 
American Jewish supporters. He had practically no experience with Arabs outside of 
meeting an Arab man at a Florida racetrack.15 Carter himself admitted that upon entering 
office, “I had no strong feelings about the Arab countries. I had never visited one and 
knew no Arab leaders.”16 However, biographer Peter Bourne explained Carter “felt that 
because, unlike Israel, Arab leaders had little or no organized constituency in the United 
States to lobby their cause, it was incumbent on him to expose himself thoroughly to their 
point of view.”17 
Carter’s broader concern about human rights also reached to the Palestinians 
living in the Israeli-controlled West Bank, a situation he described as “contrary to the 
basic moral and ethical principles of both [Israel and the United States].”18 However, 
Carter did not recognize until later in his administration how much other Arab countries 
marginalized the Palestinians or how deeply the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
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opposed Israel’s existence. In his memoirs, he subtly summed up the situation, “The 
record of the Arab nations themselves toward the Palestinians left much to be desired.”19 
Despite his limited knowledge of the region and its players, Carter launched a 
self-described “vigorous” pursuit of a comprehensive settlement among all the parties, 
something that past presidents had decided was not worth the energy or political capital.20 
Stein remarked that Carter’s determination to achieve a peace agreement in the Middle 
East “was more than stubbornness; it was a combination of persistence mixed with what 
he determined to be the ‘right thing’ to do. Carter was guided by his own moral compass 
in deriving workable formulas for policy making.”21 
Carter’s advisors frequently counseled him to temper his expectations for success 
in achieving such a peace settlement, a situation that constantly frustrated a committed 
Carter.22 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance recalled, “Carter unflinchingly refused to take 
the easy course on politically sensitive foreign policy matters.”23 National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski remembered the tension in Carter between his religious 
attachment to Israel and his frustration with the Israelis in peace negotiations: 
Occasionally Carter would also say that he would be willing to lose the 
Presidency for the sake of genuine peace in the Middle East, and I think he 
was sincere. Perhaps most importantly, Carter’s feelings on Israel were 
always ambivalent. On the one hand, he felt that Israel was being 
                                                 
19 Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 36-38; Carter, Keeping Faith, 276. 
 
20 Jimmy Carter, We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2009), 27-28; Merkley, American Presidents, Religion, and Israel, 92-93. 
 
21 Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 38. 
 
22 Carter, Keeping Faith, 278; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 39-40. 
 




intransigent; on the other, he genuinely did have an attachment to the 
country as “the land of the Bible,” and he explicitly disassociated himself 
from the more critical anti-Israeli view.24 
 
Early in his administration, Carter scheduled a series of visits with the various 
leaders of the Middle Eastern countries involved in the dispute. He wanted to gain an 
understanding of the different points of view and seek common ground as the basis for a 
comprehensive settlement at the Geneva Conference. Due to the “special” relationship 
between the United States and Israel, he first met with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin in March 1977. Before the prime minister arrived, Brzezinski advised Carter to use 
the American special bond with Israel by applying pressure on Rabin to compromise on 
territorial concessions to prevent any deterioration in US-Israeli relations.  
During this meeting, Carter and Brzezinski’s policy conversation drifted to a 
wide-ranging discussion of religion including topics such as the exact burial location of 
Jesus, the religious lives of their children, and a broad discussion of whether religion 
constituted a search or an answer. This intimate conversation was an excellent example of 
how Carter’s mind frequently turned to broader issues of religion when he discussed 
American policy toward Israel.25 
Ultimately, the meetings between Carter and Rabin faltered because the Israeli 
prime minister resented the president’s rather public discussions about the possible 
outlines of a comprehensive peace settlement. In his mind, national leaders and diplomats 
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usually discussed such details in private conversations.26 Carter remembered the meetings 
as “a particularly unpleasant surprise” and remembered “looking forward to seeing if 
[Arab leaders] are more flexible than Rabin.”27 Brzezinski recalled that Carter tried to 
build a personal relationship with Rabin by discussing his interest in biblical sites and by 
inviting him to go to the private residence and check on Carter’s sleeping daughter, Amy. 
Rabin rebuffed Carter’s efforts.28 
Whereas Carter failed to build a personal rapport with Rabin, he succeeded in 
spectacular fashion in building a close, lifelong friendship with Egyptian leader Anwar 
Sadat. Both Carter and Sadat sought to build a close relationship before ever meeting 
each other.29 During the 1976 election, Sadat told American Ambassador to Egypt 
Hermann Eilts that he preferred Gerald Ford’s re-election because of his familiarity with 
Ford, but confided that Carter “must not be all that bad” due to his deep religious 
convictions.30 Prior to his April meeting with Carter, Sadat told Egyptian Ambassador to 
the United States Ashraf Ghorbal that the new president’s faith gave them a common 
bond on which Sadat hoped to build a relationship.31 Sadat even read an Arabic 
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translation of Carter’s campaign biography Why Not the Best? to prepare for their first 
encounter.32 
Carter’s advisors counseled him to establish a good rapport with the Egyptian 
president who wanted a closer relationship with the United States. Vance advised Carter, 
“it will be important that Sadat leave Washington feeling a sense of personal trust in you. 
To this end, listening to Sadat’s views will be as important as frank explanation of our 
own views and intentions and our reasons for holding them.”33 White House speechwriter 
Jim Fallows described to Carter the common rural background and commitment to small 
town faith that both men shared as a basis for forming a close bond.34 
Carter and Sadat spent ample time spelling out their respective positions 
regarding the Geneva Conference. More important, they forged a deep friendship that 
historian Gaddis Smith described as the closest relationship between an American 
president and a foreign leader since Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.35 Eilts 
later explained, “Sadat was mesmerized by Carter, a personal relationship of 
unprecedented proportions which I had not seen before.”36  
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In his memoirs, Carter described his first meeting with Sadat as if “a shining light 
burst on the Middle East scene for me.” He told Rosalynn, “this had been my best day as 
President,” and she and Sadat’s wife, Jihan, formed a close friendship that mirrored their 
husbands’ relationship.37 Carter even expressed his fondness for Sadat to his top foreign 
policy advisors, telling Brzezinski, “Sadat was like a brother.”38 
Carter valued Sadat’s devotion to Islam, noticing “a callused spot at the center of 
his forehead, apparently caused by a lifetime of touching his head to the ground in 
prayer.”39 Carter’s close relationship with Sadat also expanded the horizons of his 
Christian faith. He later reflected: “His references to the patriarch caused me to 
reexamine the ancient biblical story of Abraham and his early descendants, looking at 
their adventures for the first time from a Jewish, a Christian, and an Arab point of view 
simultaneously.”40  
Despite the success Carter achieved in forging a close relationship with Sadat, the 
administration’s peace process calculus dramatically changed when the right-wing Likud 
coalition won a majority in the Israeli parliamentary elections. Longtime opposition 
leader and former pre-independence paramilitary leader Menachem Begin became prime 
minister.41 American intelligence had already speculated that the Israeli Labor coalition 
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that had governed Israel since its independence was in an extremely tenuous position 
after being caught off guard by the surprise Arab attacks of the 1973 October War and 
suffering a series of corruption scandals.42 Carter’s public statements about a “Palestinian 
homeland” and his frosty relationship with Rabin further weakened the Labor coalition in 
the eyes of Israeli voters concerned about Israeli-American relations.43 
Like Carter and Sadat, Begin was extremely devout in his spiritual practices. 
Begin attracted votes from the rapidly growing Sephardic population, religious nationalist 
groups such as Gush Emunim, and other religious parties previously affiliated with the 
Labor coalition by his rhetoric and public religious observances.44 Rabbi Meir Kahane, 
leader of Kach, the most extreme religious nationalist party in Israel, rejoiced over 
Begin’s election, “For the first time since its establishment, the State of Israel has as its 
prime minister potential a man who thinks like a Jew, acts like a Jew, faces television 
with a yarmulke on his head, and actually speaks the ‘one little word’ [God] that we have 
waited to hear from the lips of Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Eshkol, Golda, Rabin, and Peres.”45 
One of Begin’s aides pointed to the new prime minister’s legacy as part of his electoral 
victory: “He is the only remaining leader who lived the Israeli saga from the Holocaust 
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through the fight against the British and the wars against the Arabs. He is the last of the 
last. He has history in his veins.”46 
 Carter admitted a sense of shock in Begin’s election and confessed, “none of us 
knew what to expect.”47 A few days later, Carter watched a rerun of an Issues and 
Answers interview with Begin and wrote in his diary, “It was frightening to watch his 
adamant position on issues [such as Israeli control of the West Bank] that must be 
resolved if a Middle Eastern peace settlement is going to be realized.”48 However, in his 
memoirs, he recalled that despite his fears, “I still had some hope, though, because Begin 
was said to be an honest and courageous man.”49 
 The Carter administration immediately began discussing how to proceed with 
their plans for negotiating a comprehensive settlement at the Geneva Conference after 
Begin’s surprising electoral victory. Several administration officials saw an opportunity 
in Begin’s victory to pursue a peace settlement not possible with a Labor-dominated 
government. Brzezinski counseled Carter, “Begin, by his extremism, is likely to split both 
Israeli public opinion and the American Jewish community. A position of moderate 
firmness on your part will rally to you in time both the Israeli opposition and significant 
portions of the American Jewish community, including its responsible leadership.”50  
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However, not everyone agreed. White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz, an 
American Jew, cautioned Carter against being too optimistic about influencing the Israeli 
prime minister. “[Begin] believes at this time,” Lipshutz explained, “that he can 
‘convince’ you and your Administration, as well as the Congress and American public, 
that his assessment of the situation in the Middle East and his ideas about resolving the 
problems are correct.”51 
 At a May 26 press conference, Carter directly addressed a question about how 
Begin’s election affected his plans to pursue a comprehensive peace settlement. Carter 
tactfully answered, “I think a large part of that question can be resolved when I meet with 
[Begin] personally and when he meets with the congressional leaders and with the Jewish 
Americans who are very deeply interested in this and sees the purpose of our own 
country. I think this may have an effect on him.”52 
 Throughout June, Carter and his advisors studied Begin and the possibilities and 
limitations of negotiating with the new Israeli government before a July meeting between 
the president and the new prime minister. Quandt noted the absence of a good biography 
of Begin. Moreover, administration officials believed that Begin lacked a commitment to 
the territorial maximalism he had espoused in his public record spanning across three 
decades.53  
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Officials searched far and wide for information. Brzezinski provided Carter with 
some excerpts from the book Terror Out of Zion, the most widely read book about Begin 
in the administration. The book recounted the history of Irgun, the anti-British 
paramilitary organization that Begin led before Israel declared its independence. 
Brzezinski hoped to give the president some extra insight into Begin’s background 
through these excerpts.54  
Beyond writings, Brzezinski advised Carter that Begin might be intransigent on 
the notion of exchanging West Bank lands for peace.55 At a June 10 meeting, Carter’s 
foreign policy team discussed ways to discourage Begin’s government from doing 
anything too provocative, such as formally annexing the West Bank, while avoiding the 
appearance of excessive intervention in internal Israeli affairs.56 
 In preparation for Begin’s impending visit, Fallows pointed out that Carter and 
Begin “share[d] many personal qualities” such as their religion and even recommended 
verses from the prophet Isaiah that might be useful in their meetings.57 American 
Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis prepared a personality assessment of Begin for 
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52 
Carter’s foreign policy team entitled, “Begin: Moses or Samson,” alluding to Begin’s 
penchant to see current events through the prism of ancient Hebrew history.58 Finally, on 
the eve of Begin’s visit, Brzezinski told Carter, “Begin eventually might be better able 
than the Israeli Labor Party to deliver the concessions necessary for peace,” using a logic 
similar to “only Nixon could go to China.”59 
 Upon Begin’s arrival, Carter delivered an eloquent welcoming speech, 
commenting on Begin’s “deep and unswerving religious commitments,” praising his 
decision to admit a group of Vietnamese boat people into Israel as part of the Jewish 
biblical tradition of hospitality to strangers. He closed with Fallows’s suggestion of 
quoting Isaiah 32:18.60 Carter wrote in his diary that evening, “We welcomed Prime 
Minister and Mrs. Begin from Israel. There have been dire predictions that he and I 
would not get along, but I found him to be quite congenial, dedicated, sincere, and deeply 
religious.”61 
 Just as Sadat had developed a friendship with Carter on their respective deep 
religious convictions, Begin hoped to find support for his policies from Carter because of 
the president’s evangelical faith. Begin bluntly told one Israeli newspaper, “Carter knows 
the Bible, and that will make it easier for him to know whose land this is.”62 After 
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Carter’s welcoming speech, Begin responded in Hebrew with the following greeting, 
“Mr. President, I have come from the land of Zion and Jerusalem as the spokesman for an 
ancient people and a young nation. God’s blessing on America, the hope of the human 
race. Peace to your great nation.”63 Later at a state dinner, Begin used religious rhetoric to 
describe the post-Holocaust generation: “I am not ashamed to say that I do believe with 
all my heart in divine providence. Were it not for divine providence, where would be 
today or tonight? We were sentenced to death, all of us, and the life of every one of us is 
a present.”64 
 In their private meetings, Carter primarily listened to Begin and tried to establish 
a personal rapport similar to the one he shared with Sadat. Carter made handwritten notes 
describing Begin as “religious” and quoting the same Isaiah verse from his welcoming 
address to frame contentious discussions in a positive manner based on their common 
religious values.65 Begin responded by reciting the history of the Jews and how faith 
sustained them in the Diaspora for centuries. Carter wryly recalled Begin’s lecture on 
Jewish history “was interesting this time, although I was familiar with most of what he 
said from my studies of the Old Testament and more recent history. I had no idea then 
how many times in the future I would listen to the same discourse.”66  
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To reiterate his point, Begin even brought maps of the West Bank to the meeting, 
although he insisted on calling the land by its biblical names of Judea and Samaria. 
Quandt observed that Carter and his team did not quite understand that from the 
beginning, “History and religion were at the heart of [Begin’s] claim to these areas, not 
just security.”67 
 Brzezinski considered the first meeting between Begin and Carter “personally 
cordial,” but “it did little to advance the prospects for peace” because Begin shifted the 
peace process discussion “away from issues of substance to issues of procedure.”68 
However, Carter succeeded in establishing a personal rapport with Begin. As Stein 
explained, “Though the political distance about the future of the territories might have 
been greater between Carter and Begin than between Carter and Rabin, the personal 
warmth between Carter and Begin more than neutralized that gap.”69 Christian Century 
editor and Carter supporter James Wall wrote the president about comments Begin made 
at a breakfast with the press during his trip, “[He] referred to your ‘good heart, 
extraordinary intelligence, ability to make decisions, and quiet moral authority.’”70 
 Carter also learned some lessons that he would apply in his future discussions 
with Begin. He quickly discovered that Begin considered silence tacit consent, when 
Begin surprised Carter by announcing to the press that Carter accepted his views after the 
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president had politely listened to Begin’s Jewish history lecture.71 Carter also realized he 
needed to hold a firmer line with Begin because he heard through sources that the prime 
minister had described him as a “cream puff.”72 
 The Carter administration made little progress toward pushing all the concerned 
parties to Geneva in the early fall because of Israel’s military incursion into southern 
Lebanon and the fallout from the joint US-Soviet communiqué about the multilateral 
Geneva Conference.73 In late October, Carter sent a handwritten letter to Sadat urging 
him to make a daring move to help break the deadlock. In early November, Sadat 
announced his intentions to visit Jerusalem and meet with Israeli political leaders. These 
new circumstances forced the Carter administration to alter its strategy and ultimately 
abandon the Geneva Conference to take advantage of this historic moment. 74  
Sadat’s decision to go to Jerusalem certainly qualified as a bold maneuver 
because it symbolized Egypt’s implicit recognition of Israel as a legitimate state, a 
departure from the historic Arab refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Scholars 
retrospectively offered varying interpretations of Sadat’s maneuver including viewing it 
as a response to Carter’s letter, a move to keep the Soviets out of the peace process after 
the communiqué, a tactic to further build a special relationship with the United States 
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similar to the shah’s Iran, and a show of frustration with the procedural impasses of 
reconvening the Geneva Conference.75 
 Sadat’s announcement surprised many in the Carter administration who had 
focused on solving all the procedural problems preventing meetings in Geneva. Quandt 
explained that “it took some weeks” for Carter and his team to fully understand Sadat’s 
decision, noting a lack of comprehension of the Arab world, especially the strained 
relationship between Egypt and Syria.76 Some American officials even debated the 
possibility of convincing Sadat to postpone his Jerusalem trip to focus on Geneva. Lewis 
later recalled, “Washington feared that Sadat was going to give away the Palestinian 
cause, pay lip service to them, and feared that Begin would buy him off with Sinai.”77 
 Despite American apprehension, Sadat traveled to Israel for the weekend of 
November 19-21. On Sunday, Carter attended a special early morning service dedicated 
to praying for peace at First Baptist Church in Washington DC. As he left the church and 
returned to the White House to watch Sadat’s speech to the Knesset on television, one 
reporter asked him, “Could you tell us how your prayer for peace in the Middle East 
went? What was your prayer, Mr. President?” In his reply, Carter underscored the deep 
religious convictions of both Sadat and Begin and his private pledges to pray for each. 
Another reporter, probably still unsure about what Carter’s evangelical faith entailed, 
asked, “You see the hand of God moving in all of this, don’t you?” The president simply 
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answered, “We do have this common religious bond that at least provides a possible 
avenue for peace if we can remove the obstacles men create.”78 
 To deflect Arab criticism of his trip, Sadat’s address to the Knesset spelled out 
most of the Arabs’ maximum demands, which were unacceptable to Israel. However, 
Carter pointed to the symbolic importance of Sadat’s presence rather than the speech’s 
content. He later wrote, “The meaning of the words themselves was muted by the fact 
that he was standing there alone, before his ancient enemies, holding out an olive 
branch.”79  
Aside from his address, Sadat toured many religious sites around Israel including 
Yad Vashem, the Israeli Holocaust memorial; the Dome of the Rock mosque, the site of 
Muhammad’s ascension; and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the site of Jesus Christ’s 
crucifixion and resurrection.80 Begin and Sadat spent a significant amount of time 
together building a relationship. On one occasion during the trip, Begin wittily remarked, 
“One day, God willing, I shall visit Cairo, and I shall also go to see the Pyramids. After 
all, we helped to build them.”81 
 Sadat sincerely believed the Israelis would reciprocate with a grand gesture in 
response to his historic trip. After returning to Cairo, he told Eilts, “We will be in Geneva 
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in two weeks. You’ll see, I have done it.”82 On the eve of Sadat’s arrival in Jerusalem, 
State Department officials cautiously concurred with Sadat: “Begin and [Israeli Foreign 
Minister Moshe] Dayan undoubtedly realize that they cannot send Sadat home empty-
handed.”83  
However, Israeli officials never felt obligated to make a historic move in response 
to Sadat’s trip. Several years later, Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman privately told 
Sadat, “Do you really imagine that because of [your Jerusalem visit] we can place all our 
trust in your hands? Today, you are president, and tomorrow not. Israel’s existence 
cannot be dependent upon you.”84 
 Sadat gained popularity among many Egyptians and Americans and tremendous 
worldwide appreciation for his goodwill gesture among Jews. His trip prompted 
American officials to find ways to capitalize on this historic initiative without it being 
solely a bilateral Egyptian-Israel deal.85 Brzezinski recollected, “I believed that if we 
were to move forward on the basis of the Sadat-Begin initiative, we should find some 
ways of making sure that progress on the West Bank was also generated.”86 
 As a result of Sadat’s trip, the Egyptians and Israelis convened a series of 
meetings between lower-level officials, in order to negotiate political and military 
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matters. In mid-December, Begin traveled to Washington to confer with Carter about the 
prospects for peace following Sadat’s visit and the ongoing Egyptian-Israeli talks. At 
Brzezinski’s advice, Carter invoked the legacy of Begin’s mentor, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, to 
encourage the prime minister to act boldly and not be so preoccupied with the details.87  
In response, Begin proposed the broad outlines of granting Palestinians living in 
the West Bank administrative autonomy and abolishing the ruling Israeli military 
government.88 Brzezinski evaluated Begin’s proposal and advised Carter, “I think he is 
genuinely groping for a truly historically significant solution, but is limited by his own 
zealotry in regards to ‘Judea and Samaria.’ Nonetheless, I do sense a real opportunity 
here.”89 Carter recalled his initial positive reaction to Begin’s proposal in his memoirs, 
“Begin sounded much more flexible regarding the West Bank than I had expected, but I 
was to discover that his good words had multiple meanings, which my advisers and I did 
not understand at the time.”90 
 By the beginning of 1978, most people recognized a lack of progress in the 
bilateral talks. They clearly needed American mediation to build on Sadat’s initiative.91 
On January 20, Carter and Brzezinski discussed ways to break the impasse. They decided 
to invite Sadat for a visit in February to encourage him to persevere in the negotiations 
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despite his frustration with the lack of progress. During their meeting, they also explored, 
for the first time, the possibility of bringing both Sadat and Begin to Camp David for a 
series of intense, high-level negotiations personally mediated by Carter.92 
 On February 2, Carter discussed the Middle East situation in his address to the 
National Prayer Breakfast, citing the deep religious commitments of both Begin and 
Sadat. He said, “I have a sense of confidence that if we emphasize and reinforce those 
ties of mutual faith and our subservience and humility before God and an acquiescence in 
his deeply sought guidance, that we can prevail.”93 Many reporters found in that section 
of Carter’s speech evidence of the president viewing religion as the linchpin for solving 
the longstanding dispute.94 However, not every reporter was so sanguine. Political 
scientist Malcolm Kerr opined, “godliness has had too much to do with bringing about 
the Middle East mess, and it is not likely to get us out of it. Each leader seems to be the 
prisoner of self-serving distinctions between his own sacred interests and the profane 
ones of his adversary.”95 
 Just two days after Carter’s Prayer Breakfast remarks, the president spent the 
weekend with Sadat at Camp David. State Department Middle East experts predicted 
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Sadat would push the United States to make a bold gesture similar to his Jerusalem trip or 
decide to distance himself from the stalled bilateral talks.96  
The experts’ predictions were fairly accurate as Sadat expressed frustration with 
Begin. He planned to break off the ongoing political and military talks unless Carter 
could move the process forward. An exasperated Sadat believed he had met Israel’s needs 
for direct negotiations with Arab leaders, recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and 
peaceful relations with his Jerusalem trip, but the Israelis failed to reciprocate. He 
thought “his initiative to go to Jerusalem took the Israelis by surprise. They were not 
ready for peace and possibly still are not.”97 Carter reassured Sadat that the United States 
would push for a compromise and asked him to put forward a fairly tough peace 
proposal, so the United States could convince Egypt to moderate its proposal to extract 
concessions from Israel as well.98 
 After shoring up Sadat’s commitment to the peace process, Carter and his team 
planned for another series of meetings with Begin and his advisors. The major 
contentious issue remained UN Resolution 242. The Carter administration interpreted the 
resolution as requiring Israel to withdraw “on all fronts” with minor modifications agreed 
upon by all parties in negotiations. In contrast, Begin excluded withdrawal from the West 
Bank and Gaza in his interpretation of Resolution 242. Vance and Brzezinski both 
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advised Carter to clearly articulate the American position on 242, so Begin could not 
claim misunderstanding as he had done in the past.99 
 In their first meeting, Carter pressed Begin for more specifics about the autonomy 
proposal he had outlined in December. One of the talking points he jotted down on his 
scratch pad in preparation for the discussion was a reminder for Begin and his autonomy 
proposal that the “pursuit of justice” was “characteristic of Jews.”100 Carter asked if the 
Palestinians living in the West Bank could decide after the five year transitional period to 
join Jordan, but Begin saw his administrative autonomy proposal as only applying to 
individuals rather than territory.101 Frustrated, Carter summed up the situation for his 
Israeli visitors, “In my view, the obstacle to peace, to a peace treaty with Egypt, is 
Israel’s determination to keep political control over the West Bank and Gaza, not just 
now, but to perpetuate it even after five years. This might cause us to lose the opportunity 
for peace that you want.”102 
 The two sides met again the next day and continued the previous day’s discussion. 
Carter outlined his understanding of the Israeli position and asked Begin to clarify if he 
misunderstood any element. The president described the Israeli position as being 
unwilling to withdraw from the West Bank, to stop the expansion of settlements, to 
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withdraw existing settlers from the Sinai Peninsula, to acknowledge the applicability of 
Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to let the Palestinians determine 
their political future. Carter recorded Begin’s reaction in his diary, “Begin said this was a 
negative way to express their position, but didn’t deny the accuracy of any of it.”103 
 After two days, National Security Council staff members considered the meetings 
a success because the president had strongly stated the American views on Resolution 
242 to Begin to prevent any confusion.104 They also advised Brzezinski, “[Begin] intends 
to ignore us as much as possible. Having found that he cannot easily work with us or gain 
our endorsement for his proposals, but not wanting an open break, he seems determined 
to listen politely and then do precisely what he wants.”105 The press even reported 
Begin’s intransigence, “American policymakers have simply come reluctantly to a 
realization that Mr. Begin’s bargaining position is not an opening bid but a matter of 
religious belief.”106 
 Several weeks later, Begin returned to the United States for a White House 
reception celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of Israel’s statehood. At the event, Carter 
reiterated a sentiment from his presidential campaign, declaring, “The establishment of 
the nation of Israel is a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy and the very essence of its 
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fulfillment.”107 Although Carter professed his love for Israel and his deep spiritual 
connection to the land, he felt an equally deep sense of frustration with Begin. He 
recorded in his diary his feelings from a brief meeting with Begin a few days after the 
reception, “[Begin’s] a small man with limited vision, and my guess is he will not take 
the necessary steps to bring peace to Israel—an opportunity that may never come 
again.”108 
 Others shared Carter’s frustration with Begin’s intransigence and the slow pace of 
negotiations over the summer. Brzezinski counseled him that the United States and Egypt 
may have to wait for more moderate political forces in Israel to emerge to move the peace 
process past Begin’s insistence on retaining the West Bank.109 Many Egyptians feared the 
lack of progress after Sadat’s Jerusalem visit and the continuing construction of Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories.110 
 Despite all the frustration over the stalemated negotiations, Carter remained 
determined to forge an agreement between Israel and Egypt and make progress on 
resolving the Palestinian question. In late June, Carter met with his advisors and a group 
of senior-ranking Democrats to discuss the situation. Practically everyone advised him to 
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“stay as aloof as possible from direct involvement in the Middle East negotiations; this is 
a losing proposition,” especially because it might cost Jewish votes in the upcoming 
midterm congressional elections. Carter recalled in his memoirs, “No one, including me, 
could think of a specific route to success, but everyone could describe a dozen logical 
scenarios for failure—and all were eager to do so. I slowly became hardened against 
them, and as stubborn as at any other time I can remember.”111 
 Progress remained elusive despite Carter’s determination to achieve a solution. 
Talks at the foreign minister level at Leeds Castle and a trip to Israel and Egypt by Vice-
President Walter Mondale made little difference, but indicated that both sides wished to 
continue negotiating. Mondale advised Carter to convene a meeting between Begin and 
Sadat in “a private, secluded place” to isolate them from domestic political pressures, an 
idea Carter and Brzezinski had mulled over earlier in January. He also urged Carter to 
consider such a strategy because “the issues were so grave and the necessary 
compromises were so difficult that lower-level diplomats could not achieve them.”112  
Even Rosalynn Carter chimed in with some suggestions. She recalled that during 
a July afternoon walk at Camp David, her husband said, “It’s so beautiful here. I don’t 
believe anybody could stay in this place, close to nature, peaceful and isolated from the 
world, and still carry a grudge. I believe if I could get Sadat and Begin both here together, 
we could work out some of the problems between them, or at least we could learn to 
understand each other better and maybe make some progress.” However, she astutely 
                                                 
111 Carter, Keeping Faith, 315-317. 
 
112 Walter Mondale, The Good Fight: A Life in Liberal Politics (New York: Scribner, 2010), 209. 
 
66 
recognized the political risks and asked, “Are you willing to be the scapegoat?” He 
replied, “What else is new?”113 
 In early August, Carter decided to host Begin and Sadat at Camp David for a 
series of intense, private meetings to break the current impasse. He sent handwritten 
invitations to both, urging them to be discrete until everyone agreed to the meeting and 
they set a date.114  
The Camp David Summit seemed like it might be the successful climax to a long 
process of peace talks, but considerable pessimism existed on all sides. While some 
Egyptians feared that the United States would cave to Israeli demands, some Israelis 
feared Carter would blackmail Begin with threats of cutting off economic and military 
assistance.115  
Some noted the importance of religion. Journalist Wolf Blitzer speculated about 
how Carter’s faith might drive his desire to achieve an agreement, “[Carter] is said to feel 
that he was selected, in part, to become president at this particular point in time in order 
to achieve this elusive goal for all mankind.”116 However, Begin tried to tamp down such 
messianic expectations for the summit. “The fate of our nation does not depend on a 
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meeting—not at the King David or at Camp David,” Begin continued, “…the meeting at 
Camp David is very important, but we should not call it fateful.”117 
 Once all the parties agreed to meet at Camp David in mid-September, Carter 
plunged into intensive preparations for the meeting. Historian Gaddis Smith provided 
historical context for Carter’s preparation, “Not since Woodrow Wilson attended the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 had an American President thrown himself so deeply and 
personally into diplomatic negotiations.”118 The president instructed Vance and 
Brzezinski to prepare separate briefing books, so he could have multiple perspectives.119 
Brzezinski warned Carter that while he and Sadat could not afford failure, Begin could 
leave the summit without any progress and not suffer any domestic political 
consequences.120 The State Department prepared a briefing book entitled “The Pivotal 
Issue,” which discussed the difficulty of securing “linkage” between a bilateral Egyptian-
Israeli peace agreement and developing a broad framework for the future of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.121 
Of all the briefing book materials, Carter found the psychological profiles of 
Begin and Sadat most valuable because he planned to rely on his personal relationships 
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with both men to break the stalemate.122 In addition to the briefing books, he met with the 
American ambassadors to Egypt and Israel to gain their personal impressions of Begin 
and Sadat and learn more about the advisors in their respective entourages.123 Quandt 
later explained, “Carter found himself in the role of psychotherapist, gently trying to 
explain to each man the problems of the other in the hope of overcoming fears and 
distrust.”124 
One of the most significant components of Carter’s psychological study of Begin 
and Sadat centered on religion. The president was committed to being sensitive to each 
man’s religious commitments and framing the goal of reaching a peace agreement in 
spiritual terms. He read Begin’s autobiography, The Revolt, to further understand the 
prime minister’s militant past as the leader of Irgun and his religious convictions about 
Eretz Israel (Greater Israel).125 Carter even brought his personal annotated Bible to the 
summit and admitted he put it to use on a number of occasions in his talks with Begin.126 
He also studied the Koran to prepare for his discussions with Sadat because he had more 
familiarity with Judaism than Islam. During the summit, he frequently walked with Sadat 
around the Camp David compound and asked him questions about Islam.127 
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In planning the conference, Carter “wanted to generate an atmosphere of 
informality” in hopes that “in the quiet and peaceful atmosphere of our temporary home, 
both Begin and Sadat would come to know and understand each other better.”128 The 
president instructed his staff to house the Israeli and Egyptian delegations in alternating 
cabins “to encourage chance, informal encounters.”129 To create more warmth between 
the two principal leaders, Rosalynn invited both Begin and Sadat’s wives to the summit, 
although Jihan Sadat stayed behind because of a sick grandchild.130 To enhance the 
seclusion of the experience and prevent the negotiations from being conducted in public, 
Press Secretary Jody Powell served as the sole spokesman for the conference and the 
compound military personnel dominated to prevent civilian leaks to the press.131 
In the weeks leading up to the summit, many pastors encouraged Carter to 
incorporate a call for prayer into the meeting and the president decided early on to pursue 
this possibility.132 Vance recalled, “Carter wanted at the outset to put the summit on a 
high plane, reflecting the deep religious faith and humane purposes of the three 
leaders.”133 After both leaders had arrived at Camp David, Rosalynn suggested proposing 
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a joint prayer statement. The president submitted the ideas to both leaders and Sadat 
immediately agreed. When the draft statement reached the Israeli delegation, Dayan 
quipped, “you will have to take off your hat for the Christians and your shoes for the 
Muslims—and then you’ll end up putting on a yarmulke for the Jews,” but Begin took the 
paper, began reviewing the statement line-by-line, and requesting word changes.134 
Rosalynn later remembered that the joint prayer statement was the first statement issued 
at the summit “and for a long time it was the only issue everybody agreed on.”135  
Historian Leo Ribuffo described the leaders’ “common interest in religion” as “a 
diplomatic lubricant” to find common ground during the Camp David Summit.136 Early 
in the summit, Carter used faith to find a common ground between Begin and Sadat. In 
discussing these complicated territorial and security issues in later individual meetings 
with the two leaders, Carter frequently alluded to religion to appeal to their higher 
aspirations and to sort out the complex religious aspects of the conflict. 
Before meeting with both principals together, Carter first met with Begin and 
Sadat separately. In his meeting with Begin on Tuesday evening, Carter encouraged the 
prime minister to work toward a better relationship with Sadat during the negotiations 
and outlined his role as a mediator, but Begin mainly addressed the sacrosanct status of 
“Judea and Samaria” and restated his earlier positions on the issues.137  
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The next morning, Carter met with Sadat to discuss some of the same issues such 
as his role as mediator. During their discussion, Sadat described Begin as “bitter and 
inclined to look back in ancient history rather than deal with the present and the future,” 
but Carter stood up for the prime minister, responding that he “was a man of integrity and 
honor, with deep and long-standing opinions that were difficult for him to change.”138 
Later in the afternoon, Carter mediated the first joint meeting between Begin and 
Sadat. Demonstrating his attention to detail and concern for procedure, Begin quickly 
asked about the protocol for observing each religion’s holy day during the summit. The 
three men agreed that they would only abstain from formal summit meetings on Saturday, 
the Jewish Sabbath. Rosalynn later observed that while Sadat practiced the Islamic ritual 
of praying five times a day, he sometimes delayed a prayer to continue working because 
he considered labor sacred. To facilitate the worship services of the three different faiths, 
the Carters set up the Camp David movie theater to serve as mosque, synagogue, and 
chapel.139 
During this first joint meeting, Carter planned “to play a minimal role…so that the 
other two leaders could become better acquainted and have a more fruitful exchange.”140 
However, Carter planned to interject himself to move the conversation along. The 
president had two pages of handwritten notes for the meeting, including the sentence, 
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“First Egyptian-Jewish peace since time of Joseph Jeremiah.” Quandt remarked, “The 
Bible was never too far from Carter’s thoughts.”141 
Before diving into the substantive issues in their first meeting, both Begin and 
Sadat invoked religious imagery as part of the larger effort to put the Camp David 
Summit on a higher plane. Carter recorded in his diary, “Begin made a comment that 
when the Catholics choose a pope, they said, Habemus Papam. He would like for us to 
say Habemus Pacem. Sadat said he hoped the spirit of King David, the great leader of 
Israel, would prevail at Camp David.”142  
After Begin’s initial statements, Sadat read a document that outlined the Egyptian 
proposal for an agreement. Carter had already seen the document, knew Sadat’s fallback 
negotiating positions, and warned Begin about the document’s rigidity in advance. In his 
memoirs, he recalled how Begin politely listened throughout Sadat’s presentation and 
thanked him for the hard work he put into the proposal.143  
Despite Begin’s polite remarks, considerable tension remained between the 
parties. To add some levity to the situation, Carter joked, “Well, Mr. Begin, it would save 
us a lot of time if you would just accept these terms.” All three men laughed. Begin 
responded in jest, “Mr. President, would you advise me to do so?”144 
Although the first meeting had ended on a humorous note, Carter realized there 
was a tremendous gap to close between the Egyptian and Israeli positions. On the third 
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day, Carter arranged to meet with Begin first, then with both leaders together, and finally 
with Sadat in the evening. In his private meeting with Begin, Carter implored the prime 
minister to be more transparent and flexible. Moreover, Carter sought to appeal to 
Begin’s religious convictions and explained that his rigidity regarding the West Bank and 
Gaza was “contrary to the principles which had always been such an integral part of 
Jewish teachings and religious beliefs,” a comment Begin surely resented.145 However, 
Begin remained intransigent, prompting Carter to declare that he would resist Israeli 
pressure, commenting, “My reelection is not nearly as important to me as the resolution 
of the Middle East issue.”146 
The second joint Begin-Sadat meeting proved extremely contentious as Begin 
forcefully addressed his concern with the Egyptian proposal on a point-by-point basis, 
even though Carter had privately assured him that this document constituted only Sadat’s 
opening bargaining position. During an intense argument, Sadat criticized the Israeli 
invasion of southern Lebanon and Begin quickly interrupted to point out Israel acted “to 
save the Christians,” while directly looking at Carter.147  
After breaking for lunch after the escalating shouting match, the three leaders 
reconvened to continue their tension-filled discussion. In an effort to move the focus back 
to the nobler aspirations for peace, Sadat said, “With success at Camp David, I still dream 
of a meeting on Mount Sinai of us three leaders, representing three nations and three 
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religious beliefs. This is still my prayer to God!” Carter remembered that both he and 
Begin felt moved by Sadat’s sincerity.148 
At the end of the day, Carter met with Sadat and the Egyptian delegation who 
expressed frustration with the lack of progress. Carter proposed to Sadat that on some 
especially contentious issues such as Jerusalem, Egypt and Israel could agree to have 
different interpretations on the same document, much like the United States and China 
did with the Shanghai communiqué.149 Throughout the first few days of the conference, 
Carter later recalled how much he “craved” opportunities to exercise, think, and pray 
during the breaks between these very contentious meetings.150 
After the third day and several “unpleasant encounters” between Begin and Sadat, 
Carter decided to negotiate with the two parties separately because his original hopes of 
building a relationship between the two leaders in the seclusion of Camp David no longer 
seemed possible.151 Over the course of the summit, Carter spent 27 ½ hours meeting with 
Sadat and 29 hours meeting with Begin. Of that time, Carter spent 9 hours alone with 
Sadat and six hours alone with Begin, with no aides or interpreters.152  
During many of those meetings, Carter admitted discussing with Begin and Sadat 
how their respective religions affected their individual lives as well as the contemporary 
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Middle Eastern conflict.153 As Carter shuttled back and forth between meetings with each 
leader, he recollected, “I was to spend much of my time defending each of the leaders to 
the other. Carter devoted time to an explanation of both systems of government—the 
imperatives of political life for Begin in a democracy and the sensitive role Sadat had to 
play in representing, without their expressed approval, the interests of other Arabs.”154 
On the first Friday evening of the summit, Carter shared a special Sabbath meal 
with the Israeli delegation, replete with kosher food and religious ceremony. As he often 
did, Carter perceived that evening at Camp David through the lens of his Christian faith. 
In this case, his comparison proved unflattering to Begin and the other Israelis. He 
observed, “I could better understand the negative reaction when Jesus invited himself to 
supper with Zacchaeus, a sinful tax collector, and his friends. They were probably ‘birds 
of a feather’ who drank too much, told ribald stories, and rarely if ever went to a 
synagogue to worship.”155 
On Saturday, while the Israelis observed the Sabbath and the Egyptians worked to 
address Begin’s numerous concerns with their proposals, Carter and his negotiating team 
began preparing an American proposal to fill a void as a joint agreement appeared 
unlikely. Then Carter would meet with each side separately and use the single text of the 
American proposal as the basis for changes. While recognizing Begin had opposed any 
American settlement since he took office, Vance believed he “would also probably 
conclude that this [single text] approach would be the only way to get an agreement. 
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Moreover, it would suit his negotiating style, which was to concentrate on the specific 
language of documents.”156 
Over the next few days, the Israelis and Egyptians haggled over the language of 
the American proposal, but they slowly made progress. On Tuesday evening, Begin met 
with Carter in what the prime minister described as “the most serious talk I have ever had 
in my life, except once when I discussed the future of Israel with Jabotinsky.”157 Begin 
insisted that the framework the Americans proposed should not contain the language of 
UN Resolution 242 because it noted Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.158 He 
continued discussing Israeli settlements in biblical terms, at one point citing Psalm 137:5 
to defend Israeli control over an undivided Jerusalem, “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let 
my right hand forget her cunning.”159  
In response, Carter countered not with scripture, but public opinion polls. Without 
mentioning Jerusalem, Carter noted that a majority of Israelis favored abandoning 
settlements in the Sinai and substantially withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza to 
achieve peace. He then told Begin that his position better represented the Israeli people 
better than the prime minister’s stance, a sentiment Begin surely resented.160 
Despite their contentious meeting, Begin and the Israelis stayed to continue the 
negotiations over the wording of the American proposal. On Friday, Vance told Carter 
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that Sadat planned to leave Camp David because Dayan told the Egyptian president that 
Israel would simply not compromise on some issues. Shocked by the news, Carter 
dismissed his staff from his cottage, “moved over to the window and looked out to the 
Catoctin Mountains and prayed fervently for a few minutes that somehow we could find 
peace.”161 Then Carter went to Sadat’s cabin and invoked their friendship to implore him 
to stay for a few more days, and Sadat relented.162 
During the summit’s second week, Carter realized Begin and Sadat would not 
resolve the Palestinian issue in concrete fashion, so he refocused his attention on securing 
an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and a general framework to proceed on the issues of the 
West Bank and Gaza.163 While the issues separating Egypt and Israel from a bilateral 
agreement narrowed, Begin’s refusal to evacuate Israeli settlers from the Sinai Peninsula 
proved the major obstacle. On Saturday, Begin offered a compromise, promising the 
Knesset would vote on the issue of the Sinai settlements within two weeks. Sadat 
consented, but the entire agreement would be contingent on the vote.164  
It seemed as if both sides had achieved a breakthrough, but a paragraph in the 
agreement about Jerusalem almost prompted Begin to walk out on the conference. Sadat 
wished for some sort of Muslim emblem or flag over the Dome of the Rock, but Begin 
firmly opposed the plan.165  
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As Begin prepared to leave Camp David without an agreement, Carter used 
personal diplomacy. He brought copies of a photograph of the three leaders form the 
beginning of the conference, and he signed each copy, adding the name of one of Begin’s 
grandchildren on each photograph. Begin became emotional and agreed to review 
Carter’s latest revisions that omitted the paragraph on Jerusalem.166  
Ultimately, Begin agreed to Carter’s suggested changes. The American president 
met with Sadat, telling him that they had finally arrived at a mutually acceptable 
settlement. In short, the Camp David Accords contained two separate agreements: a 
broad outline for an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and a framework for Palestinian 
autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank. Carter promised Sadat to use American influence 
on Israel to create more linkage between the two agreements.167 After Sadat agreed, 
Begin called him to congratulate him on their historic achievement and then walked over 
to his cottage to share a handshake. It marked the first contact between the two leaders in 
ten days.168 At the signing ceremony for the Camp David Accords, Begin joked, “As far 
as my historic experience is concerned, I think that he worked harder than our forefathers 
did in Egypt building the pyramids.”169 
The Camp David Accords produced an instant variety of reactions among 
Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Maranatha Baptist Church, a new congregation in 
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Carter’s hometown of Plains, sent a message congratulating the president on his 
landmark achievement with one member writing a note, “We always knew it would take 
a born-again Christian to do what you did.”170 Other American evangelicals were not so 
sanguine. Fundamentalist preacher Jerry Falwell declared, “In spite of the rosy and 
utterly unrealistic expectations by our government, this treaty will not be a lasting 
treaty…You and I know that there’s not going to be any real peace in the Middle East 
until the Lord Jesus sits down upon the throne of David in Jerusalem.”171  
While many Egyptians applauded the agreement, Arabs in other countries felt the 
agreements constituted the betrayal that began with Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.172 Not all 
Egyptians accepted the agreement either, as religious nationalists in organizations such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood ultimately assassinated Sadat for his decision to make peace 
with Israel.173   
Religious Zionists in Israel felt betrayed by Begin, believing he was one of their 
own. In fact, upon Begin’s return to Israel, some greeted him with a procession of black 
umbrellas, comparing the Camp David Accords to the 1938 Munich Agreement.174 Rabbi 
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Meir Kahane, who had rejoiced in Begin’s election just one year ago, now denounced the 
prime minister, “The heart of the Begin tragedy is that a man who was a symbol, for half 
a century, of Jewish pride and strength, surrendered Jewish rights, sovereignty, and land 
out of a fear of the Gentile pressure. It is in a word, Hillul Hashem, the humiliation and 
desecration of the name of G-d by substituting fear of the finite Gentile for Jewish faith in 
the G-d of creation and history.”175 
Despite the ambivalence and hostility of some, Carter sought to facilitate the 
conclusion of the formal Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as rapidly as possible. The Camp 
David Accords provided the substantive framework for such a treaty, one that Carter 
believed could be negotiated within two weeks.176 However, two major contentious 
issues remained: the linkage between the bilateral peace treaty and the Palestinian 
autonomy talks and the question of priority of obligations (e.g. did the Egyptian-Israeli 
treaty supersede Egypt’s defensive agreements with other Arab countries?).177  
The talks between Begin and Sadat’s subordinates bogged down quickly, 
necessitating Carter’s continuing personal involvement. However, the Iranian Revolution 
changed the conditions of the negotiations because Iran was Israel’s principal supplier of 
oil and many Israelis feared what would happen if Khomeini-like extremists overthrew 
Sadat. Moreover, Carter’s looming reelection battle would limit the amount of personal 
attention he could devote to the talks.178 
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In February 1979, Carter met with Begin in Washington to convince the prime 
minister to move more quickly to conclude negotiations with Egypt. However, Brzezinski 
advised Carter, “Begin is in no rush. He believes that election year realities will 
increasingly weaken our hand in the negotiations.”179 After another heated Begin-Carter 
meeting, the president decided to become more personally involved in moving the treaty 
negotiations forward through a “shuttle diplomacy” strategy between Egypt and Israel.180 
His advisors cautioned him about the consequences of failure, but ultimately Jordan 
conceded, “[Shuttle diplomacy] would be risky, but it seems no riskier than the notion 
several months ago of a Camp David summit.”181 
On March 8, Carter flew to Cairo for his first round of negotiations with Sadat. 
For his part, Sadat accepted Carter’s role, telling the president, “Brother Jimmy, I will do 
whatever you think is best.”182 Before departing for Israel, Carter addressed the People’s 
Assembly and invoked words of peace from each of the three Abrahamic faiths: 
We who are engaged in this great work, the work of peace, are of varied 
religious faiths. Some of us are Moslems; some are Jews; some are 
Christians. The forms of our faith are different. We worship the same God. 
And the message of Providence has always been the same. I would like to 
quote the words of the Holy Koran: "If thine adversary incline towards 
peace, do thou also incline towards peace and trust in God, for he is the 
one that heareth and knoweth all things." Now I would like to quote from 
the words of the Old Testament: "Depart from evil and do good; seek 
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peace, and pursue it." And now I would like to quote from the words of 
Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they 
shall be called the children of God." My friends, my brothers, let us 
complete the work before us. Let us find peace together.183 
 
The American Embassy in Cairo later reported that Carter’s invocation of faith produced 
an “emotional response” that was “palpable” among Egyptians.184 
 Upon arriving in Tel Aviv, Carter reminded his Israeli audience in the welcoming 
ceremony, “The task we are striving to accomplish together demands more than reason, 
more, even, than will. It demands faith. For in a very real sense, the task of building 
peace is a sacred task. In the words of the Midrash, ‘Peace is important, for God’s name 
is Shalom.’ Let us have shalom. Let us make peace together.”185 That evening, Carter met 
with Begin to cover all the progress made with Sadat, but the prime minister’s 
unwillingness to compromise on some issues infuriated the normally mild-mannered 
president.186 The next day, Carter visited Yad Vashem with Begin and empathized more 
with the prime minister’s intransigence: “Moving slowly through this shrine, I was filled 
with extraordinary emotion. It was much easier for me to understand Begin’s extreme 
caution concerning the security of Israel. The historic persecution of the Jewish people 
had always been known to me—but now it was a more vivid reality.”187 
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 Following his visit to the Israeli Holocaust memorial, Carter attended a Baptist 
worship service, although he was preoccupied with his meeting with the Israeli cabinet 
later that day and his speech before the Knesset the next day.188 Jordan and Carter’s other 
advisors reminded him that despite his frustration with Begin, he should remain calm 
because he had the opportunity to present the case for peace to the cabinet, the Knesset, 
and the Israeli people at large, thus putting more pressure on the prime minister to be 
flexible.189 
 On March 12, Carter spoke to the Knesset, making numerous allusions to Old 
Testament metaphors like “pounding Middle East swords into plowshares” and using the 
traditional Christian aphorism, “we must pray as if everything depended on God, and we 
must act as if everything depends on ourselves” to convince the Israeli legislators of the 
urgency of finalizing this treaty.190  
While some parliamentary debate followed, the Carters found time to spend with 
the Jewish archaeologist Yigael Yadin to learn more about the Dead Sea Scrolls. The 
Israeli cabinet also met to further discuss how to reach a mutually acceptable compromise 
with Egypt.191 The next morning, Carter met with Begin again and agreed to an American 
guarantee of Israeli oil supplies in case of an interruption and a deletion of the treaty 
language permitting free Egyptian access to the Gaza District. Begin found these 
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proposals acceptable and Carter prepared to travel back to Cairo to inform Sadat of his 
success.192 
 Upon his arrival in Egypt, Carter informed Sadat, “You will be pleased.” He 
responded, “My people in Egypt are furious at how the Israelis have treated our friend 
Jimmy Carter.” Carter laughed, “It wasn’t bad.”193 However, Egyptian Foreign Minister 
Mustafa Khalil opposed the details of the treaty and wanted some additional revisions. 
An exasperated Carter responded, “For the last 18 months, I, the president of the most 
powerful nation on earth, have acted the postman. I am not a proud man—I have done the 
best I could—but I cannot go back to try to change the language.”194 Due to their close 
friendship, Sadat accepted the treaty draft, so Carter had finally succeeded in brokering 
an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. When he called to inform American political leaders of 
the trip’s outcome, Democratic Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill declared, “Mr. 
President, you’re not just a deacon anymore, but a pope!”195 
 Two weeks later, Begin and Sadat met in Washington to formally sign the treaty 
in the presence of Carter, the leader who had devoted so much time, energy, and political 
capital to the peace process. In his speech at the signing ceremony, Carter again invoked 
the words of peace from Islam and Judaism to put their work on a spiritual plane: 
All our religious doctrines give us hope. In the Koran, we read: "But if the 
enemy incline towards peace, do thou also incline towards peace, and trust 
in God; for He is the One that heareth and knoweth all things." And the 
prophet Isaiah said: "Nations shall belt their swords into plowshares and 
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their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against 
nation, neither shall they learn war any more." So let us now lay aside war. 
Let us now reward all the children of Abraham who hunger for a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Let us now enjoy the adventure 
of becoming fully human, fully neighbors, even brothers and sisters. We 
pray God, we pray God together, that these dreams will come true. I 
believe they will.196 
 
Later at the evening banquet to celebrate the treaty’s signing, Carter opened the meal 
with a prayer, a decision he thought was “acceptable” because of the “religious overtones 
of the event.”197 Initially, the White House had planned an interfaith praise service for 
Carter, Begin, and Sadat to attend at the National Cathedral as part of the treaty signing 
ceremony, but later cancelled the event at the cathedral because it “would be 
inappropriate for non-Christians in such a sensitive political situation.” Instead, an 
interfaith organization took over and hosted the event at the Lincoln Memorial.198 
 Even prior to the signing ceremony, Brzezinski urged the president to step back 
from the West Bank autonomy talks the next phase of the process outlined in the Camp 
David Accords. He wanted Carter to focus on other pressing foreign policy issues and his 
reelection campaign.199 Satisfied with the achievement of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty and 
determined to focus on the autonomy talks in a second term, Carter appointed US Trade 
Representative Robert Strauss as his special envoy to the Middle East to oversee the 
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talks. When Carter asked Strauss to fill this role, he said, “I’ve never even read the Bible, 
and I’m a Jew,” concerned that he would not understand the president’s religious 
convictions about achieving peace in the Holy Land. Carter kindly responded that it was 
never too late to start reading the Bible and reminded him that Henry Kissinger had 
overseen the disengagement agreements after the 1973 October War.200 
 For the rest of his term, Carter never involved himself in the peace process at the 
same level because he had to deal with the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the fight for a second term. However, he noted on several occasions 
how the Camp David Accords functioned as a “bible” or “sacred document” in guiding 
the ongoing autonomy talks.201 In October 1979, Carter even urged Pope John Paul II to 
visit Jerusalem and lend some of his moral authority to the peace process, so the 
American president would not be the only outsider working for a comprehensive 
peace.202 That same month, Strauss resigned his post as envoy to return to the United 
States to run Carter’s campaign, so the president selected Sol Linowitz, the lawyer who 
oversaw the Panama Canal treaty negotiations, to replace Strauss.203 
 Unfortunately, the autonomy talks progressed little, but laid the groundwork for 
future negotiations that resulted in the Oslo Accords of 1994. Quandt summed up the 
reason for the failure, “However talented his special negotiators might have been, they 
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had little chance of succeeding once Carter no longer seemed to be personally involved in 
the negotiations.”204 Moreover, Yosef Burg, leader of the National Religious Party, led 
the Israeli negotiating team after Dayan’s resignation in October 1979 and opposed Israel 
losing control over the West Bank and Gaza.205 The crises in Iran and Afghanistan also 
confirmed the oft-repeated Israeli argument that the Palestinian issue did not drive all the 
problems of the region and reinforced Israeli leaders’ security fears of instability in the 
Islamic world.206 
Even as he prepared to leave office, Carter remained committed to the unfinished 
work of Camp David. A few days before Ronald Reagan’s inauguration, Carter told 
Israeli Ambassador Ephraim Evron he would be active in the region as a former president 
“to pursue my concept of what Israel ought to be.” Foreshadowing future controversies, 
he told Evron, “I don’t see how they can continue as an occupying power depriving the 
Palestinians of basic human rights, and I don’t see how they can absorb 3 million more 
Arabs into Israel without letting the Jews become a minority in their own country.”207 
In his memoirs, Carter admitted that he spent more time on the Middle East peace 
process than any other issue in his presidency and described his hopes that other Arab 
leaders would follow Sadat’s courageous example and make peace with Israel.208 As a 
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deeply committed evangelical Christian, Carter felt a great affinity for Israel and wanted 
to secure the future of the Holy Land because his mind always thought of the Bible when 
he discussed issues surrounding Israel. To achieve his goal of peace for Israel and its 
neighbors, he frequently alluded to biblical symbols and themes in his public addresses 
and private conversations, especially with other fervently religious leaders, such as Begin 
and Sadat. Sometimes these spiritual appeals worked, other times, especially with Begin, 
they complicated a situation that was already tremendously complex due to the 
competing religious claims of Jew, Christian, and Muslim to the same lands. Looking 
back on Camp David, Carter told an interviewer how much religion played a role in the 
success of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement: 
Even if the religious factor was a minimal element, the Camp David 
agreement hung by such a narrow thread that I think any particular factor 
could have caused failure, so because of that explanation, I don’t think 
there’s any chance, in retrospect, that we could have been successful 
without a common faith in a monotheistic God, whom we all recognized 
to be the same, among me and Begin and Sadat…So to summarize…I 
would say that any substantial factor could have caused failure, and 
religion—a common faith—was a substantial factor.209 
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Chapter 4 
"THOSE WHO ARE SLOW TO ANGER CALM CONTENTION": JIMMY CARTER 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF KHOMEINI'S IRAN 
It is one of the great ironies of history that it should have been the administration of 
Jimmy Carter that was called upon to deal with the exotic extremes of the ayatollah’s 
regime in Iran. No writer of fiction could ever have conjured up a set of circumstances so 
ripe with contrasts and opportunities for mutual incomprehension. Each of these two 
national leaders embodied an aspect of his own national culture to a degree of perfection 
that lent itself naturally to exaggeration and caricature.1 
     -Gary Sick, NSC Iran expert 
 
 Gary Sick’s retrospective comments illustrate the considerable difficulties the 
Carter administration faced in dealing with the revolutionary leadership of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran. While Jimmy Carter won by running on his character and 
highlighting his Southern Baptist faith, Khomeini, a highly-regarded cleric in Shia 
Muslim circles, became the symbol that united disparate elements of the Iranian 
opposition to successfully overthrow the shah. Later, Khomeini gradually eliminated his 
opposition partners and guided the Iranian revolution down a radically religious 
nationalist path that secular liberal and Communist Iranian leaders never expected.2  
 During the revolution to overthrow the shah, the ensuing transitional period, and 
the hostage crisis, President Carter and his advisors at times seemed ill-informed about 
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the appeal of Khomeini’s religious nationalism and other times underestimated 
Khomeini’s power and decision making. While some hoped that Carter’s religious 
convictions would help deal with the new Islamic Republic of Iran, they frequently 
hindered US-Iranian relations.3 
 The Carter administration faced its first crisis with Khomeini in the waning 
months of 1978, as the shah lost power and finally collapsed in January 1979. Diplomatic 
historian Gaddis Smith notes that “the Carter Administration was very slow to realize the 
seriousness of the situation. It was hampered by a lack of understanding of Iranian history 
and society, and especially of the political character of the Islamic clergy. It acted in a 
confused way in the face of a very confusing situation.”4  
 One can attribute the delayed reaction of the administration to the worsened 
political conditions in Iran and the flurry of other foreign policy initiatives pursued at the 
time, including the Camp David accords, the SALT II negotiations, and the normalization 
of US-Chinese relations. National security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski recalled, “Our 
decision-making circuits were heavily overloaded.”5 Even if senior administration 
officials had focused their undivided attention on Iran during the revolution, they rarely 
questioned US support for the shah, making it impossible to find a moderate alternative 
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to him or Khomeini. Thus, Nikki Keddie, a historian of modern Iran, concludes, 
“Probably only a very different set of policies over the previous twenty-seven years could 
have led to different results.”6 
 Just as Carter’s human rights rhetoric raised hopes in the US after eight years of 
the Nixon-Kissinger realpolitik foreign policy, Carter’s faith as well as his emphasis 
about human rights also created new expectations among Iranians who opposed the 
shah’s authoritarianism. One of Khomeini’s allies, Ayatollah Hussein Montzeri, pointed 
to Carter’s Christian faith as reason to believe US-Iranian relations were changing, “We 
didn’t expect Carter to defend the shah for he is a religious man who has raised the 
slogan of defending human rights. How can Carter, the devout Christian, defend the 
Shah?”7 He also recalled, “At the time we were in jail, prisoners would say that dear 
Jimmy will arrive and solve our problems and we will be set free.”8 Part of the later 
Iranian demonization of Carter arose from the president’s failure to meet the lofty 
expectations of Iranian dissidents in how the US government would put an end to the 
shah’s repressive practices.  
 Despite warnings about the religiously inspired uprisings against the shah that 
began in 1978, the Carter administration’s intelligence on Khomeini and his politics was 
limited. US intelligence only understood Khomeini’s politics through the lens of 
traditional Shia clergy rather than taking into account the revolutionary implications from 
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his writings about the velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist). One NSC report noted 
that Khomeini “presented no specific program but is rich in pious generalities.”9 A CIA 
report issued a couple weeks later claimed “Khomeini’s ambiguity reflects a lack of 
interest in a specific political program. For him Shia Islam is a total 
social/political/economic system that needs no further explanation.”10  
 Even the ayatollah’s closest confidants did not fully appreciate Khomeini’s plans 
to establish an Islamic Republic. Future Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh believed 
Khomeini’s pamphlet Islamic Government “sounded like a Muslim Mein Kampf,” but he 
declared “that touch of native fascism could be smoothed out.”11 Ghotbzadeh and future 
Prime Minister Abolhasan Bani Sadr promoted Khomeini as the “Gandhi of Islam” who 
would renounce his political ideas to account for the political realities of governance.12 
Bani Sadr later recounted that during Khomeini’s brief exile in Paris before returning to 
Iran, “[Khomeini] was scripted. Just like Ronald Reagan. We told him what to say and he 
memorized it and recited it verbatim.”13 
 Optimistic predictions that the shah would remain in power well into the 1980s 
faded quickly. President Carter wrote on November 2, 1978, “The shah expressed deep 
concern about whether to set up an interim government, a military government, or 
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perhaps even to abdicate.”14 Contrary to his earlier report that “our destiny is to work 
with the shah,” Ambassador William Sullivan cabled Washington on November 9 with a 
message entitled “Thinking the Unthinkable,” which concluded that the shah would fall 
and that the Carter administration needed to begin considering the range of possible 
future governments in Iran.15  
 While Carter and his team discussed a variety of options for how to proceed in 
Iran, the shah felt that he was receiving “confusing and contradictory” messages from the 
State Department and the National Security Council about whether to continue with 
liberalization programs or to reestablish law and order by the use of force. These 
contradictory messages encouraged the shah’s paranoid conspiracy theories as he later 
claimed “the Americans wanted me out” to replace him with “an Islamic Republic as a 
bulwark against communist incursions.”16  
 Carter’s December 7 response to a reporter’s question about the shah’s survival, 
“I don’t know. I hope so,” reflected a vacillating US attitude.17 Iranians perceived the 
statement as the president publicly announcing the end of US support for the shah’s 
regime even though in reality Carter and his advisors preferred that the shah remain in 
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power in some capacity.18 Iranian scholar Amir Taheri explains the reception as part of 
the larger Iranian belief at the time that the US was a deus ex machina in their affairs: 
“Every word uttered by US diplomats was seized upon as a signal from Washington and 
wildly interpreted far beyond its original context.”19 Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime 
minister of the Islamic Republic, later told Charles Naas, deputy director of the US 
embassy, “You have no idea how encouraged we were by President Carter.”20 
 The Carter administration began seeking moderate alternatives to the shah and 
Khomeini as early as November 1978. Options discussed included a regency council, a 
military government, and even a way to welcome Khomeini back to Iran with the shah as 
a constitutional monarch. Defense Secretary Harold Brown agreed with Brzezinski’s 
preference for a military government, making the case, “The military might in fact be bad 
in the long run; but, we are certain that Khomeini would be bad in the short run.”21 After 
the shah departed Tehran on January 16, 1979 for a “vacation” from which he never 
returned, Carter called on Khomeini and his “deep religious convictions” to support 
stability and prevent bloodshed in Iran.22 
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 In January 1979, as a last ditch effort to prop up the recently installed government 
of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar, an appointee of the shah, and prevent the return of 
Khomeini, the Carter administration dispatched General Robert Huyser to consult with 
the Iranian military in the event the Bakhtiar government collapsed and the military 
needed to step in and govern. Huyser simply knew little about Iran and the Iranian 
generals kept him in the more secure, shah-friendly areas of Tehran, so he never quite 
understood the larger revolutionary picture.23 Furthermore, he firmly believed that the 
arrival of Khomeini signaled the beginning of Iran’s transition to communism as he could 
not comprehend that Khomeini and the other religious leaders could lead a successful 
political revolution or establish a religious state in an increasingly secular world. He later 
wrote in 1986, “There were so many clever moves on Khomeini’s side that I continually 
wondered who was doing their planning for them, and I would still like to know the 
answer.”24 
 The unsuccessful efforts to support a moderate Iranian government to replace the 
shah demonstrated how badly the US intelligence community had failed in its operations 
in Iran. As early as November 6, 1978, Sick wrote Brzezinski complaining about the lack 
of adequate information about the Iranian opposition, calling the situation “an 
intelligence disaster of the first order.”25 CIA Director Stansfield Turner further noted 
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that practically none of the evidence of the revolution required secret information or 
espionage missions because “just plain scholarly research on Iran from about 1970 
onward should have forecast the problems the Shah would encounter.”26 With the 
insights offered by hindsight, Brzezinski waxed eloquent about the administration’s 
failure to understand the phenomenon of religious nationalism sweeping Iran: 
But a deeper intellectual misjudgment of a central historical reality was 
involved here: that rapid modernization of a very traditional society breeds 
its own instabilities and revolutionary dynamics, that it requires a political 
system that can gradually enlarge political participation while providing 
safety valves for social dissatisfaction, that old religious beliefs should not 
be uprooted without gradual public acceptance of more modern values, 
including some genuine connection with the national past.27 
 
 One of the most fundamental factors contributing to the US intelligence failure in 
the fall of the shah and the rise of Khomeini remained a general underestimation of the 
power of religion in politics. During one Iran policy meeting, a CIA operative exclaimed, 
“Who ever took religion seriously anyway!”28  It seemed surprising that the evangelical 
Carter would underestimate the power of faith, but much of the surrounding secular 
culture believed religion was best left in the private sphere other than the occasional civil 
religion references. Even Carter’s chief campaign advisor Hamilton Jordan dubbed his 
boss’s public confessions of his born-again faith the “weirdo factor” in the 1976 
election.29  
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However, the president’s faith included a strong commitment to the traditional 
Baptist doctrine of the separation of church and state, a conviction not shared by 
Khomeini.30 Carter did not understand that Khomeini was the latest figure in the long 
history of mixing of religion and politics in Islam. The notion of separating church and 
state was largely foreign to Islam. As John Esposito, an expert on Islam, explained, 
“From its beginnings, Islam existed and spread as a community-state; it was both a faith 
and a political order.”31 
 Dismissals of the power of Khomeini’s religious appeal to ordinary Iranians 
included policymakers at all levels of the administration and even Carter himself. 
Professor James Bill explained how Carter administration policymakers routinely 
described Iranian actions as “irrational, fanatical, unpredictable, aberrant, or ‘oriental’ 
behavior.”32 For example, Carter read a translated interview with Khomeini and sent the 
article back to Brzezinski with the word “Nutty” scrawled across the top.33 Officials in 
Washington and Tehran refused to believe religious leaders with what they described as a 
“medieval” mindset could topple the mighty shah.34  
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 Furthermore, these same officials had a tendency to see the Kremlin behind the 
scenes of the revolution rather than appreciating the power of Khomeini’s indigenous 
Shia movement. One NSC official remarked, “The Soviets are there but they know how 
to cover their tracks. By the time you get proof, the Russians will be in control of 
Tehran.”35 
 As the prospects for a Khomeini-led government seemed more inevitable, the 
Carter administration considered exactly what an Islamic Republic might look like since 
no models existed. Most policymakers accepted the assessments of secular Iranian 
revolutionaries like Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh that Khomeini would only serve as a 
spiritual guide of the Islamic Republic rather than a driving force in governance. 
Brzezinski informed Carter a general consensus existed in the Special Coordination 
Committee that “Khomeini will revert to his role as venerable sage, establishing the 
general parameters of political action but not involving himself in the details.”36 Precht 
believed Khomeini’s revolution would only try “to bring Islam into line with new 
realities,” such as the land reform of the shah’s White Revolution.37 Andrew Young, UN 
ambassador, encouraged Carter, noting “Khomeini will be some kind of a saint when we 
finally get over the panic of what is happening there.”38  
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 After the intelligence failures surrounding the fall of the shah, the State 
Department paid more attention to the analysis of academic Iran experts, many of whom 
had forecasted the shah’s overthrow. Bill represented the widely held view among 
academics that Khomeini would only serve as a spiritual guide because no Islamic cleric 
had ever governed Iran since Shia Islam became Iran’s official state religion in 1501.39 
Bill chided US policymakers for not accepting the success of the revolution and failing to 
understand Khomeini.40 Princeton University Professor Richard Falk concluded after 
visiting the country that “Iran may yet provide us with a desperately-needed model of 
humane government for a third-world country.”41 
 During the final days of 1978, even before the shah left Iran, Carter knew that his 
senior foreign policy advisors, a collection of mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, 
simply lacked an understanding of Khomeini’s Islamic revolutionary movement or the 
larger global resurgence of religion. At one meeting during Iran’s revolutionary crisis, 
Vice-President Walter Mondale, a Presbyterian, asked Director Turner, a Christian 
Scientist, “What the hell is an ‘Ayatollah’ anyway” Turner responded, “I’m not sure I 
know.”42 General Huyser recalled not even hearing of Khomeini until April 1978 during 
an arms sale-related mission. At that time, he viewed Khomeini’s opposition to the shah 
                                                 
39 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 279-280. 
 
40 Memo, David Newsom to Cyrus Vance, “Situation in Iran,” February 2, 1979, “Iran—Meetings 2/1/79-
2/17/79” folder, Box 12, Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Materials Collection—Geographic File, JCL. 
 
41 As cited in Sick, All Fall Down, 195. Sick recalls that, “Three years later, appearing on a panel with 
Professor Falk, I was startled to hear him describe the Khomeini regime as ‘the most terroristic since 
Hitler.’” 
 
42 As cited in Peter Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Postpresidency 
(New York: Scribner, 1997), 454. 
 
100 
as nothing but a Persian “blood feud,” resulting from the deaths of Khomeini’s father and 
son.43 Carter’s principal representative to the shah, Ambassador Sullivan, admitted “I had 
never lived in the Islamic world and knew little about its culture or its ethos.”44 
 To remedy this deficiency, Carter ordered the NSC, the State Department, and the 
CIA to study the resurgence of political Islam. Carter wanted each to not only utilize his 
own regional experts, but also to consult with outside academics to discuss issues ranging 
from the national and transnational roots of the Islamic resurgence phenomenon to the 
link between this religious revival and socioeconomic modernization.45 To this point, 
Carter and his team had focused much of their attention on trying to maintain the shah’s 
regime or a US-friendly transitional regime, but his decision to commission this 
governmental study of political Islam coincided with the realization that Khomeini’s 
revolution likely would be successful. Moreover, Carter recognized that very few of his 
senior advisors knew enough about the Islamic roots of this political movement and what 
it might mean for US-Iranian relations. One Islamic scholar cleverly described the large-
scale government study as addressing the fundamental question, “How does a born-again 
Christian deal with a born-again Moslem?”46 
 Many of the subsequent reports discussed Islam as a “political religion” with no 
clear division between the sacred and secular. The reports also noted the significant 
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differences between Sunni and Shia Islam such as the tendency of Sunnis to more 
willingly to accept the flaws of temporal governments. The government experts and 
scholars, including a handful of Muslim academics, also anticipated future academic 
discussions of religious nationalism as they explored how the failures of modernization 
contributed to the resurgence of religious fervor. The specialists also noted how Islamic 
fundamentalism had an anticolonial history that had transitioned into ire toward 
indigenous secular nationalist regimes such as the shah in Iran or Nasser in Egypt that 
had tried and failed at Western-style modernization.47 
 One of the central questions the study of resurgent Islam addressed was “can it 
happen elsewhere?” Certainly, Khomeini had grander ambitions extending beyond Iran 
because he wanted to establish a “papacy” among Shia Muslims and possibly be the 
leader of the entire Muslim world. However, the national boundaries dividing Shia 
Muslims and the theological differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims proved too 
large to bridge for Khomeini to exert greater leadership.48 American policymakers 
worried about the potentially destabilizing effect of the Islamic Revolution on Turkey, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, all pro-US allies. Ultimately, they concluded their allies were 
safe from the “Iranian sickness” partly because of the differences between Sunni and Shia 
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Islam. Sunni Muslims typically regarded temporal government as the leading force of the 
umma (community of the faithful), while the clergy led the umma in the Shia tradition.49  
 Ultimately, all the major components of the US foreign policy bureaucracy 
believed that Iran’s Islamic Revolution was a local phenomenon with limited regional 
implications. Brzezinski cautioned the president, “we should be careful not to 
overgeneralize from the Iranian case. Islamic revivalist movements are not sweeping the 
Middle East and are not likely to be the wave of the future.”50 A National Security 
Council colleague wrote, “We are unlikely to see a series of Iran-like upheavals in the 
rest of the Middle East, but we are fated to deal with a large number of Islamic countries 
whose populations are proud of their cultures, fearful of some of the consequences of 
modernization, and aware of their vulnerability and weakness.”51  
 Others in different parts of the bureaucracy agreed. State Department experts at 
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research believed that “Pan-Islam is not likely to become 
a significant international force. There are too many regional and cultural divisions 
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within the Muslim world for united political action.”52 CIA analysts dismissed the idea of 
a transnational Islamism, explaining “Iran aside, the politics of Islamic states remains 
focused on local concerns, and various Islamic groups so far show no signs of developing 
a leadership or a philosophy that crosses national boundaries” and concluding that 
“national interest overrides transnational values.”53 
 Other than the effect of the Iranian Revolution on other Muslim countries, 
American policymakers also studied how Islamic religious nationalism would affect the 
US-USSR competition. The notion that the United States and Iran shared a common 
interest based on faith against the atheistic Soviet Union developed out of this study of 
the Islamic resurgence. In particular, Brzezinski, an ardent anti-Soviet hawk, sought to 
find ways to make religious appeals to the Islamic Republic of Iran to combat 
communism. Carter enunciated similar ideas about the common foe of communism later 
in his public rhetoric after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One paper even sought to 
find common ground among the three Abrahamic faiths of Christianity, Islam, and 
Judaism in the problems they faced such as communism while downplaying their 
theological differences.54  
 To implement this concept, the Voice of America broadcasts began to emphasize 
the common spiritual heritage shared by the United States and Iran as a way to prevent 
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Tehran from aligning with the Soviet Union. VOA began expanding its Persian-language 
broadcasts to reach more Iranians in their native language. These new broadcasts 
included content on the importance of religion in American life and profiles of prominent 
Muslim Americans. Meanwhile, the International Communication Agency developed 
new exchange programs between the United States and Islamic countries to cultivate this 
idea of a shared religious background.55  
 However, the Iranians resisted American propaganda messages. Although the new 
government opposed communism, it also sought to be nonaligned. As new Foreign 
Minister Ibrahim Yazdi pointed out to the Americans, Iran had “no better memories” of 
Russia than the United States and that “at least Americans believe in God.”56 
 Despite all the information gathered during this study of resurgent Islam, the 
Carter administration still found it difficult to apply all this new data in dealing with the 
new Iranian government. Khomeini continued to cultivate an anti-Western sentiment in 
Iran with statements such as, “I beg you to be on your guard, these Westernized 
[Iranians] want to take away our Islam.”57 One Iranian scholar who spent significant time 
with Khomeini advised the Carter administration that Khomeini “knows almost nothing 
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of the non-Islamic world. He does not understand the West, and in his fear of the 
unknown he hates it.”58  
 As the chaos surrounding the revolution continued to unfold and purges occurred 
across Iranian society, the American diplomats in Tehran wondered how to maintain 
routine diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. Bruce Laingen, the 
charge d’affaires in Tehran, noted the new government was “adrift” and seeking to make 
the United States the “convenient scapegoat” for the lack of social progress following the 
fall of the shah.59 Ken Taylor, the Canadian ambassador in Tehran, attributed part of the 
chaotic conditions to the fact that “Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters were 
astounded by the rapid and total collapse of the shah and his army. They had anticipated 
years of struggle and counted on more time to introduce and form a government in exile 
during a lengthy transitional period.”60 
 Since the political scene in Iran was in flux, the Carter administration mistakenly 
built relationships only with the secular leadership represented by Bazargan and Yazdi. 
The earlier assumptions that Khomeini would be only a “spiritual guide” or “Gandhi-
like” figure in the new Islamic Republic misjudged Khomeini’s political acumen, 
especially in his denunciations of the US as the “Great Satan” that helped discredit the 
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more moderate secular leadership.61 Administration officials consistently underestimated 
Khomeini and the religious leadership, believing that the secular leaders would “tame” 
Khomeini and that “although [the secular leaders] lose more often than they win, they are 
buying time and giving Khomeini the chance to discredit himself by his extremism.”62 
These officials believed that theocratic government was a relic of the Middle Ages rather 
than understanding the modern modifications to theocracy of Khomeini’s Islamic 
Republic. In a top secret “black room report,” policymakers believed that “Khomeini is 
his own worst enemy. Left to his own devices, he will destroy himself. We should 
prepare for that event and use our covert assets to urge it along.”63  
 However, a lack of intelligence clouded US assessments of the political scene in 
Iran of the ability of the secular leaders or the durability of a Khomeini-led regime. Henry 
Precht reported in July 1979, “We simply do not have the bios, inventory of political 
groups or current picture of daily life as it evolves at various levels in Iran. Ignorance 
here of Iran’s events is massive.”64 
 The transitional period beginning with Khomeini’s arrival in Tehran on February 
1 quickly foreshadowed the hostage crisis that would dominate US-Iranian relations for 
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the rest of Carter’s presidency. In mid-February, Iranian revolutionaries took Americans 
hostages in the city and then later stormed the American embassy. In both instances, the 
Iranian provisional government acted quickly and freed the American hostages. 
Moreover, in both cases, intermediaries communicated apologies to US officials from 
Khomeini.65 The CIA, however, warned administration officials that the Shia holy month 
of Moharram (falling in November) could be an occasion for a particularly hostile Iranian 
outburst against the United States.66  
 In the fall of 1979, the shah announced he had terminal cancer and requested 
entry to the United States for medical treatment. The request stirred a great debate 
because some advisors advocated admitting the shah for humanitarian reasons while 
others proclaimed the potential damage to US-Iranian relations. Carter proceeded on the 
issue very cautiously, telling his advisors, “I won’t have the shah playing tennis in 
America while our people are at risk in Iran.”67 When Carter finally decided to admit the 
shah for medical treatments, he prophetically asked his staff, “What are you guys going 
to advise me to do if they overrun our embassy and take our people hostage?” After a 
brief silence, Carter continued, “On that day, we will all sit here with long drawn, white 
faces and realize we’ve been had.”68 
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 After the shah arrived in the United States to begin his cancer treatments, tensions 
between the United States and Iran quickly escalated. While in Algeria, Brzezinski met 
informally with Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi. Both men 
expressed fears of the shah using the United States as a base to launch a 
counterrevolution. Brzezinski tried to allay their fears by trying to communicate the 
shah’s medical condition to the Iranians to verify the reason for his stay and by 
encouraging them to sue for the shah’s assets in American courts.69 This meeting in 
Algeria stoked suspicions among Iranian radicals of their country returning to the US 
orbit and that it was a pretext for the return of the shah.70  
 Thus, the final stage for the 444-day hostage crisis arose when Khomeini, 
unaware of the students planning to take over the US embassy, announced on November 
2, “It is incumbent upon students in the secondary schools, the universities and the 
theology schools to expand their attacks against America and Israel. Thus America will 
be forced to return the criminal, deposed shah.”71 
 When a group of militant Iranian students seized the American embassy and took 
diplomatic personnel hostage on November 4, most members of the Carter administration 
believed the crisis would be short-lived, like the earlier February 14 embassy seizure. 
Carter himself recalled, “My impression was that originally [the students] had not 
intended to remain in the embassy or to hold the Americans captive beyond a few 
                                                 
69 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 476. 
 
70 Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 
105; Harold Saunders, “The Crisis Begins,” in Warren Christopher et al, American Hostages in Iran: The 
Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 43. 
 
71 As cited in Wright, Our Man in Tehran, 110. 
 
109 
hours.”72 US officials realized its seriousness when a few hours later, Khomeini endorsed 
the hostage taking by sending his son Ahmed to congratulate the students on seizing this 
“den of spies” and after secular leaders such as Bazargan and Yazdi resigned from the 
provisional government.73  
 The students attacked the embassy not only to demand the return of the shah, but 
also to protest the improving relationship between the United States and Iran’s secular 
leadership, best represented by the recent meeting between Bazargan and Brzezinski in 
Algeria. Although Khomeini did not know of the students’ plans in advance, he quickly 
endorsed the embassy seizure as a way to consolidate support for the upcoming vote on 
the Islamic constitution and further cripple the secular leadership in Iran.74  
 The administration experienced some division over how to handle the hostage 
situation. On one hand, Vance supported saving the hostages’ lives at all costs. On the 
other hand, Brzezinski was willing to sacrifice their lives to protect the nation’s honor.75 
Carter straddled the fence between Vance and Brzezinski, later recalling in his spiritual 
memoirs that his “two preeminent goals” were “to protect the interests and honor of my 
country and to bring all the hostages back home to safety and freedom.”76 However, a 
lack of intelligence hindered policymakers’ ability to devise more specific plans to 
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achieve these objectives of ensuring the safe return of the hostages and maintaining the 
honor of the country. CIA Director Turner admitted in one early meeting that his agency 
had practically no information about who captured the embassy and their ties to the 
Khomeini government.77  
 In hindsight, Sick claimed that policymakers quickly understood that the hostage 
crisis related to Iranian internal politics as the conservative mullahs sought supremacy 
over the secular liberals in government. Nevertheless, Sick admitted that he 
underestimated how long it would take for Khomeini to “make his political point” and his 
“willingness and ability to absorb external economic and political punishment in pursuit 
of his revolutionary objectives.”78 Shortly after the resignations of Bazargan and Yazdi, 
Carter asked his staff, “With Bazargan gone, who does that leave us to deal with?” 
Secretary Vance replied, “The Ayatollah Khomeini.” In a very quiet voice, Carter 
responded, “I’m afraid I had reached the same conclusion.”79  
 In gathering more intelligence about Khomeini and the new shape of the Iranian 
government, US officials filtered most of the information through the lens of their biases 
against the notion of a cleric-led Islamic republic being successful. Policymakers’ 
tendencies to view Khomeini as “crazy” or “irrational” inhibited planning because 
Khomeini’s actions in establishing an Islamic republic in Iran ran so counter to their 
American assumptions of how governments worked in the late 20th century and their 
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acceptance of the metanarrative of secularization and progress.80 The CIA reported on the 
transition of power in Iran as the Revolutionary Council took on a greater role in day-to-
day affairs after Bazargan and Yazdi resigned, noting that council members, mostly Shia 
clerics, “are unprepared by background and temperament to run the country effectively” 
and “have little regard for the norms of international diplomacy and are not very 
concerned about Iran’s foreign image.”81 Carter was less measured in his perception, 
expressing in his diary, “The students are still holding our people with the public 
approval of the idiot Khomeini.”82 
 Many analysts dismissed the new Iranian government because they seemed 
culturally biased against Islam as an antiquated religion that fostered aspirations of 
martyrdom. CIA analyst Richard Lehman explained, “Khomeini’s attempt to rule a semi-
developed state of the late twentieth century by the standards of a tenth century theocracy 
will ultimately fail” and described the Islamic republic as an “anachronism.”83 Gary Sick 
affirmed this assessment, portraying Khomeini as “a man of the eighth century” who 
“speaks and thinks a medieval and symbolic language which is incomprehensible to all 
but those initiated into Shia religious doctrine.”84 In complimenting Carter’s handling of 
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the first week of the crisis, psychiatrist Ronnie Heifitz urged the president to consider 
Khomeini’s “suicidal psychology” in all future negotiating efforts.85 
 All the negative assessments of Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council pointed 
to the immense difficulty the United States would face in trying to free the hostages, a 
task complicated by the ignorance and feelings of cultural superiority of US 
policymakers. Experts in the National Security Council quickly dismissed negotiating 
with Khomeini as fruitless. Sick argued, “we should not assume we are working with an 
opponent who is capable of exercising real judgments.”86 Despite feelings that 
negotiating would be futile, Sick advised Brzezinski, “Khomeini is not going to accept 
the political costs of giving up the hostages until he is persuaded that continued holding 
of the hostages is more costly to him than give them up… Our strategy, therefore, must 
concentrate on making the present situation as costly politically as possible for Khomeini 
and his followers.”87 Brzezinski concurred, noting that diplomatic approaches constrained 
the administration to a “litigational approach” that would create a “prolonged malaise.” 
Instead of an extended negotiating process, he wanted a military strike.88  
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 Other Iranian experts anticipated similar difficulty in resolving the hostage crisis. 
When the crisis began, experts in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research predicted a long, difficult process as its experts feared Khomeini’s 
unpredictable nature.89 Former attorney general Ramsey Clark, a friend of secular 
elements in the new Iranian government, opined “humanitarian appeals to Khomeini are 
not likely to be productive. His years of exile have not made him sympathetic to the 
plight of the hostages.”90  
 Despite the widespread pessimism about negotiations, Carter and his advisors 
discussed who would be a proper emissary to visit Khomeini to petition for his assistance 
in releasing the hostages shortly after the crisis began. They discussed a variety of 
options including secular and religious figures. Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher suggested former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, a virulently anti-shah 
advocate who had met with Khomeini during his Paris exile, and congressional staffer 
William Miller, who had contacts with Khomeini.91 Clark could not guarantee Khomeini 
would see him, but he encouraged Carter to contact the ayatollah directly via telephone 
and speak to him on the basis of a shared commitment to religion. He naively hoped the 
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president’s deep faith and personal testimony could reach Khomeini in ways that secular 
forms of persuasion could not.92  
 Clark’s assumption that Carter could utilize his own status as a “man of religion” 
to speak to Khomeini overlooked the vast gulf separating the two men’s beliefs. Sick by 
contrast argued that while Carter was pragmatic in his faith, Khomeini was a “total 
ideologue” who possessed “absolute and final” answers to all questions.93 Chief of Staff 
Hamilton Jordan recalled that he walked into Carter’s personal study adjacent to the Oval 
Office while the president was writing a personal letter to Khomeini imploring him to 
receive Clark and Miller as his personal emissaries. Jordan remembered, “I was amused 
at the idea of the Southern Baptist writing to the Moslem fanatic. What will he say to the 
man? I thought. Maybe he’ll sign the letter ‘The Great Satan.’”94 
 The Carter administration also sought to make contact with Khomeini through 
religious figures appealing to Khomeini on spiritual terms. Carter wrote, “It’s almost 
impossible to deal with a crazy man [Khomeini], except that he does have religious 
beliefs…I believe that’s our ultimate hope for a successful resolution of this problem.”95 
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The Vatican appeared a likely choice for this strategy of faith-based persuasion since 
Khomeini considered the pope as his equal.96  
 The pope sent a special representative to Tehran to persuade the ayatollah to 
release the hostages, but the papal envoy instead received a lecture from Khomeini on 
November 11.97 Khomeini berated the Catholic official, pointing to the Vatican’s silence 
during the shah’s reign, “nor did it ever occur to His Eminence, the Pope, to show any 
concern for our oppressed people, or even to mediate with the plea that oppression 
cease.” Khomeini also warned the pope that he “should realize that certain people claim 
to be Christians while acting in a manner contrary to the precepts of Jesus Christ” and 
boldly declared “if Jesus Christ were here today, he would call Carter to account and 
deliver us from the clutches of this enemy of humanity.”98 The Iranian embassy published 
the full version of Khomeini’s response to the pope in the November 18 edition of the 
New York Times.99 
 Although lacking official sanction from the Carter administration, pastor Jimmy 
Allen, the former Southern Baptist Convention president and a close ally of the president, 
traveled to Tehran as part of a delegation of clergymen invited by Khomeini to discuss 
religious issues.100 Upon his return to the United States, Allen wrote a detailed memo to 
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Carter with observations about Khomeini and the revolutionary climate in Iran. Allen 
commented that Khomeini “think[s] in those terms [his righteous cause] first and in 
practical geopolitics secondarily,” cautioning Carter not to place too much faith in 
coercive military, diplomatic, and economic measures. He suggested that Andrew Young 
might be a good emissary because the Iranian students held American civil rights icon 
Martin Luther King Jr. in such high esteem, and Young could play on his connections to 
King, his background as a minister and civil rights activist, and his firing from his 
ambassadorship after making sympathetic comments to the Palestinian cause. In the 
margins of Allen’s letter, Carter recommended that Vance and Brzezinski carefully study 
the pastor’s observations and directed them to “share with others as appropriate.”101 
 In addition to using other Christian leaders to reach Khomeini on religious terms, 
Carter and his team launched an outreach campaign to the Islamic world, including 
Muslim ambassadors, the Habib Chatty of the Islamic League, and various Muslim 
clergymen in hopes that Khomeini’s fellow Muslims could persuade him to release the 
hostages.102 Sick recalled “a number of independent initiatives by Islamic statesman” to 
negotiate an end to the conflict.103  
 State Department experts in the Iran Working Group worked to establish contacts 
among the Shia clergy in Iraq in hopes of reaching Khomeini. They also sought to 
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develop scenarios in which Khomeini freed the hostages as an act of Islamic mercy 
during the holy month of Moharram. Harold Saunders, assistant secretary of state for the 
Middle East and head of the Iran Working Group, recalled that “we would look again and 
again at those events in the Islamic calendar that might be occasions for pardoning 
prisoners and releasing captives.”104 In January 1980, a senior Islamic statesman secretly 
visited Washington in an attempt to repair the damage done to Islam’s image following 
the capture of the hostages. He prophetically advised Secretary Vance, “You will not get 
your hostages back until Khomeini has put all the institutions of the Islamic revolution in 
place.”105 
 The administration also considered a wide range of options as it sought to 
maximize the resources of the American Muslim community to help free the hostages. In 
early December, Carter met with a number of American Muslim leaders including clerics, 
scholars, and businessmen to reassure them that their country was not at war with Islam 
and emphasize their common monotheistic heritage.106 Shortly thereafter, the Council of 
Islamic Organizations of America sent Carter a letter pledging their support to freeing the 
hostages.107 The administration also considered using black Muslims to reach out to 
Khomeini. Louis Martin, advisor on black affairs, encouraged Carter to consider sending 
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boxer Muhammad Ali or Nation of Islam leader Wallace Muhammad to plead with 
Khomeini for the hostages’ release.108 
 American policymakers also worked with scholars and Muslim clergymen to 
attempt to make a legal case for the hostages’ release based on Islamic law or to provide 
a possible defense in case Khomeini put the hostages on trial. They tried to use 
precedents in Islamic law where Islamic rulers had expelled foreign diplomats rather than 
incarcerating or executing them to convince the Iranians to release the hostages.109 Based 
on those precedents, some State Department experts believed that if Khomeini put the 
hostages on trial, he might use the month of Moharram to declare the hostages guilty and 
expel them from Iran. However, the CIA saw the potential hostage trials more 
pessimistically and took Khomeini’s rhetoric about the embassy personnel spying at face 
value.110 Ultimately, these attempts to use Islamic law to free the hostages were fruitless 
because according to the CIA, Khomeini “has increasingly come to see himself as the 
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Imam, the ultimate interpreter of Islamic law—indeed the very embodiment of Islamic 
law” in his role as the velayat-e faqih.111 
 In early December, the National Security Council and State Department convened 
a conference of American policymakers and scholars of the Islamic world to consider a 
long-term strategy for US relations with Muslim countries in the wake of the Iranian 
Revolution and the hostage crisis.112 The papers at the conference varied in scope from 
addressing the larger phenomenon of Islamic resurgence to the more specific implications 
of the Iranian crisis in hopes of avoiding a long-standing conflict with the Islamic world. 
One paper entitled “Islamic Resurgence: Some Thoughts for Discussion” argued that 
while Islam “is not confined to one sector or segment of life,” it did not provide the basis 
for a “single world state,” reaffirming conclusions from the government study in early 
1979 that the Islamic resurgence lacked strong transnational tendencies, implying that 
Iran’s revolution would not be the starting point of a large Islamist movement across the 
region.113 However, the CIA’s assessment of the Middle East at the end of 1979 painted a 
different picture, noting the rising unrest among Shia Muslims in the Persian Gulf and the 
increasing transnational activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization 
active since the 1950s.114 
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 The conference also produced papers about the general rise in religious fervor 
around the world and the specifics of the Iranian crisis. One paper encouraged increased 
sensitivity among the American policymakers toward the Islamic world in it actions and 
rhetoric such as the course of US involvement in Arab-Israeli affairs, birth control funded 
by US economic assistance programs, and human rights rhetoric too grounded in Western 
values. The writer astutely noted that the Islamic resurgence “is a natural part of a global 
search for underlying spiritual values in which American society is also involved” and 
that “actions taken by the US government are likely to be viewed in the Islamic world, 
however wrongly, as reflecting American spiritual values and be judged accordingly” due 
to the absence of the notion of separation of church and state among many Muslims.115  
 Another paper focused exclusively on the Iran issue emphasized the differences 
between the Shia population of Iran and the majority Sunni population of the Arab world, 
arguing that US action Iran would not necessarily create an adverse reaction among 
Sunni Arabs because of the Shia-Sunni doctrinal divide. However, the author cautioned 
US policymakers to craft a “selectively Iranian response” that avoided the perception of 
being “against Islam.”116 
 During the Christmas season, the conflict between the United States and Iran took 
an interesting twist after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Government experts, 
scholars, and journalists already anticipated Soviet fears of the Islamic resurgence 
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affecting the predominantly Muslim populations of its Central Asian republics.117 The 
Soviets had a track record of involvement in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, but this 
invasion changed the entire geopolitical context of the Iranian hostage crisis and the 
American strategy to resolve it.118 Brzezinski, the strongest advocate of anti-Soviet views 
in the administration, began to reconsider his support for a military strike against Iran, 
fearing that it might thrust Iran into Soviet arms.119 Vance recalled that some Iranian 
leaders contacted the State Department after the invasion, indicating their willingness to 
move forward in resolving the crisis so they could focus on defending Iran’s northern 
border with Afghanistan.120 
 The Carter administration wanted Khomeini to end the hostage crisis so that Iran 
could more easily unite with the rest of the Islamic world against the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan.121 While preparing a speech for Muslim scholars, Carter directed his 
speechwriter to “have [a] paragraph added referring strongly but indirectly to [Soviet] 
attempts to subjugate Moslems in Afghanistan.”122 In addition to the president’s public 
addresses, the Carter administration sought to persuade the member nations of the Islamic 
Conference to press for an end to the hostage crisis so that it could devote its entire 
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attention to Afghanistan.123 Despite its continuing conflict with the United States, Iran 
still strongly opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported the insurgency 
with training and supplies.124 
 While the government sought avenues to communicate with Khomeini and assure 
the Islamic world that the United States had no quarrel with it, the administration planned 
a series of public religious displays to demonstrate American unity and resolve and to 
keep the American public focused on the return of their countrymen. In the first two 
weeks, public outreach advisor Anne Wexler and religious liaison Bob Maddox urged 
Carter to call for a national day of prayer. The president agreed and urged Americans to 
pray to “seek God’s guidance in our search for peace and human brotherhood, and pray 
for the safe return of those whose lives are threatened.”125 Carter further encouraged 
American churches to ring their bells to remember the hostages’ absence, a gesture 
Khomeini lambasted, exclaiming, “Jimmy Carter could be seen trembling today in his 
cozy White House desperately ringing bells for the hostages and not for God or His 
messenger the Holy Christ.”126 In another symbolic gesture to remember the hostages’ 
imprisonment, Carter ordered that the national Christmas tree remain partially dark until 
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they came home. In his public address at the lighting of the tree, the president explained, 
“the recent events in Iran are an unfortunate example of that misguided application of 
belief in God.”127 
 Just as Khomeini claimed that “we are not in war with the American people,” 
Carter and his advisors went to great lengths throughout the crisis in communicating the 
United States only had a conflict with Khomeini, not the Iranian people or the larger 
Islamic world and that Americans had “respect and reverence for their religious 
beliefs.”128 In fact, Carter worried in his diary that Khomeini’s actions might harm Islam 
in the eyes of the world community “if a fanatic like him should commit murder in the 
name of religion against sixty innocent people.”129 At one meeting, Carter declared, “If 
Khomeini is the religious leader he purports to be, I don’t see how he can condone the 
holding of our people. There is no recognized religious faith on earth that condones 
kidnapping.”130  
 In a major press conference, Carter reiterated that no conflict existed between the 
United States and the Islamic world, pointing to the assistance rendered by Islamic 
countries and organizations in the crisis, even from unlikely sources like Libya. The 
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president emphasized that the hostage taking constituted an affront for not only the 
Islamic faith in general, but also the Shia branch of Islam in particular. Based on the 
extensive research on Islam produced by government analysts and his own personal study 
of the Koran prior to the Camp David negotiations, Carter proclaimed the hostage crisis 
as “the misguided actions of a few people in Iran who are burning with hatred and a 
desire for revenge, completely contrary to the teachings of the Moslem faith.”131 
 In early February 1980, Carter followed the tradition of presidents giving a speech 
at the National Prayer Breakfast and punctuated his speech with the statement, “Every 
day, I pray for the Ayatollah Khomeini…It’s not easy to do this, and I have to force 
myself sometimes to include someone on my list, because I don’t want to acknowledge 
that that person might be worthy of my love.”132  
 However, Carter’s profession of his Christian duty to love his enemies muddied 
the waters of the hostage situation. Many Iranians scoffed at the notion of Carter praying 
for the ayatollah as ludicrous since the American president was the “Great Satan.133 The 
same day Carter spoke at the prayer breakfast, he also made a statement about US 
relations with the Islamic world in a meeting with Muslim scholars as part of the ongoing 
effort to reassure Muslims that the United States was not in a war with their religion. 
Carter stressed the common belief in one God and the common values of family and 
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hospitality shared by the predominantly Christian United States and the Islamic world. 
He also emphasized, “Of course there is indignation among Americans today over events 
in one Islamic country…But I can assure you that this just anger will not be twisted into a 
false resentment against Islam or its faithful.”134 
 The Carter administration, especially lower-level policymakers in the Iran 
Working Group, continued reaching out to the academic community to learn more about 
Iran, Shia Islam, and the broader Islamic resurgence. The president carefully read their 
analyses and reports, placing a C on all the reports he read, because he placed such a high 
importance on resolving the hostage situation and was very hands-on in the various 
efforts to ensure the hostages’ safe return. With an engineer’s penchant for detail, Carter 
told reporters that “I have spent hundreds of hours, literally, studying Iran and the 
composition of its people and the religious and political attitudes, the character of specific 
people who are involved, so that I can make the proper judgments accordingly.”135 In his 
February 7 meeting with Islamic scholars, President Carter sought advice on how to 
avoid saying or doing things that would escalate the conflict. Saunders recalled, “Like a 
lot of White House meetings, this one showed a few key people the President’s concern.” 
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136 Professor Bill stressed that policymakers should admit the US made mistakes in being 
so close to the shah’s regime and that “Khomeini must feel directly in touch with us.”137 
 Despite his meetings with small groups of experts, advocates, and scholars, Carter 
could not develop a plan to expedite the hostages’ release. The president’s national 
security team continued to encourage him to point out in public appearances that the 
hostage seizure “violates fundamental principles of traditional hospitality and Islamic 
law.”138 Carter accepted the advice. In his March 14 press conference, Carter condemned 
the continued holding of hostages in religious language as “an abhorrent act in direct 
violation not only of international law but the very Islamic principles which these 
militants profess to espouse and to support.”139  
 Much like earlier attempts to declare the illegality of the seizure of the hostages, 
the newest attempt in March 1980 proved futile. Douglas Huber, an American working 
with the government of Bangladesh, wrote the president, “emphasizing the lawlessness of 
their position I would not expect to be effective. They will be firm that Islamic and 
revolutionary principles are superior to the moral values we express as international law.” 
He further encouraged the president to seek a US-Iranian dialogue that transformed the 
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status quo where “[the Iranians] have labeled the President a demagogue and we have 
labeled Iran’s leader a fanatic lunatic.”140 
 As frustration mounted with each passing day, Chief of Staff Jordan presented a 
scenario in which Iran would free the hostages in exchange for a UN commission to 
investigate atrocities of the shah’s regime, among other stipulations. French lawyer 
Christian Bourguet and Argentine businessman Hector Villalon touted their contacts 
within Khomeini’s regime and offered Jordan their assistance in freeing the hostages. 
Bourguet and Villalon educated US policymakers on the politics of Khomeini’s Iran and 
even set up a top-secret meeting between Jordan, who went in disguise, and Iranian 
Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh in Paris.141 Ultimately, the scenario failed because 
Khomeini wanted the yet-to-be-elected Iranian parliament to decide the issue and refused 
to hand a victory to secular politicians, such as Ghotbzadeh and President Abolhassan 
Bani-Sadr, who felt that the hostage situation hurt Iran more than it helped.142  
 Later, in a meeting after the scenario’s failure, Bourguet told Carter and his senior 
staff, “your humanitarian arguments will never touch the Iranians…because these are the 
very same people who for years were imprisoned by the Shah, tortured, and have seen 
many of their friends and family members killed” while they took much better care of the 
American hostages. Irate, Carter responded, “I find that sickening!...To punish fifty-three 
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innocent human beings violates all the teachings of Christianity and the Moslem faith that 
I know of.”143 
 After this scenario to free the hostages fell through, it seemed clearer that 
Khomeini had a personal vendetta against the president. The ayatollah taunted Carter, 
accusing him of “a satanical conspiracy” and urging him “to abide by the teachings of 
Jesus Christ, instead of continuously ignoring them.”144 The CIA suggested that 
Khomeini made Carter the new object of his wrath after the defeat of the shah and wanted 
to make the hostage crisis as politically costly for Carter as possible, hoping the president 
would not win his reelection campaign.145 Vice-President Mondale believed Khomeini 
“was a fanatic who thought his opponents were wrong and should be punished for their 
evil. He hated us, he hated Carter, and we were a wonderful kicking post.”146  
 However, Carter himself made the occasional jab at the Iranians. In early April, a 
group of Iranian diplomats told Henry Precht, the State Department Iran expert, that the 
hostages were being well-treated and becoming sympathetic to the revolutionary cause. 
Precht curtly responded, “Bullshit,” a reply that created a media buzz in Washington. 
Carter read an article about the incident in the Washington Post and wrote in the margins, 
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“One of the elements of good diplomatic language is to combine conciseness, clarity, & 
accuracy. You have mastered this principle.”147 
 After experiencing so many disappointments in the negotiation process, Carter 
accepted Brzezinski’s advice that only a rescue mission would break the ongoing 
diplomatic deadlock.148 Brzezinski and other supporters pointed to the successful 
extrication of six Americans who hid in the Canadian embassy after the students seized 
the American embassy.149 Secretary Vance, who ultimately resigned after the rescue 
attempt, vigorously objected, “Khomeini and his followers, with a Shi’ite affinity for 
martyrdom, actually might welcome American military action as a way of uniting the 
Moslem world against the West.”150 When Vance raised his concerns at a National 
Security Council meeting prior to the mission, Carter replied firmly, “The Moslem 
countries may make a few public statements for the sake of Islamic unity, but you know 
as well as I do that they despise and fear Khomeini and will be snickering at him behind 
his back.”151 
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 Vance’s objections did not impede the president’s decision to authorize the rescue 
mission. During the mission, Carter gave the order to abort the operation when 
mechanical failures struck the helicopters in the desert outside Tehran. With a somber 
demeanor, Carter announced the failure of the rescue attempt and the death of several 
American soldiers as a result of aircraft crashes caused by the malfunctioning technology.  
 In Iran, Khomeini seized the opportunity to declare victory against the United 
States, attributing the rescue’s failure to “the sand storm which God sent which caused 
the mission to fail.”152 He also sent a fellow ayatollah to the site of the helicopter crash to 
say a prayer of thanksgiving for the American failure.153  
 As the Carter administration reflected on the reasons behind the mission’s failure, 
NSC deputy director David Aaron confided to Sick in a “half-joking” manner that 
perhaps the operation did not succeed because it was “Allah’s will.” Sick recalled he 
thought, “The ayatollah would have been pleased.”154 
 While teaching a Sunday school class about Jesus’ admonition to “turn the other 
cheek” during the lead-up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Carter recalled the pressure he 
faced during the Iranian hostage crisis to react militarily. He noted “we could have 
destroyed Iran with our powerful military, but in the process many innocent Iranians 
would have been killed.” In this brief excerpt from his daily devotional book, Carter 
omitted the fact that he ordered the rescue operation, instead focusing on his 
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administration’s use of “economic pressure and persistent negotiations.”155 Perhaps the 
mission’s failure shaped Carter’s post-presidential religious convictions about the use of 
force, as he was an outspoken opponent of American military action in Iraq (in 1990 and 
2003), in Haiti (1994), and in the recent drone strikes in Afghanistan.156  
 Following the failure of Jordan’s scenario and the rescue operation, the Carter 
administration refocused its negotiating efforts on working through Iran’s religious 
leadership to free the hostages rather than its secular officials whom Khomeini 
consistently undermined. However, Saunders noted that trying to find the intermediaries 
to reach the religious leaders would be difficult because “Khomeini has shown himself 
intolerant of the political views of the most respected Shia Ayatollahs in Iran, and is 
unlikely to be moved by any Islamic figure from outside.”157 Other administration 
officials considered working again through the Islamic Conference to convince Khomeini 
and his fellow clerics that “the continued holding of the hostages will not be in their best 
interest.”158 The Iran Working Group emphasized the difficulty of negotiating with Iran’s 
religious leadership through traditional Western-style pressure because “we are not in a 
classic bargaining position.”159  
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 Some administration officials only reluctantly agreed to the new negotiating track 
with the religious leaders because they still viewed the new Islamic Republic with great 
disdain. Gary Sick wrote, “the present Khomeinist effort to establish a clerical-dominated 
Islamic Republic is a temporary aberration which cannot and will not succeed. The only 
interesting questions are when and how it will collapse and what will emerge out of the 
wreckage to replace it.” To further make his point, he drew an analogy to American 
history, “imagine the state of this country if the Yippies had seized control of power in 
1968.”160 
 Many Carter administration officials had high hopes that they could finally reach 
out to the Iranian religious leadership and secure the release of the hostages after Iraq 
invaded Iran on September 22. They believed the crisis could be resolved before the 
election because the Iranian military relied primarily on US military hardware purchased 
during the shah’s regime and that equipment would need spare parts during a war. 
Brzezinski quickly suggested that such a strategy would be logical despite his assessment 
of the “irrational” and “fanatical” character of Iran’s leadership.161 However, this strategy 
ultimately failed because Iran was too consumed at the beginning of the war to seriously 
pursue negotiations with the United States and because Israel secretly sold Iran the 
necessary spare parts for its US-manufactured military equipment.162 Despite Iranian 
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accusations that the United States had encouraged Iraq’s invasion, no evidence exists to 
suggest American involvement in the beginning of the war.163 
 Despite American hopes that the Iran-Iraq war would lead to a resolution of the 
hostage situation before the American presidential election, Khomeini was determined 
not to do anything that might aid Carter’s re-election. Iranian President Bani-Sadr warned 
Khomeini that Reagan would be a much more dangerous American president than Carter, 
to which the ayatollah responded, “So what if Reagan wins? Nothing will change…He 
and Carter are both enemies of Islam.”164 On an earlier occasion, Khomeini told PLO 
leader Yasser Arafat that he would release the hostages only after the presidential 
election because he wanted to be remembered as “the man who brought down the Shah 
and the Carter administration.”165  
 After the two sides settled on the broad outlines of an agreement in the weeks 
before the election, one of Khomeini’s clerical advisors told him that the United States 
agreed to the conditions “because it would serve the President’s interests,” to which 
Khomeini angrily responded that “he did not want to do anything  that would help with 
the reelection of the President.”166 Despite considerable rumors of an October surprise on 
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the part of both the Carter and Reagan campaigns, the hostages remained in captivity 
when Election Day arrived, and Reagan won a landslide victory.167 
 In a very active “lame duck” period, the Carter team worked overtime to negotiate 
the release of the hostages and set a deadline of January 16 to reach a deal. If the sides 
did not come to an agreement, the negotiations would reset and be handled by the 
incoming Reagan administration.168 Deputy Secretary Christopher, who oversaw the final 
negotiations with the Algerians, warned the Iranians “might as well deal with the devil 
they knew” rather than Reagan, who had used a lot of bellicose rhetoric about the Iranian 
government during the campaign and the transition.169  
 In an ironic end to a conflict defined by religious misunderstanding and cultural 
biases, an Algerian mediator spoke of the final negotiations process, “These weren’t 
negotiations. They were more like an extended seminar. In Tehran, we explained to the 
Iranians the American legal, banking, and political systems. In Washington, we explained 
the politics of revolutionary Iran.”170 
 The Iranians released the hostages just moments after Reagan took the oath of 
office as a final insult to President Carter. Brzezinski offered the most succinct 
assessment of the hostage crisis, “Jimmy Carter succeeded in preserving both lives and 
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our national interest, but at the cost of his Presidency.”171 Biographer Frye Gaillard 
defended Carter against critics who described him as weak by pointing out how he 
prevented the deterioration of US-Iranian relations from becoming a global superpower 
conflict or a war pitting the United States versus the entire Islamic world.172  
 With the power of hindsight, many former administration officials and scholars 
point out how the significant attention Carter devoted to the hostage crisis gave Khomeini 
more power than he might have otherwise had.173 Barry Rosen, one of the hostages, 
remembered seeing a photograph of Carter praying for the hostages and thinking to 
himself, “I wondered whether he knew that the worst he could do was let the Iranians feel 
he badly wanted what they were selling. Nothing lowers [the] price so quickly as walking 
away from an Iranian’s stall.”174 During the crisis, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) told 
Carter, “The Ayatollah Khomeini doesn’t just have fifty-three hostages. He also has the 
President hostage.”175 
 Throughout the entire tenure of Carter’s presidency, Iran was an unexpectedly 
significant crisis point that no one anticipated would dominate the attention of 
policymakers, scholars, journalists, and the entire American population. In a later 
interview with religion scholar Richard Hutcheson, Carter reflected on how his Christian 
values affected his response to the hostage crisis. He commented, “The avoidance of 
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violence, or the killing of innocent people, an emphasis on human life, were all 
compatible with Christian principles.” Then he paused and added, “I guess you might add 
parenthetically, a long-suffering patience was also compatible with Christian 
principles.”176 In his spiritual autobiography Living Faith, Carter remembered the trying 
events of the hostage crisis as a time when he prayed more than any other time in his 
life.177 Beyond his private prayers, Carter and his advisors sought to increase their 
understanding of the Islamic character of Iran’s revolution and its new government and to 
find ways to use religious means first to establish better US-Iranian relations and later to 
free the hostages. However, the cultural and religious misunderstandings of Carter and 
his administration plagued their attempts to reach out to Khomeini and his cleric-led 
government. 
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"MY PEOPLE ARE DESTROYED FOR A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE": JIMMY 
CARTER AND SUPPORTING THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN 
 In a 1998 interview with Le Monde, former Carter administration national security 
advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski noted his advocacy for aiding the Afghan mujahidin in July 
1979 in hopes of provoking a Soviet “Vietnam.” The interviewer questioned Brzezinski, 
“do you regret having supported the Islamic fundamentalists, having given arms and 
advice to future terrorists?” Brzezinski replied, “What is most important to the history of 
the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet Empire? Some stirred-up Moslems 
or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?” The interviewer 
incredulously retorted, “Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated, 
Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.” Brzezinski dismissively 
responded, “Nonsense!...That is stupid. There isn’t a global Islam.”1 
 Brzezinski’s Le Monde interview underscored the Carter administration’s 
widespread underestimation of the power of religious nationalism among Afghan 
insurgents fighting Soviet invaders and Afghanistan’s history as a “graveyard of 
empire.”2 According to Fawaz Gerges, successive American administrations of both 
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parties “did not shift their strategic focus away from the Soviet Union, largely perceiving 
the new Islamists as a mere nuisance rather than a serious threat.”3 
President Jimmy Carter and other American officials had just begun grappling 
with the Islamic resurgence earlier in 1979 with the rise of Khomeini in Iran, but they 
were not able to decide which elements of Khomeini’s revolution were particular to Shia 
Iran and which parts had broader implications for the rest of the Muslim world. 
Ultimately, Carter chose to support the mujahidin on the familiar Cold War terms of the 
“enemy of my enemy is my friend” rather than fully appreciating the possible 
consequences of supporting Islamic insurgents. Previously, the United States had 
conceived of “Islam-as-bulwark” to contain the spread of communism in the strategically 
vital Middle East, but with the invasion of Afghanistan, Carter administration officials 
decided to use “Islam-as-sword” through the mujahidin and make the Soviet occupation 
as costly as possible.4 
With Brzezinski’s encouragement, Carter moved away from his earlier 
religiously-inspired rhetoric of championing human rights toward more traditional Cold 
War confrontational rhetoric and policies.5 Early on, Brzezinski tried to convince the 
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president to actively confront the Soviet Union. He identified the Muslim populations of 
the Soviet Central Asian republics as the USSR’s most significant vulnerability. 
Government experts and journalists alike pointed out that the Central Asian republics 
contributed to the USSR having the fifth largest Muslim population in the world while 
also highlighting the pitifully small number of government-approved mosques and 
clerics.6 Beginning in late 1977, Brzezinski supported broadcasting radio programs to 
Soviet Muslims, distributing copies of the Koran in Central Asian languages, and 
contacting the few Soviet Muslims permitted to make their pilgrimage to Mecca. 
However, the State Department, eager to preserve détente, resisted Brzezinski’s 
“nationalities” plan targeting Soviet Muslims, insisting that the US government lacked 
enough information about the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia to take action.7 
 Although Brzezinski oversaw the creation of the Nationalities Working Group in 
June 1978 to discuss ways to exploit Islamic hostility against the Soviet Union, his plan 
of reaching out to Muslim populations in Soviet Central Asia only gained traction after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.8 Until April 1978 when Afghan 
Marxist leader Nur Muhammad Taraki launched a successful coup against President 
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Mohammed Daoud Khan, the Carter administration’s interest in Afghanistan focused on 
fighting the narcotics trade, especially in opium.9 
 Taraki’s coup caught the Carter administration offguard because the CIA had 
ignored Afghanistan’s internal politics and lacked reliable information.10 The intelligence 
agency rapidly developed sources inside Afghanistan. By the beginning of May, the CIA 
addressed the Taraki regime’s efforts to avoid immediately alienating the Afghan 
religious community, but added that “although the government denies that it is 
Communist, popular suspicion of the government will grow as word spreads that the 
Communists—i.e., the atheists—are in power.”11 
 Through SAVAK, the Shah of Iran’s secret police, the CIA connected with 
Islamic groups opposed to the new regime. Brzezinski wanted to support the nascent 
resistance immediately after the coup, but at this point, Carter feared creating some sort 
of theocratic state in Afghanistan.12 However, US officials acquainted themselves with 
the groups coalescing to fight the new government. A member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a Muslim political organization with branches all over the Islamic world, 
reached out to a US air attaché in Kabul to report an upcoming counter coup.13 While 
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Carter wanted to stay out of the conflict initially and avoided the counter coup plots, one 
NSC analyst reported that Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia wanted to supply the rebels 
with “covert assistance in the form of funds, weapons, and safe havens, in the case of 
Pakistan.”14 
 In the waning months of 1978 and in the early months of 1979, a resistance effort 
unfolded in Afghanistan and challenged Taraki’s government forces for control of the 
countryside.15 After being preoccupied with normalizing US-Chinese relations and the 
Camp David Accords, Brzezinski seriously sought to aid the growing Afghan insurgency 
to undermine the Soviets. Tom Thornton, the NSC’s expert on South Asia, informed 
Brzezinski,  
as the [Taraki] regime gets more embroiled [against the insurgents], it will 
turn more to the Soviets for help. Some argue that this is against our 
interests since we would like to see the Afghans be more independent of 
the Soviets. If you believe as I do, however, that this is a vain hope, then 
there might be some advantage in getting the Soviets deeply involved.16    
 
With his interest further stimulated, Brzezinski asked Paul Henze, a NSC officer 
responsible for intelligence coordination, for “a coherent and systematic plan” to aid the 
insurgency. Henze explained that the resistance remained too “fragmentary” to produce 
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such a plan, and then he reminded his boss that Carter appeared unwilling to “support 
serious intervention” anyway.17  
 However, Carter was aware of the growing conflict in the region. In diary entries 
over a few weeks in February and March, Carter noted the “increasing turbulence” 
among “tribal leaders and religious groups” in Afghanistan. At the beginning of April, 
the CIA briefed Carter about the growing resistance in Afghanistan as well tying that 
intelligence to the presence of large Muslim populations in Soviet Central Asia.18 
However, intelligence officers, recalling some of the lessons of Vietnam, cautioned the 
president to not be too sanguine about the insurgency because resistance fighters “can 
hold their own in the mountains and may even win minor victories against the 
government, but they have little chance of capturing a major city or waging a successful 
campaign outside the tribal areas.”19 
 The Afghan resistance gained significant momentum and more attention from the 
Carter administration after a popular uprising and a large-scale mutiny among Afghan 
government troops in the town of Herat in March 1979. The Taraki regime introduced 
several secular reforms such as compulsory literacy education for girls and land reforms 
that took land away from tribal elders and Islamic clerics. These reforms sparked the 
revolt in Herat.20 The central government carried out these Marxist-inspired reforms in a 
                                                 
17 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Paul Henze, “Afghanistan,” February 21, 1979, NLC-17-88-4-1-2, RAC 
Project, JCL; Memo, Paul Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Afghanistan,” February 26, 1979, NLC-17-88-
4-1-2, RAC Project, JCL. 
 
18 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary, 297, 305, 306, 311. 
 
19 “Afghanistan: Prospects for the Insurgents,” n.d., NLC-23-61-2-3-4, RAC Project, JCL. 
 
20 Coll, Ghost Wars, 39-40. 
 
143 
society that had largely been governed at the local level for decades. Furthermore, the 
Taraki government attacked the Islamic identity of Afghanistan, repressing mullahs, 
foregoing the customary civil religious rhetoric of Islam, and using a new all-red flag 
similar to other Communist nations rather than green, the traditional color of Islam.21  
 Above all, the Afghan insurgents feared becoming just another Soviet republic, 
such as Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan.22 However, at a meeting of the Soviet Politburo a few 
weeks after Herat, one official worried about “the flare up of religious fanaticism,” tied to 
the success of Khomeini’s revolution in Iran.23 Taraki, believing the Iranians and 
Pakistanis disguised their regular army soldiers and sent them into Afghanistan, he 
requested that the Soviets send in regular troops from the Central Asian republics (who 
looked more like Afghans than ethnic Russians did) masquerading as Afghans to help 
quell the rebellion.24 
 Just as Carter and his team were skeptical of the Afghan resistance forces, the 
Soviet leadership feared the Taraki government had taken Marxist ideology too literally. 
Soviet intelligence chief Yuri Andropov wrote, “We know about Lenin’s teaching about 
a revolutionary situation. Whatever situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not 
that type of situation.” Another Soviet official remarked, “if there is one country in the 
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world where we would like not to try scientific socialism at this point in time, it is 
Afghanistan.”25 Andropov tried to convince Taraki to constructively engage Islamic 
leaders and not pursue reforms that alienated ordinary Muslims. He failed because Taraki 
wanted to crush the rebellion.26 
 Despite their private concerns about the Taraki regime, Soviet leaders publicly 
accused the United States, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia of interfering in Afghan 
internal affairs by aiding the resistance as early as August 1978. In the midst of the Herat 
uprising, an article in Pravda, the official Soviet paper, blamed the revolt on outside 
agitators. 27 After receiving a newswire report of the allegation, Carter scrawled a 
comment in the margins, “Mention atheistic nature of SU/Afghan govts.” Although he 
was generally respectful of people’s religious beliefs or lack thereof, Carter made a 
tactical decision to highlight the religious issue to drive home the contrast between the 
United States as a land of religious freedom and the Soviet Union as an atheistic nation 
bent on repressing religious expression for the sake of sowing anti-Soviet suspicion 
among Muslim states. Brzezinski relayed the president’s instructions to Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance for the State Department, CIA, and International Communication Agency 
(ICA) to highlight the atheism of the Marxist Taraki regime and its oppression of Islam.28 
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 While the Carter administration’s denials of Soviet allegations of US support for 
the rebels were technically correct, officials in the NSC and CIA busily explored the 
issue of whether such involvement benefited US goals vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Even 
prior to the Herat revolt, the CIA circulated some options for covert action in supporting 
the insurgency among senior policymakers.29 
 At Brzezinski’s direction, the CIA began investigating the extent to which the 
Taraki government constituted a Soviet puppet regime. The CIA’s Soviet expert, Arnold 
Horelick, predicted increasing Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to prop up the Taraki 
regime, asking “how far would the United States go in responding to Pakistani or Iranian 
appeals for US support of the cause of the Afghan rebels against Soviet intervention?”30 
 On March 30, Brzezinski’s deputy David Aaron hosted a session of the Special 
Coordinating Committee to discuss potentially aiding the Afghan insurgents. David 
Newsom, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, informed the group that the 
president was determined “to reverse the current Soviet trend and presence in 
Afghanistan, to demonstrate to the Pakistanis our interest and concern about Soviet 
involvement, and to demonstrate to the Pakistanis, Saudis, and others our resolve to stop 
extension of Soviet influence in the Third World.” Walter Slocombe, the Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, wondered aloud if the United States should support 
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the continuation of the insurgency in order to “[suck] the Soviets into a Vietnamese 
quagmire.”31 
 In preparation for another SCC meeting on the issue a week later, Horelick told 
CIA Director Stansfield Turner that support for the insurgents would likely fail to 
dislodge Taraki from power. However, since the Soviets already blamed the United 
States for secretly supporting the resistance, Horelick’s sentiment was, as senior CIA 
officer Robert Gates summarized it, that “covert action would raise the costs to the 
Soviets and inflame Moslem opinion against them in many countries.”32 Again, 
administration officials sought to use religion as a tool in the Cold War struggle against 
the Soviets with little consideration for the future possibility that inflamed Islamic 
fundamentalists might turn their sights to a new target. 
 By the summer of 1979, US intelligence reported that the Islamic and tribal 
resistance to the government had gained even more momentum and that the government 
had not effectively countered the rebels either militarily or politically.33 Based on those 
reports, Carter signed a presidential finding that authorized the CIA to provide nonlethal 
assistance to the Afghan insurgency, a move the administration had been debating for 
months. The president approved $500,000 to provide the rebels with radio equipment, 
medical supplies, and propaganda assistance. In a second finding, Carter permitted the 
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CIA to develop a more extensive propaganda network to further spread the message 
among the Afghan population that the Taraki regime was nothing but a Soviet puppet.34 
 After taking the first step of providing nonlethal assistance to the resistance, 
Brzezinski, in a speech approved by Carter, cautioned the Soviets “to abstain from 
intervention and from efforts to impose alien doctrines on deeply religious and nationally 
conscious peoples.”35 In addition to Brzezinski’s public statement, Director Turner and 
his team began reviewing “enhancement options” that might include arms shipments 
through Pakistan. On September 20, an interagency meeting discussed the range of US 
responses if the Soviets launched an invasion of Afghanistan to prop up the increasingly 
fragile Taraki regime.36  
 As the Carter administration increased its involvement in Afghanistan, Brzezinski 
renewed his push to create programs to exploit the differences between the Islamic world 
and the Soviet Union. Based on the findings of the Nationalities Working Group, he 
proposed a more assertive approach because the time seemed ripe for such a campaign 
toward the Islamic world due to the Iranian revolution and the increasing effectiveness of 
the mujahidin in Afghanistan.37 
 On December 11, the Special Coordination Committee devoted an entire meeting 
to broadcasting to the Islamic world. The group discussed not only expanding 
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programming in Islamic languages, but also consulting academic experts to improve the 
content of the programs in response to the “renaissance” occurring in the Islamic world as 
a way to foster Muslim goodwill toward the United States, especially because of the 
hostage situation.38 Brzezinski informed the president about the results and urged him to 
approve measures to improve American broadcasting capabilities in the Islamic world. 
However, Carter, a fiscally conservative Democrat, hesitated, not sold on the 
expenditures necessary to improve the facilities or programming of American 
broadcasting efforts that had deteriorated through many years of neglect. He wrote in the 
margins of the memo, “I approve the immediate action, but OMB [Office of Management 
and Budget] will have to assess for me the other new expansion projects.”39 
 With Carter’s approval of his short-term broadcasting plans, Brzezinski instructed 
Vance and Turner to start the immediate expansion of Persian-language broadcasts in 
programming content and transmitter power because such broadcasts would reach not 
only Iranian audiences, but some groups within Afghanistan as well.40 To implement the 
president’s instructions, the State Department began inquiring about building new radio 
facilities in Saudi Arabia and Israel, but broadcasting from either state carried costs. For 
instance, the Saudis wanted control of the broadcast content to expand their religious 
influence as the guardian of the Islamic holy places of Mecca and Medina. Meanwhile, 
radio broadcasts originating from Israel would generate suspicion among Muslim 
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audiences and officials in the American Embassy in Tel Aviv predicted that the US 
would have “eventually have to pay indirectly” for transmitters in Israeli territory through 
the sale of more arms or more sophisticated military equipment.41 
 The increasing American broadcasting effort and aid to the Afghan insurgency 
resulted from CIA reports of buildups of Soviet troops near the border of Afghanistan. 
Gates recalled that the CIA precisely tracked Soviet military movements, but its analysts 
had several opinions about the motivations for the mobilization.42 For instance, Turner 
believed that the Soviets would not invade Afghanistan “to avoid deflecting onto 
themselves any of the militant Islamic hostility now directed against the United States,” 
referring to the ongoing hostage crisis in Iran.43 
 American policymakers decided that while they would like to prevent a Soviet 
invasion to ensure the ratification of SALT II by the US Senate, they would find other 
avenues to support the Islamic resistance in Afghanistan and make a potential invasion 
“as expensive as possible” for the Soviets. The Special Coordinating Committee also 
agreed to continue propaganda efforts “to cast the Soviets as opposing Moslem religious 
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and nationalist expressions.” To achieve that objective, Carter signed another presidential 
finding to increase contacts with the insurgents.44 
 Even though the Carter administration had effectively tracked Soviet military 
movements, the Soviets surprised American policymakers when they launched their 
invasion on Christmas Day 1979, perhaps none more so than President Carter. Rosalynn 
Carter recalled her husband’s extreme reaction, “I’ve never seen Jimmy more upset than 
he was the afternoon the Russian invasion was confirmed. ‘We will make sure that 
Afghanistan will be their Vietnam,’ he said.”45 Carter remembered his reaction in his 
memoirs, “The Soviet Union, like Iran, had acted outrageously, and at the same time had 
made a tragic miscalculation. I was determined to lead the rest of the world in making it 
as costly as possible.”46 
 Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, celebrating the holidays in Georgia when the 
invasion happened, experienced a similar sense of surprise when he heard the news. He 
called the president to see if he should immediately return to Washington. Carter told him 
to stay in Georgia and compared the Afghan crisis to the current hostage situation in Iran: 
This is more serious, Hamilton. Capturing those Americans was an 
inhumane act committed by a bunch of radicals and condoned by a crazy 
old man. But this is deliberate aggression that calls into question détente 
and the way we have been doing business with the Soviets for the past 
decade. It raises grave questions about Soviet intentions and destroys any 
chance of getting the SALT Treaty through the Senate. And that makes the 
prospects of nuclear war even greater.47 
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Like many of his advisors who underestimated the power of Khomeini’s religious appeal, 
Carter not only discounted Khomeini, but he also did not fully consider the consequences 
of American support for the religiously-motivated insurgency in Afghanistan. Carter saw 
Khomeini as an aberrant madman rather than as a part of a larger Islamic resurgence that 
would produce violent results in the Afghan mujahidin. Instead, Carter focused his 
attention and energy on the Soviet threat. 
 Predictably, Brzezinski and Vance interpreted the reasons for the Soviet invasion 
differently. The national security advisor perceived the invasion as a renewed Soviet 
effort at global domination, recalling, “To me, it was a vindication of my concern that the 
Soviets would be emboldened by our lack of response over Ethiopia.”48 In a memo 
written the day after the invasion, Brzezinski warned Carter that the invasion posed “an 
extremely grave challenge” to the United States and that it was “essential” that the 
insurgency continued with American assistance.49  
On the other hand, Vance characterized the Soviet invasion as a response to the 
local problem of shoring up a struggling client state rather than something in a grand 
scheme.50 Ultimately, Carter shared Brzezinski’s outlook about the Soviet rationale for 
invading Afghanistan rather than Vance’s more nuanced perspective. 
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 Although American policymakers disagreed about why the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership launched an intervention because they believed 
Hafizullah Amin, the Afghan president who murdered Taraki to seize control in 
September, had moved away from a Soviet orientation. Amin had met with American 
diplomats several times and associated with the Asia Foundation, an organization the 
KGB linked to the CIA. Moreover, Soviet officials feared that Amin sought a 
rapprochement with the mujahidin.51 One official summed it up best, the Soviet 
leadership feared Amin was “doing a Sadat on us.”52 
 In addition to their concerns about Amin’s coup, the Soviets launched an invasion 
of Afghanistan because they feared the rising tide of Islamic religious nationalism, best 
represented by the Iranian revolution and the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, 
might spread to Afghanistan and then to its Central Asian republics.53 Soviet leaders also 
grossly underestimated the mujahidin’s abilities.54 Moreover, they miscalculated the 
international response to their invasion; for instance, Premier Leonid Brezhnev estimated 
that outrage would subside in a matter of weeks. Soviet Ambassador to the United States 
Anatoly Dobrynin commented to Brezhnev that Carter was “behaving like a bull in a 
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china shop” while other Soviet leaders believed “the emotional instability of Carter 
himself or…Brzezinski’s domination over him” caused the American reaction.55  
 In the wake of the invasion, President Carter scheduled a National Security 
Council meeting with his most senior foreign policy advisors to determine the American 
response. Prior to the meeting, the CIA, NSC, and State Department worked furiously to 
offer the president the best available information. The most pressing question revolved 
around expanding US assistance to the mujahidin. An official at an interagency SCC 
meeting lamented, “the covert actions that you authorized have been very slow in getting 
off the ground,” declaring that a rapid Soviet pacification of Afghanistan would be a 
disaster for the United States.56 
 To effectively increase aid to the insurgents, Carter administration officials knew 
Pakistani channels remained invaluable, especially since the shah’s demise. Carter’s 
strong conviction on nuclear nonproliferation complicated US-Pakistani relations, but 
CIA experts agreed with Brzezinski’s recommendation to Carter that “our security policy 
toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy.”57 However, some of 
Brzezinski’s lieutenants disagreed about such drastic changes in US-Pakistani relations. 
Thornton believed India would rise to the occasion and challenge the Soviets if 
Afghanistan remained a regional conflict and did not become a Cold War battle of Soviet 
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and American proxies, a condition that would be impossible with massive American aid 
to Pakistan.58 
 At the December 28 NSC meeting, Carter and his foreign policy team discussed a 
menu of options for responding to the Afghan invasion including support for the 
insurgents, a grain embargo, and a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Brzezinski stressed 
the importance of building international opposition to the invasion, especially among 
Islamic states.59 Most of the policymakers agreed that a Soviet withdrawal was unlikely 
in the short-term, so they wanted to make the invasion “as costly as possible” for the 
Soviets.60 An angry Carter sought to reorient American foreign policy away from its 
Soviet obsession, but he wanted to make sure this invasion did not go unpunished. As 
Cold War scholar Odd Arne Westad observed, “the president surprised even [Brzezinski] 
by supporting all proposals that were on the table.”61 
 Providing lethal assistance to the mujahidin was the most significant decision 
reached at the NSC meeting. Carter signed a presidential finding authorizing the United 
States to provide weapons and military training for the insurgents.62 The US arms supply 
operation commenced by providing Soviet-manufactured weapons and antiquated 
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American rifles to the rebels to help conceal American involvement in Afghanistan.63 
However, Carter and his advisors did not consider the potentially negative consequences 
of arming and training the Islamic religious nationalists of the mujahidin because they 
only focused on gaining advantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. No one in the 
administration foresaw any warning signs about the decision.64 
 In addition to providing arms to the resistance, Carter sent a strongly worded 
private note to Brezhnev, warning the Soviet premier that the Afghan invasion 
“represent[ed] an unsettling, dangerous and new stage in your use of military force, 
which raises deep apprehension about the general trend of Soviet policy.”65 Brezhnev 
tersely responded that the Americans should stop interfering in Afghan internal affairs, 
justifying the Soviet invasion by claiming the local government invited his troops. In a 
marginal comment intended for his aides, Carter wrote, “The leaders who ‘requested’ SU 
presence were assassinated.”66 
 After meeting with all his foreign policy advisors, Carter made a public statement 
about the invasion, noting, “this is the first venture into a Muslim country by the Soviet 
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Union since the Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1940s.”67 Another Carter 
administration official provided a background briefing for the press corps, explaining,  
One can, I believe, predict with a high degree of certainty, that the 
traditional spirit of independence of the Afghani people would express 
itself through sustained resistance. I think that one has reasons to believe 
that this will have an impact on the attitude of Moslem people. The 
Islamic world has been deeply concerned about the denial of religious and 
political rights to some 50 million Soviet Moslems. It is therefore highly 
unlikely that the Islamic world will be indifferent to the use of Soviet arms 
to suppress and to kill Afghans who wish to be independent.68  
 
Carter intended these statements to not only inform and inspire the American people, but 
also to encourage Muslim leaders around the world to see the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan as an atheistic regime waging war on a deeply religious country, not just as a 
violation of a nation’s sovereignty.  
 In public speeches in January and February, Carter again sought to emphasize the 
religious character of this conflict. For his January 4 address to the nation, Carter wrote in 
the margins to inform his speechwriters that he wanted to highlight the “major effort of 
atheistic Soviet gov’t to subjugate independent Muslim people of Afghan.”69 In various 
speeches, Carter praised the mujahidin and the character of the Afghan people based on 
the history of Afghan resistance to invaders and his desire to portray their struggle against 
the Soviets as a Muslim versus atheist conflict. He used language like “the fiercely 
independent Muslim people of [Afghanistan],” “an independent, freedom-loving country, 
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a deeply religious country,” and “the courage and tenacity of freedom fighters in 
[Afghanistan]” to encourage the Afghan resistance.70 
 For his State of the Union address, the president not only enunciated the Carter 
Doctrine, explaining that the United States would forcefully respond to threats against its 
interest in the Persian Gulf, but he again reached out to the Islamic world, seeking 
support for the American effort to induce a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and free 
the hostages in Iran. Carter declared, “We believe there are no irreconcilable differences 
between us and any Islamic nation. We respect the faith of Islam, and we are ready to 
cooperate with all Moslem countries.”71 
 In public and private, Carter transformed into an ardent Cold Warrior because he 
felt betrayed by the Soviets after his work to shore up détente, pursue additional arms 
control treaties, and reorient US foreign policy toward issues like human rights. 
Brzezinski, a strident Cold Warrior, influenced Carter’s transformation, counseling him, 
“since we have not always followed these verbal protests up with tangible responses, the 
Soviets may be getting into the habit of disregarding our concern.”72 
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 Carter seemed tired of turning the other cheek to the Soviets and sought to 
demonstrate American resolve to the Soviets, American allies, and the Islamic world. At 
a NSC meeting on January 2, Carter told his team that the United States would work with 
its allies “to try to do the maximum, short of a world war, to make the Soviets see that 
[the invasion] was a major mistake.”73 One NSC official urged Brzezinski to convince 
Carter to provide “extensive support to Soviet opponents wherever we find them, not on 
the basis of their worthiness or chances of winning, but on the basis of their ability to tax 
Soviet power.”74 
 The Carter administration took great interest in the January meeting of the Islamic 
Conference, discreetly encouraging Saudi Arabia to make the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan the main issue of discussion.75 The conference moved its meeting from 
Singapore to Islamabad to demonstrate support for Pakistan and added the issue of Israel 
to its agenda to entice leftist Arab states to participate. At the meeting, the delegates 
decided to expel the Soviet-installed government of Afghanistan from the conference, to 
condemn the Soviets and demand their withdrawal from the country, and to debate what 
further measures they could take such as boycotting the Moscow Olympics or all the 
member countries breaking off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.76 
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 In the midst of these early responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
Brzezinski renewed his focus on expanding American radio programming to Muslim 
audiences, building upon the president’s December 11 approval of such a plan prior to 
the invasion. However, the implementation of this new programming proceeded slowly, 
especially in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Brzezinski wrote notes to 
OMB Director Jim McIntyre and Vice-President Walter Mondale in hopes of expediting 
implementation, but to little avail.77 
 The cumbersome pace of the federal bureaucracy did not dampen Brzezinski’s 
hopes for an expanded American broadcasting agenda to encourage the Afghan 
resistance, and also drive a wedge between the Kremlin and its Muslim population. NSC 
Soviet expert Marshall Brement advised his boss to highlight the contrast between the 
suppression of Islam in the Soviet Union and the constitutional protections for religious 
freedom in the United States in his public rhetoric and private conversations with the 
president.78 In a press briefing on December 28, he directly linked the Afghan resistance 
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to the struggles of Muslims living in Soviet Central Asia, noting their common bonds of 
language and ethnicity.79  
 Brzezinski also hoped that the new broadcasting programs would assist in 
building support for the United States against the Soviet Union in the Islamic world. NSC 
Soviet expert Stephen Larrabee advised that the broadcasts should emphasize the “anti-
Islamic element [of the Soviet-sponsored government], particularly among countries of 
Middle East. We should portray regime as a Soviet puppet and Soviet action as anti-
Afghan and anti-Moslem. Aim should be to isolate Soviets within Moslem world.” He 
further explained that the broadcasts should “continue to stress our own common interests 
with Islamic world, contrasting our approach to internal change with Soviet approach.”80 
 The broadcasting agenda shaped the January 2 NSC meeting among the 
president’s senior advisors. Carter and his team agreed that the United States should take 
maximum advantage in the arena of public diplomacy in highlighting the Soviet invasion 
to Muslim audiences and encourage its allies to follow suit.81 In a memo to Carter written 
the day of the meeting, Brzezinski, taking Brement’s advice, argued that Voice of 
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America and other American radio broadcasts should emphasize the history of Russian 
and Soviet repression of Islam.82 
 Although implementation proved slow and uneven due to the budgetary process 
and bureaucratic turf wars between the State Department and the International 
Communication Agency, Voice of America’s (VOA) programming content reflected the 
spirit of Brzezinski’s suggestions and the actions approved by Carter.83 Early on in the 
crisis, VOA broadcast a seven-part series on Islam to demonstrate to Muslim audiences 
the American understanding of their religion. The series included a panel of distinguished 
scholars, Muslim and non-Muslim, from the United States, Canada, Britain, and India, to 
discuss issues such as the Islamic resurgence and the Muslim populations in Soviet 
Central Asia.84   
 This VOA series responded to the common perception among many Muslims that 
Americans lacked understanding that Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shia sect were not 
representative of all Islam, especially since the Iranian regime had continued holding a 
group of American hostages. Carter administration officials hoped that the VOA series 
would also encourage hope among Muslims that it would attempt to be accurate and 
                                                 
82 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, “Possible Steps in Reaction to Soviet Intervention in 
Afghanistan,” January 2, 1980, “Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—Afghanistan: [12/26/79-1/4/80]” folder, 
Box 17, Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Materials Collection—Geographic File, JCL. 
 
83 “Implementation of Instructions Emerging from January 2, 1980 NSC Meeting,” n.d., in “Towards an 
International History of the War in Afghanistan.” 
 
84 Memo, John Reinhardt to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “January 1, 2, and 3 Coverage of Afghanistan and Iran,” 
January 4, 1980, “FGA298-1 1/1/80-1/15/80” folder, Box FG-218, White House Central File—Subject File 
(hereafter WHCF), JCL; Memo, Charles Bray to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “VOA Output on Iran, Afghanistan, 
and US-Soviet Relations, January 22-24,” January 25, 1980, “FG298-1 1/16/80-1/31/80” folder, Box FG-
219, WHCF—Subject File, JCL. 
 
162 
sensitive to the history and theology of their faith and that the American people had 
begun to learn more about Islam.85  
 VOA broadcasts leaned heavily on scholars of Islam and former American 
diplomats with expertise in the Islamic world to help provide content for their 
programming. They provided coverage of a three-day conference at the Washington 
Islamic Center. Famous Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis gave a series of interviews on 
“Islam as a Civilizing Force” and “The Uniqueness of Islam,” noting, “Muslims cannot 
be expected simply to borrow their concepts and institutions from the West. Still less, of 
course, from atheistic communism.”86 Theodore Eliot, the former American ambassador 
to Afghanistan, dismissed Soviet claims that Islam “flourishes” within its borders, an 
attempt to persuade the Afghan population of the beneficence of their occupation. 
Moreover, Eliot argued that the Afghan resistance was “so fierce” because they realized 
that the atheistic Soviets oppressed Islam and all other religions.87 
 As part of the effort to reach out to the Islamic world to bolster opposition against 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and support for the release of American hostages in 
Iran, President Carter met with a group of Islamic scholars and made a statement 
expressing US friendship toward Muslim peoples everywhere. VOA promptly reported 
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on the meeting and Carter’s remarks in English as well as various Islamic languages. ICA 
officials hoped Muslim audiences would understand that the United States was not 
opposed to Islam due to the hostage crisis, but that the Soviets had clearly demonstrated 
their hostility to the Islamic faith in their invasion of Afghanistan.88 
 Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty had long provided news 
to the populations of the world, especially to countries in the Communist bloc that had no 
other source of news except state-run media. In this way, VOA already did its job in 
reporting the news to Islamic countries regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
VOA programs pointed to statements by President Carter and other world leaders such as 
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat that condemned the Soviet incursion and their 
decisions to support Pakistan in the face of a potential invasion.89 Radio broadcasts also 
reported the Islamic Conference’s unanimous condemnation of the Soviet Union at their 
conference in Islamabad and the Soviet media’s attempts to distort the meeting’s outcome 
to the Muslim world.90 
 Despite the bureaucratic difficulties in implementing an extensive public 
diplomacy initiative in the Muslim world, the limited American efforts to expand the 
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reach of their radio programs to Muslim audiences and focusing the content on Islamic 
themes and Soviet aggression seemed to have some success. Both State Department and 
NSC officials reported adequate progress for this public diplomacy strategy, but noted 
additional work remained in expanding the reach and content of the programming and 
assessing audience impact. Vance, in particular, noted planning to expand public 
diplomacy initiatives to include American observances of the 1400th anniversary of 
Islam, more cultural exchanges, more education on Islam for private sector employees 
working in Islamic countries, additional Islamic language training for civil servants, and 
even bringing Islamic journalists to the United States to observe the 1980 presidential 
election.91  
 Carter administration officials also hoped these broadcasts would encourage the 
Afghan resistance in their “genuine liberation struggle” against Soviet occupiers. These 
officials debated what exact language to employ in broadcasts and statements, preferring 
terms such as “resistance forces” to “insurgents” or “rebels” because the latter terms 
suggested “a legitimacy for the Babrak Karmal government which it does not possess.” 
Brement also requested that officials making statements use adjectives like “Muslim” or 
“nationalist” to describe the resistance to point out the religious nature of the Afghan 
fight against the Soviets and their puppet regime.92 
                                                 
91 Memo, Paul Henze to Les Denend, “ICA Reports on VOA Output,” February 19, 1980, “FG298-1 
2/16/80-2/29/80” folder, Box FG-219, WHCF—Subject File, JCL; Memo, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, “US Relations with the Radical Arabs,” January 16, 1980, NLC-25-142-6-1-0, RAC Project, 
JCL; Memo, Cyrus Vance to Jimmy Carter, “Blueprint for Implementation of the President’s State of the 
Union Message,” January 29, 1980, NLC-15-123-9-2-8, RAC Project, JCL. 
 
92 Memo, Marshall Brement to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ten Next Steps,” January 7, 1980, “Afghanistan: 
1/1-8/80” folder, Box 1, Office of National Security Advisor—Country File (JCL); Memo, Jerry Schecter 
to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “SCC Working Group on Iran and Afghanistan: Sixth Meeting,” January 26, 1980, 
NLC-132-154-5-7-2, RAC Project, JCL; Memo, Marshall Brement to David Aaron, “Meeting of the 
165 
 While President Carter and his foreign policy team sought to shape international 
perception about the Soviet invasion and cultivate hostility among Muslim countries 
toward the Soviets, the Afghan resistance provided the boots on the ground fighting the 
invaders. American intelligence noted on several occasions the resilience of the Afghan 
resistance, a quality that the Soviets badly underestimated before invading. Analysts 
agreed that the Soviets would not permanently subdue the resistance, but possibly reduce 
it “to an acceptable level of annoyance” and “suppress [its] most troublesome aspects.”93 
 Although the resistance endured against the Soviets, it was also deeply 
fragmented among tribal, ethnic, and religious lines. Brzezinski remarked that such a 
divided resistance benefitted US interests because such a “low-level and enduring 
insurgency is essential to keep the Islamic states mobilized against the Soviets.” A group 
of Afghanistan experts assembled by the State Department later concurred that the 
divided nature of the resistance was a strength and that a unified resistance would be 
weaker in facing the Soviet threat.94 
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 To support the various resistance groups with arms and other supplies, the United 
States sought to build a coalition of other Muslim countries to assist the Afghan 
insurgents. However, the American commitment to Israel complicated efforts to find 
willing partners in the Islamic world. NSC staffer General William Odom suggested that, 
“the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan should be used to replace Israel as the focal point of 
Islamic hostility.”95 Brzezinski suggested to Carter a broader strategic rationale for 
Middle East peace beyond the president’s humanitarian commitment to peace, “to 
mobilize Arab support for our position in the region, and particularly to shore up Islamic 
opposition against the Soviets, we simply must accelerate our efforts regarding the 
Palestinians.”96 
 Pakistan, Afghanistan’s southern neighbor, worried less about Israel than the rest 
of the Islamic world because it faced an immediate security threat from a potential Soviet 
invasion. Thus, Pakistan became the natural ally for the Carter administration’s efforts to 
support the resistance in Afghanistan. Shortly after the invasion, Carter sent Brzezinski 
and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher on a trip to Pakistan to consult with 
President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq about his country’s supporting the insurgency. Carter 
instructed his two advisors to tell Zia that the United States would provide military 
equipment to help Pakistan secure its northern borders. On the issue of the Afghan 
resistance, the president wanted Brzezinski and Christopher to inform Zia that American 
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objectives included “a neutral Afghanistan” or at least “a protracted resistance that 
increases the costs to the Soviets and galvanizes world opinion about their aggression.”97 
 Brzezinski and Christopher traveled to Pakistan in January 1980 and met with Zia 
to reaffirm American security assurances for his country made in 1959 and to offer a 
$400 million arms package. Making humorous light of Carter’s former occupation, Zia 
dismissed the military aid offer as “peanuts.” Brzezinski recounted in his memoirs that 
while Zia desired American arms, he wanted to publicly distance himself from the United 
States and work together with other Islamic countries on the issue of Afghanistan to 
avoid the perception of Pakistan becoming an American client state.98  
 During their mission, Brzezinski and Christopher visited an Afghan refugee camp 
where the refugees bombarded them with requests for American weapons to fight the 
Soviets. While there, Brzezinski posed for a provocative photograph, holding an 
automatic rifle as he looked toward the Pakistani border with Afghanistan. He told the 
Afghan refugees, “You should know that the entire world is outraged. That land over 
there is yours. You will go back to it one day, because your fight will prevail and you’ll 
have…your mosques back again, because your cause is right and God is on your side.”99 
 Despite Brzezinski’s rousing speech invoking religious themes to the Afghan 
refugees, he was not really concerned with the radical Islamic nature of the Afghan 
resistance, except in how it could inflict damage to Soviet occupation forces. He agreed, 
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on Carter’s behalf, to Zia’s preconditions that arms supplied by the United States must be 
distributed by Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, to any group of the ISI’s choosing. 
The ISI also provided much of the training for the mujahidin forces who operated out of 
Pakistan. One month later, Brzezinski traveled again to Pakistan to meet with Zia to 
discuss further expanding the arms supply to Pakistan and the Afghan insurgents, with 
Saudi Arabia matching US expenditures dollar-for-dollar.100 
 The Pakistanis were not a passive third party in the American covert operation 
supplying arms to the Afghan resistance. Zia, the nation’s embattled military dictator, 
hoped to use his power of distributing arms and money to the Afghan freedom fighters as 
a way to present himself as a courageous leader in the rest of the Islamic world. Thus, the 
US and other countries funneled most of their covert arms to Islamic religious nationalist 
resistance groups rather than secular organizations.101 Zia also asserted his own 
nationalist credentials to the rest of the world to avoid the perception that he would 
become another shah-type leader dependent on US military aid. He declared, “If 80-
million people cannot safeguard their own freedom then nobody else in this world can do 
anything for them to safeguard their own freedom and integrity.”102 
 Despite Zia’s proclamation about Pakistan defending itself from potential Soviet 
aggression, the country’s military was ill-prepared for such a possibility. Brzezinski 
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reported to the president that Pakistan’s army had “poor equipment, no infrastructure, 
little effective communications.”103 
 To fund military aid to Pakistan (and covertly to the Afghan resistance), the 
Carter administration sought other supporters to supplement the American effort. 
American policymakers targeted Saudi Arabia as the primary source of support because 
of its tremendous oil wealth. They also sought to foster a closer US-Saudi relationship to 
avert future oil price crises. One NSC official advised Brzezinski to contact Saudi Arabia 
“with [the] aim of getting them to bankroll arms to Pakistan and insurgents.”104 
Brzezinski passed along the suggestion to Carter that the burden of funding the operation 
“might be shared with Saudi Arabia.”105 On their January trip to Pakistan, Brzezinski and 
Christopher met with the Saudis, whom Vance described as “generally responsive to our 
initial request for assistance for Pakistan.”106  
 The Saudis were very happy to provide matching funds for the Pakistanis and the 
Afghan insurgents. Saudi Arabia, the protector of the Islamic holy places of Mecca and 
Medina, wanted to assist in the effort to support the mujahidin’s struggle against the 
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atheistic Soviet Union. Prince Turk al-Faisal, head of Saudi intelligence, said, “We don’t 
do operations. We don’t know how. All we know how to do is write checks.”107 
 Although the Saudis provided a lot of financial support, Egypt was the major 
supplier of weapons to the insurgents in the first two years after the Soviet invasion. 
Sadat provided support for the resistance in the form of weapons, training, food, and even 
clothes from his own wardrobe.108 Brzezinski also visited Cairo to build up a coalition of 
supporters for the Afghan insurgents. Sadat willingly agreed to help supply the Afghan 
forces with Soviet-made weapons as he received more American financial and military 
assistance after signing a peace treaty with Israel. He also orchestrated support for the 
Afghan resistance among Islamist organizations in Egypt which was the most important 
center for Islamist religious nationalist thought. Sadat had a turbulent relationship with 
Islamist groups, frequently using them to achieve his political goals. For instance, he 
freed a number of activists jailed during Nasser’s regime when he first took office and 
then later repressed these same groups for their opposition to the Camp David Accords. 
Ultimately, Islamist extremists would assassinate Sadat.109 
 While Brzezinski traveled to Cairo, Islamabad, and Riyadh seeking assistance for 
American efforts to aid Pakistan and the mujahidin, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
traveled to Beijing to request support from the Chinese who had good relations with 
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Pakistan, Egypt, and several Afghan resistance groups.110 Brown met with the Chinese, 
offering a most-favored nation trade agreement, increased US-PRC military cooperation, 
and partial reimbursement for shipping arms to Afghanistan in return for China’s support 
of American efforts to bog down the Soviets in Afghanistan.111 
 The United States turned to other sources for support as well because the Carter 
administration received little assistance from the Western European allies.112 For 
instance, the CIA used anti-Soviet drug traffickers in Afghanistan to supplement 
American covert assistance to the mujahidin.113 Even Israel secretly provided support to 
the mujahidin as part of a larger effort backing Islamists against secular nationalist forces, 
such as Syria, Iraq, and the PLO, that posed the most immediate threat to Israel at that 
time.114 
 Although the covert American arms supply to the resistance had just begun in the 
first months after the invasion, the Afghan insurgents had successfully contained the 
Soviets and their puppet regime to the cities. Soviet tactical errors contributed much to 
the resistance’s early success because the Soviet military leadership trained their troops to 
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fight a conventional war in Europe against NATO forces rather than fight a guerrilla war 
in the mountains of Afghanistan. By summertime, the Soviets adjusted their tactics to use 
helicopters rather than tanks in fighting the insurgents, but by this time, the Carter 
administration’s arms supply operation had become more effective.115 
 In mid-March, Carter and his team met together to assess all their efforts in aiding 
the Afghan resistance against the Soviets. As part of that reassessment, Brzezinski urged 
Carter to authorize the introduction of anti-helicopter weapons to counter the Soviets’ 
adjusted counterinsurgency tactics.116 However, Carter hesitated, not seeing immediate 
benefits. He also believed that articulating American support for a neutral Afghanistan 
would prevent further tensions within NATO.117 
 Although reluctant, Carter increased the types of arms being sent to Afghanistan 
to make the Soviet occupation a costly venture. He prioritized the American-Soviet 
competition over understanding the latent anti-Americanism developing in the mujahidin 
organizations his administration supported. However, he had to maintain the public sham 
that the United States was not involved in supplying weapons to Islamic forces in 
Afghanistan. At an April Q&A session with journalists, Carter denied that his 
administration sent weapons to the Afghan insurgents, claiming “the Afghan freedom 
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fighters are doing very well on their own in getting weapons away from their own 
previous armed forces and also perhaps some from the Soviet invaders.”118 
 Even though Carter and his team focused on the mujahidin primarily in the 
context of inflicting damage on the Soviets, they did not ignore religion entirely as the 
administration still sought to make religious appeals to “maintain Islamic outrage at the 
Soviet actions in Afghanistan.”119 An Islamic Conference meeting in May became a focal 
point of this effort as American ambassadors in Muslim countries urged their host 
governments to focus on the Soviet subjugation of their co-religionists in Afghanistan.120 
 The Soviets also tried to influence the outcome of the Islamic Conference, 
assuring attendees of their eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan. They also sought to 
focus attention on the aborted American military rescue mission in Iran.121 Although the 
delegates spent more time discussing other issues such as Iran and Israel-Palestine, they 
largely reaffirmed the resolution from January’s meeting that condemned the Soviet 
invasion and established a standing committee to seek a withdrawal of Soviet troops and 
ensure Afghan sovereignty.122 
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 As part of the US-Soviet struggle to influence the course of the Islamic 
Conference, VOA reporters were on the scene to broadcast the proceedings of the 
meeting to Muslim audiences. The VOA reporters also conducted interviews with 
representatives from the various countries and from the Afghan resistance to publicize 
opposition to the continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan.123 
 Although VOA continued an active program of outreach to Muslim audiences, the 
American broadcasting effort had come under fire from Washington Post columnist 
Michael Getler earlier in May. His article illustrated some of the larger American 
challenges in reaching out to the Islamic world, especially in the area of language 
expertise. He argued that the Americans tried to reach the Afghans by broadcasting in 
Farsi, a language mainly understood by the upper class, rather than the more widely 
spoken languages of Pushtu and Dari. Getler interviewed Thomas Gouttierre, director of 
the University of Nebraska’s Center for Afghan Studies, who explained that the Farsi 
spoken in VOA broadcasts was “a very literary form of Persian. It’s stilted and certainly 
hard for Afghans to understand. If we are really trying to get information to Afghans, we 
are limiting our potential.” However, Gouttierre acknowledged that most of his Afghan 
friends point to the VOA and the British BBC “as the only real source of information” in 
the country.124 
 The Carter administration immediately responded to the withering criticism from 
the Washington Post column by pushing for six new positions at VOA who would 
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specialize in the Dari language. NSC officials hoped to start broadcasting a half-hour 
news segment in Dari within ninety days, but the bureaucratic battle of securing the 
necessary funding that had plagued the broadcasting program from the beginning 
continued as Carter continued to insist on fiscal discipline to counter rising military 
spending. Almost all the success of expanding American broadcasting to Muslim 
audiences came from diverting money from other ICA programs in other regions of the 
world.125 
 Despite the problems in the American broadcasting program, the American 
military aid covertly supplied to the mujahidin worked very well. A Los Angeles Times 
reporter explained, “the Afghan government, with Soviet help, controls less of the 
countryside today than the Afghan army alone did before the massive Soviet invasion last 
December.”126 American intelligence analysts reported, “resistance groups have 
continued to operate with impunity in the countryside…[and now] insurgents are moving 
closer to urban centers and are repeatedly cutting road links serving them,” but noted that 
the fighters had looming problems in getting enough ammunition and food.127 
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 The success of the Carter administration’s covert supply program raised concerns 
about potential Soviet reprisals against Pakistan. The mujahidin increasingly relied on 
support from Pakistan, whether from foreign governments or from their families living in 
refugee camps. Wary of the prospect of a Soviet strike into Pakistan, Turner declared, 
“we have to ask ourselves how important it is for us to frustrate what the Soviets are 
trying to do in Afghanistan.”128 In October, President Zia expressed to Carter his concern 
of Soviet retaliation, despite his denials of Pakistani aid to the mujahidin, telling him that 
Pakistan would need more assistance in the case of such an attack.129 
 Despite concerns of a Soviet reprisal against Pakistan, Carter and his team looked 
to continue expanding aid to the mujahidin not only with weapons, but food as well.130 
However, Brzezinski remained unsatisfied, believing the CIA should primarily continue 
to expand the arms supply operation. After hearing Brzezinski’s complaints in an October 
meeting, Turner committed the CIA to “pushing everything through the pipeline that the 
Pakistanis were willing to receive.”131 
 Carter’s advisors directed the course of the program aiding the mujahidin because 
the president dedicated most of his attention for the rest of his term to getting the 
hostages released and campaigning for his re-election. Lower-echelon policymakers 
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participated in the Middle East Studies Association conference in Washington DC after 
the election to hear what academics said about American efforts in Afghanistan. One 
scholar criticized the American approach to Afghanistan, chiding policymakers, “Our 
government made the invasion of Afghanistan an American-Soviet superpower 
confrontation—rather than allowing the Islamic states to make it a matter of highest 
priority for Islam and their own national sovereignty.” VOA reporters in attendance 
prepared favorable broadcasts and a special segment to reflect on the one-year 
anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.132  
 As Carter prepared to leave office, the mujahidin seemed to be performing well 
against the Soviet occupiers and their Afghan puppet regime, partly as a result of the 
burgeoning covert arms supply operation that Carter had authorized. One reporter 
claimed, “government forces can travel on key highways only under heavy military 
escort, while rebels move openly through major cities, including the capital of Kabul.”133 
VOA broadcasts highlighted the success of the mujahidin against the Soviets in many of 
its news segments transmitted to Muslim audiences to encourage other Islamic countries 
to support the continuation of the resistance.134 
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 Several years after leaving office, Carter traveled to Pakistan on behalf of his 
newly-established Carter Center to discuss health program initiatives with Zia. While 
there, the former president traveled to the Khyber Pass, the same site of the controversial 
Brzezinski photograph and a major center for Afghan refugees. Carter recounted, 
“several thousand Afghan freedom fighters assembled under a large tent to welcome me 
and express thanks for American assistance in their struggle against the occupying 
Soviets.”135 
 Carter remained involved in Pakistan in his post-presidential ventures through the 
Carter Center. The Center’s most important achievements in Pakistan were its eradication 
of Guinea worm disease in 1992 and its ongoing campaign to prevent neonatal tetanus 
disease. Although not directly involved in observing elections or negotiations, Carter 
made public statements calling for free and open elections at the end of General Pervez 
Musharraf’s rule and recommended compromises for Pakistan and India in their 
continuing dispute over Kashmir. The former president has not worked in Afghanistan 
due to the seemingly perpetual political instability there since the Soviet withdrawal.136  
 By the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Brzezinski’s 
anti-Soviet worldview had become the dominant guiding force in Carter administration 
foreign policy. Carter authorized a program to support the Afghan mujahidin with arms 
and other supplies in their fight against the Soviet Union. He also decided to launch a 
major expansion in American broadcasting to Muslim audiences, hoping to curry 
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influence with them on religious terms. However, both of these actions did not consider 
the long-range implications of supporting the religious nationalist Muslims that made up 
much of the mujahidin because Carter prioritized the US-Soviet competition above all 
other factors in his decision making. 
 Over the next several decades, the United States has experienced the blowback 
from Carter’s and Ronald Reagan’s decisions to further expand American involvement in 
funding the mujahidin. Radical Islamist groups received most of the arms because the 
United States ceded control of the distribution of its weapons to Pakistani intelligence, 
who favored many of the most radical resistance organizations. Throughout the 1980s, 
Muslim radicals from across the Islamic world, including Osama bin Laden, traveled to 
Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Their eventual success in driving out the Soviets created 
a global consciousness among these foreign fighters, which led to the evolution of a 
transnational Jihadist ideology rather than the indigenous Afghan religious nationalist 
resistance that Carter’s administration originally supported.137 Early into Reagan’s term, 
one Afghan prophetically warned the Americans, “For God’s sake, you’re financing your 
own assassins.”138 
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Chapter 6 
"A PROPHET WITHOUT HONOR": JIMMY CARTER AND THE RISE OF THE 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 
 At the 1976 Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) in Norfolk, Virginia, Bailey 
Smith, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Del City, Oklahoma, offered a resounding 
endorsement for Jimmy Carter’s presidential candidacy. Smith exclaimed that the US 
needed “a born-again man in the White House. And his initials are the same as our 
Lord’s!”1 Four years later on August 7, 1980, President Jimmy Carter welcomed Smith 
and his wife to the Oval Office to celebrate Smith’s election as president of the SBC. 
Carter and Smith briefly exchanged pleasantries, but their meeting ended on a sour note. 
Carter remembered, 
As he and his wife were leaving, he said, ‘We are praying, Mr. President, 
that you will abandon secular humanism as your religion.’ This was a 
shock to me. I didn’t know what he meant, and I am still not sure. He may 
have said this because I was against a constitutional amendment to 
authorize mandatory prayer in public schools and had been working on 
some things opposed by the ‘religious right,’ such as the Panama Canal 
treaties, a Department of Education, and the SALT II treaty with the 
Soviets.2 
 
What happened in the four years between Smith’s ringing endorsement of Carter and his 
condemnation of Carter as a secular humanist? At home and abroad, religious 
nationalism emerged as a force to reckon with. As Carter confronted religious 
nationalism in Israel, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a highly organized, well-financed 
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religious nationalist movement, dominated by conservative evangelical and 
fundamentalist Christians, emerged as a major force in American electoral politics.3  
Carter’s election in 1976 raised high hopes among these conservative Christians, 
but he never met those expectations because he failed to promote their policy priorities. 
Although Carter shared a similar evangelical faith, he did not root his evangelicalism in 
specific political positions, especially on foreign policy issues such as increased military 
spending, unquestioning support of Israel, and an aggressive anticommunist foreign 
policy, issues that to Carter, did not seem to be related to evangelical Christianity at all.  
 By the 1980 presidential election, the emerging Christian Right supported Ronald 
Reagan, the Hollywood actor, divorcee, and irregular churchgoer, over Jimmy Carter, the 
Sunday School teacher from Plains, Georgia. The differences between what being an 
evangelical meant to Carter and to the Christian Right led these activists to oppose 
Carter’s re-election and significantly diminished Carter’s evangelical support in 1980. 
For the Christian Right, the deterioration of America’s moral fiber in the 1960s and 
1970s led them to seek candidates who promised to restore the nation’s system of Judeo-
Christian values and the military strength to spread those values, but Carter was unwilling 
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to use the power of the federal government to legislate morality in the way that the new 
religious activists wished.4  
 Furthermore, Carter’s strong belief in the separation of church and state, a 
traditional Baptist position, compounded his problem with the nascent Christian Right 
because he failed to build relationships with them until it was too late. Historian Andrew 
Preston noted the irony that “part of Carter’s problem was that he did not comprehend the 
religious mood of the country. In particular, he erred in trying too stringently to separate 
religion from politics.”5 Much to the annoyance of members of the Christian Right, 
Carter consistently stressed his commitment to the separation of church and state to 
explain, for instance, that he personally opposed abortions but had to uphold the law of 
the land mandated by Roe v. Wade.6 
 While campaigning for the Democratic nomination in 1976, Carter sought to 
portray himself as a man of integrity opposed to politics as usual. His Christian faith 
shaped his campaign to restore competence and integrity in government.7 However, in his 
campaigning, perhaps Carter took the Apostle Paul’s admonition to “become all things to 
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all people” a bit too seriously.8 Carter used his faith to appeal to diverse audiences 
including southern white conservatives, blacks, and northern liberals, demonstrating the 
inclusiveness of his evangelicalism, a contrast to the more exclusive strands in 
evangelicalism and fundamentalism that would later comprise the Christian Right.9  
Carter’s approach of appealing to different groups with his faith created high 
expectations, especially among rank-and-file white evangelicals who sought to elevate 
one of their own to the highest office of the land.10 In their hyperbolic expectations for 
Carter, Howard Norton and Bob Slosser wrote, 
Jimmy Carter was one of the best things to happen to American 
evangelical Christianity in this century…In the months that he was in the 
national spotlight campaigning for the nomination, the secular press did 
more to spread the gospel—by factual reporting of the Carter campaign—
than all the religious press combined. Cynical, hardened political reporters 
by the scores learned what it meant to be “saved” or “born again,” hardly 
standard-brand newspaper jargon.11 
 
These high expectations for a Carter administration contributed to the rising discontent of 
the Christian Right with it frustration over Carter not supporting their political stances or 
giving them special access to the White House.  
 Even before voters went to the polls in 1976, Carter had already begun to alienate 
some evangelical and fundamentalist voters with his decision to grant an interview to 
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Playboy magazine. Attempting to reassure secular audiences that he would not impose 
his beliefs on them, Carter discussed Jesus’s teachings on humility and refraining from 
judgment in some rather candid terms: 
I’ve looked on a lot of women with lust. I’ve committed adultery in my 
heart many times. This is something that God recognizes I will do—and I 
have done it—and God forgives me for it. But that doesn’t mean that I 
condemn someone who not only looks on a woman with lust but who 
leaves his wife and shacks up with someone out of wedlock…Christ says, 
Don’t consider yourself better than someone else because one guy screws 
a whole bunch of women while the other guy is loyal to his wife.12 
 
Carter’s Playboy interview set off a firestorm among the evangelical and 
fundamentalist voters hopeful for a born-again president. While most accepted his 
interpretation of the scriptures, they opposed his word choice. Bruce Edwards, Carter’s 
pastor at Plains Baptist Church, admitted, “I do wish he had used different words.”13 
Bailey Smith, who had so enthusiastically endorsed Carter at the Southern Baptist 
Convention a few months prior, questioned whether he would even vote for Carter, 
stating, “We’re totally against pornography…And well, ‘screw’ is just not a good Baptist 
word.”14 
 Despite the fallout created by the Playboy interview among some evangelicals 
and fundamentalist voters, Carter won the presidential election with a slim majority of the 
popular and electoral vote. Although Ford won 51 percent of the evangelical vote, 
Carter’s religious rhetoric and spiritual biography helped him reduce the margin of white 
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evangelical votes traditionally received by Republican candidates. Carter carried the 
Southern Baptist vote and the white Baptist vote nationwide by a margin of 56-43.15 
 During the transition period and in the first several years of his administration, 
Carter made few efforts to improve or maintain a relationship with the evangelical 
community. Phil Strickland, an official with the Southern Baptist Christian Life 
Commission, had advised the Carter campaign on religious matters and formulated a plan 
to continue religious outreach. In a memo penned during the transition period, Strickland 
tried to assuage Carter’s fear about breaching the separation of church and state, arguing, 
“using the church to get elected and utilizing the structures of religion to advance 
administration programs which are conceived to advance social justice and meet human 
need are altogether different.” He advised Carter to appoint a White House liaison to the 
religious community, someone “religious enough to understand religious mind-sets and 
political enough to understand issues.”16  
 Carter ignored Strickland’s advice, and instead established a broader Office of 
Public Liaison as part of the White House structure with Midge Costanza, a women’s and 
gay rights activist, as its first director. While Costanza had success in outreach to liberal 
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activist groups, her activism on behalf of women and homosexuals alienated some 
religious groups, especially evangelical and fundamentalist groups.17 
 Evangelicals had high hopes for Carter’s potential accomplishments, expecting 
greater access to the White House and a larger share of presidential appointments. Their 
high expectations diminished as Carter declined speaking invitations to the National 
Religious Broadcasters annual meeting in Washington DC and ignored a list of hundreds 
of evangelicals qualified to serve in government compiled by Pat Robertson (who 
supported Carter in 1976).18 In fact, some of Carter’s appointments like Costanza’s 
offended many evangelical supporters. Carter administration officials consistently 
ignored requests for meetings with evangelical groups in its first two years because they 
took evangelicals for granted and dismissed many of their firmly held political 
convictions. They believed the president’s character and testimony would maintain 
evangelical support while the president focused his religious outreach on Catholics and 
Jews (groups still wary of Carter’s religious beliefs).19  
 While the Carter administration largely ignored the evangelical and 
fundamentalist community for its first two years, New Right political operatives busily 
built an umbrella of organizations to mobilize evangelicals and fundamentalists to 
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support politically conservative candidates and causes.20 The IRS decision to threaten the 
tax exemptions of racially discriminatory religious schools provided New Right activists 
a cause that could effectively mobilize rank-and-file conservative Christians. Christian 
schools advocate Robert Billings observed that the August 1978 IRS decision had “done 
more to bring Christians together than any man since the Apostle Paul.”21  
 Prior to the schools controversy, conservative Christians offered practically no 
organized opposition to the Panama Canal treaties, an issue they would frequently 
mention in their attacks on Carter later in the 1980 campaign. Early in his administration, 
Carter focused on negotiating a treaty to turn control of the canal over to Panama to 
protect long-term American interests in the region, a goal pursued since the Johnson 
administration. Ultimately, Carter and Panamanian President Omar Torrijos signed two 
treaties: one turning the Canal over to Panama after 1999 and another permanently 
guaranteeing that the United States could defend the neutrality of the Canal. However, 
Carter’s faith also played a role in making the treaties a priority; he later used the Panama 
Canal Treaties as an example to illustrate the Niebuhrian concept of justice as the highest 
aspiration of society to a class of divinity students at Emory.22 
                                                 
20 For more on the emergence of the modern conservative movement, see Donald Critchlow, The 
Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2007); Jonathan Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in 
America since 1945, thirtieth anniversary edition (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute Books, 
2006); Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the 
Transformation of American Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995); and Donald Critchlow, 
Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005). 
 
21 As cited in Williams, God’s Own Party, 164. 
 
22 Peter Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-Presidency (New York: 
Scribner, 1997), 382; For a contemporaneous account of the Panama debate, see Walter LaFeber, The 
Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
188 
Despite the lack of organized opposition, individual pastors, laypersons, and 
denominations voiced their opinions of the treaties. Within Carter’s own Southern Baptist 
Convention, considerable disagreement existed over the treaties. SBC President Jimmy 
Allen supported ratification along with many Baptist missionaries who believed that the 
treaties would help them in their evangelistic efforts.23 Other Southern Baptist laypersons 
opposed the treaties for fear of advancing communism in Panama and protested certain 
Baptist periodicals who reported on the support some Baptist officials offered for 
ratification without registering the views of opponents.24  
 To make matters worse, Carter made no substantive attempt to court evangelical 
support for the treaties outside of the Southern Baptists and two representatives from the 
National Association of Evangelicals. Instead, he and his staff briefed numerous religious 
leaders from the Catholic Church, mainline Protestant denominations, and various Jewish 
organizations. This slight exacerbated evangelicals’ frustration with their lack of access 
to the White House.25 
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In essence, while the more secular New Right lost the battle over the Canal 
treaties, they discovered that winning the larger war would require additional troops that 
the unorganized conservative Christian constituency could provide.26 New Right 
operative Richard Viguerie confirmed that assessment, “Because of Panama we are better 
organized. We developed a great deal of confidence in ourselves, and our opponents 
became weaker.”27 
 To recruit these frustrated Christians, New Right political operatives Paul 
Weyrich (Eastern Rite Catholic), Howard Phillips (Orthodox Jew), and Viguerie (Roman 
Catholic) needed someone to appeal to rank-and-file white evangelicals and 
fundamentalists.28 The New Right operatives found the perfect candidates in Southern 
Baptist laymen and former Colgate-Palmolive sales manager Ed McAteer and Christian 
schools activist Robert Billings, both of whom played critical roles in linking Weyrich 
and company with politically conservative evangelical and fundamentalist pastors. 
Weyrich, Phillips, Viguerie, and their new allies McAteer and Billings successfully 
coordinated the formation of a trio of Christian Right organizations over the course of 
1979: Christian Voice, Moral Majority, and Religious Roundtable.29 
                                                 
26 For the best history of the New Right and the Panama Canal Treaties, see Adam Clymer, Drawing the 
Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2008); James Robert Hinkson, “Of Gog and Naboth: The Christian Response to the Panama Canal 
Treaties of 1977” (MA thesis, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, 2006), 46. 
 
27 As cited in Pfeffer, “The Drill: The Emergence of the New Right as a Political Force in US Conservative 
Politics during the Panama Canal Debates, 1977-1978” (MA thesis, North Carolina State University, 2006), 
64. 
 
28 Williams, God’s Own Party, 171. 
 
29 Clendinen, “Christian New Right’s Rush to Power,” New York Times, August 18, 1980. 
 
190 
 In addition to the formation of these new Christian Right organizations, the 
conservative takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention further facilitated evangelical 
laypersons embracing the causes of the New Right despite the denomination’s traditional 
commitment to the separation of church and state. Although driven primarily by 
theological concerns such as biblical inerrancy, the SBC takeover had a number of 
explicitly political consequences for the nation’s largest denomination. McAteer, a 
member at Bellevue Baptist Church, would influence his pastor Adrian Rogers, the newly 
elected SBC president, as he became more active in political affairs during his term as 
convention president. At the 1979 convention, Charles Stanley, pastor of Atlanta’s First 
Baptist Church, warned that “we are about to lose our republic” due to liberalism in the 
churches and the tendencies toward communism and socialism in the federal government 
and in the larger American culture.30  
 While the religious schools issue provided the major unifying force for the 
Christian Right, these new organizations espoused a variety of conservative political 
positions. Unsurprisingly, the Christian Right took strong stands on domestic issues such 
as abortion, gay rights, and the Equal Rights Amendment, but it also consistently took 
conservative stances on foreign policy issues that seemingly had no apparent religious or 
moral content. To conservative Christians, foreign policy issues such as SALT II and the 
B1 bomber had moral implications like social issues while domestic social issues such as 
prayer in schools and gay rights seemingly had global implications. 
Christian Right activists even opposed Carter’s human rights policy, the 
cornerstone of the president’s foreign policy agenda, because they believed it was 
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“evidence of his being motivated by a deep-seated secular humanism rather than the 
guiding Christian faith and principles by which he lived.”31 To Christian Right leaders, 
secular humanism was an ideological springboard to socialism and communism because 
it denied God’s place in the order of society. Although present in the foreign policy 
thought of conservative Christian circles since the Russian Revolution, anticommunism 
was the key element defining the Christian Right’s stances on contemporary foreign 
policy issues including the Panama Canal Treaties, SALT II, the B1 bomber, and 
normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China.32 
 For instance, the Carter administration’s support of majority rule in Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe) created indignation among many Christian Right activists who feared 
that the black majority would turn the country over to the communists.33 Some Christian 
Right leaders such as Falwell had once promoted policies of segregation in the South and 
denounced the civil rights movement, so their opposition contained traces of racial as 
well as anticommunist feelings.34 As part of a larger campaign to promote issues of 
morality, Christian Voice used religious broadcasting to advocate for their foreign policy 
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concerns and to urge Carter to lift sanctions against the government of Prime Minister Ian 
Smith and oppose majority rule.35 One Christian Right activist decried Carter’s decision 
to back the black Robert Mugabe, “a man with a Marxist philosophy” instead of the white 
Smith, whom he described as “a Godly man.”36  
 Many conservative Christians saw the advance of communism not just abroad in 
places like Rhodesia but also in Carter’s lack of action on domestic moral issues such as 
abortion and ERA. The issue of gay rights was especially disconcerting to conservative 
Christians because of the perceived links between homosexuality and susceptibility to 
communist persuasion. Thus, a person’s bedroom behavior became a matter of national 
security.37  
These Christians believed that Carter’s unwillingness to make Christianity a 
centerpiece of national discourse and pride again weakened the nation and gave the 
Soviets the advantage in the Cold War. Kim Wickes warned that “if we continue 
retreating from the Communists, God will have to apologize to Sodom and Gomorrah if 
He does not chastise us Americans for turning away from Him and hearing the anti-God 
forces.”38 Samuel Collins lamented that, “the doors of our public schools were closed to 
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prayer but remained open to the atheism of communism.”39 In a creative form of 
criticizing Carter’s domestic and foreign policy agendas and expressing the fear of 
communist encroachment, James Grice wrote “A Poetrait of Washington DC”:  
Where the masters of politics congregate 
A perfect illusion to decide our fate 
Surely there is our endless sorrow 
Heaven can only change our tomorrow 
In the beginning this they wouldn’t allow 
Nothing can change their authority now 
God gave us Jesus and the power of unity 
To bring goodwill in every community 
Our hearts are cold and the good is hid 
No use to deny it we have all backslid 
 
Demons rule instead of God’s power 
 Communism grows closer by the hour40 
 
 In addition to their strident anticommunism, Christian Right activists were very 
interested in US policy in the Middle East, especially regarding the holy land of Israel. 
During his 1976 campaign, Carter told Christian broadcaster Pat Robertson in an 
interview that the creation of Israel in 1948 was part of “biblical prophecy.”41 His 
statement assured many evangelicals and fundamentalists that Carter would support Israel 
unconditionally, but historian Leo Ribuffo later commented that his response on the 700 
Club was “atypical” and that Carter possessed “virtually no interest” in dispensational 
premillennialism, a doctrine common in many fundamentalist churches.42  
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 Meanwhile, the new Likud government in Israel led by Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin sought to actively woo the leaders of the nascent Christian Right. Based on a 
dispensational premillennial interpretation of scriptures, many evangelical and 
fundamentalist Christians endorsed Israeli territorial expansion until it encompassed its 
biblical boundaries, a goal shared by Begin and his religious nationalist supporters. The 
Christian Right supported Israel as not only a bulwark against communism in the Middle 
East, but also the harbinger of the millennium and the corresponding tribulation and 
rapture. Falwell, the most prolific Christian Zionist courted by Begin, later remarked that 
the modern state of Israel was “the single greatest sign indicating the imminent return of 
Jesus Christ” and that “since the Ascension of the Lord Jesus Christ to the right hand of 
His Father nearly two thousand years ago, the most important date we should remember 
is May 14, 1948” (the founding date of Israel).43  
In April 1978, Falwell received an invitation to visit both Israel and Egypt and 
meet with both Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. After his meetings with 
Begin and Sadat, Falwell sent a trip report to the Carter administration describing both 
leaders as still ready to negotiate for peace, but administration officials ignored the 
report, which further fueled the animosity between Falwell and Carter.44  
 As the major organizations of the Christian Right took shape in the summer of 
1979 around a host of domestic and foreign policy issues, the Carter administration 
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renewed its interest in religious outreach after two years of relative inactivity. Robert 
Maddox, who had crossed paths with Carter numerous times in Georgia Baptist circles, 
had aspired to become part of the White House staff and work as a liaison between the 
administration and religious groups. In fact, he wrote Carter on several occasions 
expressing his desire to join the White House staff.45  
Jody Powell, Carter’s press secretary, encouraged Maddox’s ambition to join the 
administration when he requested that Maddox write a draft for a speech Carter was 
going to deliver for the SBC Brotherhood Commission. No one on Carter’s staff knew 
how to connect with the religious community, so they sought Maddox out to do some 
freelance speechwriting for this particular audience.46 Maddox began contacting fellow 
Southern Baptists in preparation for the speech and discovered many angry at their lack 
of access to the Carter White House. His desire to work for Carter was even more intense 
now because he felt “if [Carter] was in trouble with Southern Baptist leaders, what would 
he be with others?”47  
 White House Communications Director Gerald Rafshoon later contacted Maddox 
about coming to Washington as a full-time speechwriter after he had contributed some 
suggestions to Carter’s speech at the ceremony for the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian 
peace treaties.48 Even though he was hired as a speechwriter, news of Maddox’s 
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appointment created a stir in the religious community as clergy from all sorts of 
denominations began seeking access to the White House through Maddox.49  
Following the staff and Cabinet shakeup after the “malaise” speech, Maddox 
transferred from the Speechwriters’ Office to the Office of Public Liaison where he 
served as the Carter administration’s religious liaison. In fleshing out his new job 
description, Maddox proposed that he would travel the country to hear the concerns of 
the religious community, participate in religious meetings, and establish contacts with 
conservative Christian leaders and groups.50  
 Despite the general lack of enthusiasm among the White House staff for religious 
outreach, Maddox dedicated himself to improving Carter’s standing with the religious 
community, especially among conservative evangelical and fundamentalist Christians. 
Maddox anticipated the challenge Carter would face in the upcoming presidential 
election from them, noting, “[Carter’s] ‘born-again’ faith raises their expectations and 
makes him more vulnerable to their charges of inconsistency if he does not lift up 
selected issues.”51  
Maddox pushed hard to schedule a meeting between Carter and conservative 
religious leaders, such as Falwell, Stanley, McAteer, Billings, Rogers, and Robison. 
Maddox strongly believed in Carter’s ability to win these leaders over with his 
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personality and Christian testimony.52 However, this proposed meeting would not occur 
until January 1980 due to Carter’s scheduling conflicts and the lack of emphasis on 
religious outreach among other administration officials who believed Carter’s time 
should be focused on other groups because they felt his personal faith was sufficient to 
maintain evangelical support.53 Even if Maddox had succeeded in scheduling this 
meeting earlier, it probably would not have been successful because the relationship 
between Carter and the Christian Right had already soured so much and conservative 
Republicans had preemptively courted their support. 
 Early in his tenure as religious liaison, Maddox also sought to cultivate a 
relationship between the Carter administration and Billy Graham. The famous preacher 
had counseled presidents since Harry Truman, but felt particularly betrayed by Richard 
Nixon’s Watergate scandal because he was closer to Nixon than any previous president.54 
In his earlier years, Carter had organized a Graham video crusade in Americus, Georgia 
and had served as honorary chairman of a crusade in Atlanta while he was governor. 
However, Carter and Graham remained distant, in part stemming from the 1976 
campaign when both Graham’s organization and the Carter campaign exchanged some 
sharp remarks about one another.55 Journalists Nancy Gibbs and Michael Duffy 
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speculated that “Carter was so thoroughly grounded in conventional church life that he 
hardly needed a drop-in presidential pastor like Graham.”56 
 Prior to Maddox’s work, Carter’s team sought the popular evangelist’s 
endorsement of SALT II, an arms limitation treaty that provoked the ire of many 
Christian Right activists who perceived it as a display of weakness to the Soviets. One 
activist accused Carter of continuing Ford and Kissinger’s game of “playing footsie with 
the communists in Russia and China” in direct violation of Paul’s admonition to the 
Corinthian church to “not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers.”57 In a letter to 
the editor to the Daily Press in Newport News forwarded to Maddox’s office, a writer 
called the Democrats “sin sick” for their support of SALT II “because SALT I made us 
weak and SALT [II], will help to give this country to God’s enemy. The Communist[s] 
are for SALT II, why????? God wants you free, but the communist does not believe in 
freedom.”58  
 Graham seemed more amicable toward the treaty than most of his Christian Right 
counterparts, explaining, “as a Christian I am committed to peace. I am also committed to 
disarmament,” but he added the following caveat, “unless it involves unilateral 
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disarmament.”59 Outgoing SBC president Allen urged the administration to get a stronger 
endorsement from Graham, which would carry considerable weight with many 
evangelicals. In 1978, the SBC had passed a resolution supporting the treaty, but Allen 
warned the Carter administration passing another resolution at the next annual meeting 
would be difficult due to the growing strength of conservatives angling for more power 
and influence in the denomination.60  
 Maddox traveled to the Grahams’ home in Montreat, North Carolina to meet with 
the respected evangelist and request his support for the president’s agenda. He 
particularly wanted to convince Graham to issue a more specific endorsement for SALT 
II that went beyond his earlier general statements about nuclear arms control. Maddox’s 
entreaty to Graham was part of a larger strategy to involve evangelical leaders in the 
SALT II ratification debate to make up the mistake of ignoring them during the Panama 
Canal treaties debate, but the approach proved too little, too late as the Christian Right 
steadfastly opposed the treaty.61 In his report to the Carters on his trip to Montreat, 
Maddox stated that Graham “would especially welcome private time with [Carter] for 
conversation. [However] Dr. Graham does not care to be a highly visible figure at the 
White House.”62  
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 Despite Maddox’s entreaty to the famous evangelist on behalf of the president, 
Graham called a private meeting of a dozen or so prominent ministers at an airport hotel 
in Dallas in the fall of 1979. These leaders discussed the moral problems of the country 
and prayed for America’s future. Echoing concerns of retired senior military leaders 
worried about growing Soviet military spending compared to declining American 
military spending, Graham expressed fears that the United States only had a thousand 
days of freedom left if no major changes occurred. The leaders agreed that Reagan 
seemed like a more promising leader than Carter, but they decided they needed to 
confirm the depth of his convictions. Despite his role in organizing this ad hoc meeting, 
Graham stressed to the other participants that he could not play a public role in this 
venture due to the residual damage from his close relationship with Nixon, but he 
eventually privately supported Reagan.63 
 The 1980 election was significant not only for the role of evangelical and 
fundamentalist Christian voters in the general election, but also in their role in the 
selection of the Republican Party nominee during the primaries.64 As Christian Right 
organizations such as Moral Majority and Religious Roundtable formed in mid-1979, 
they searched for a candidate in the Republican Party to champion their values in the 
coming presidential election. During a meeting with former Texas governor John 
Connally, James Kennedy, pastor of the conservative Coral Ridge Presbyterian Church in 
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Fort Lauderdale, Florida, asked, “If you were to die tomorrow, Governor, and you wanted 
to go to heaven, what reason would you give God for letting you in?” Connally 
responded, “Well, my mother was a Methodist, my pappy was a Methodist, my 
grandmother was a Methodist, and I’d just tell him I ain’t any worse than any of the other 
people that want to get into heaven.” In contrast, at a similar private meeting, Reagan 
responded to the same question, “I wouldn’t give God any reason for letting me in. I’d 
just ask for mercy, because of what Jesus did for me at Calvary.”65  
 Reagan rarely addressed religion during his campaign for the Republican 
nomination in 1976. Although Reagan had contributed his voice to narrating anti-
Communist filmstrips for evangelicals and fundamentalists including Billy James Hargis 
and the Church League of America, Christianity Today lamented that Reagan seldom 
discussed his faith in public. In fact, Reagan only spoke about his faith in the 1976 
campaign with talk show host George Otis on a Christian television broadcast.66  
In the eyes of some prominent evangelicals, Reagan did not just rarely speak of 
his faith, but he also did not even know the language of evangelicalism. Charles Colson 
(a Watergate co-conspirator turned evangelical Christian) recalled that in response to a 
reporter’s question whether he was born-again, “Reagan shrugged, like the fellow had 
landed from Mars. He didn’t know what he meant.”67 
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In a total about face from that 1976 campaign, Reagan powerfully used the 
language of faith to entice Christian supporters in his 1980 campaign. His eloquent 
response about his personal faith eased many doubts about Reagan’s Christian bona fides 
among the evangelical and fundamentalist Christian leaders present at that private 
meeting during the Republican primaries.68  
 Convinced of Reagan’s Christian faith, his anti-communist and anti-big 
government values, and his leadership abilities, the Christian Right actively campaigned 
for him during the Republican primaries. Christian Voice established Christians for 
Reagan, a political action committee to raise funds and to campaign on behalf of 
Reagan’s candidacy. The group launched a media blitz during the March primaries 
focused on promoting Reagan’s spiritual life through direct mail, radio and television ads, 
and transcripts of Reagan’s 1976 interview with George Otis.69 In Alaska, the state 
chapter of the Moral Majority essentially took over the state Republican Party through its 
caucuses and state convention to support Reagan’s bid for the GOP nomination.70 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
68 One of the more interesting questions scholars of Reagan debate is where does belief end and rhetoric 
begin for a president who made such strong professions of faith, but rarely ever attended church. Much of 
the work to date on Reagan and his faith is hagiographic. For instance, Paul Kengor’s chapter discussing 
Reagan’s 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns does not really address his increased use of religious 
language in 1980 and instead draws mainly on Reagan quotes about the atheistic nature of communism 
from the 1976 election. See Paul Kengor, God and Ronald Reagan: A Spiritual Life (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2004), 139-155. While his work is certainly favorable to Reagan, it is a scholarly starting 
point for a discussion of Reagan’s faith rather than just being a devotional book. For a more hagiographical 
work on Reagan’s faith, see Mary Beth Brown, Hand of Providence: The Strong and Quiet Faith of Ronald 
Reagan (Nashville: Nelson Current, 2004). 
 
69 Russell Chandler, “Christian Voice Political Action Group Plains Massive Drive on Reagan’s Behalf,” 
Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1980; Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt, 388. 
 
70 Wallace Turner, “Group of Evangelical Protestants Takes Over the GOP in Alaska,” New York Times, 
June 9, 1980. 
 
203 
 A series of foreign policy crises in late 1979 further solidified the Christian 
Right’s support of Reagan and its opposition to Carter, whom many activists viewed as 
weak and unwilling to assert American power. The belated discovery of a Soviet combat 
brigade in Cuba in mid-September 1979 was one incident that ignited Christian paranoia 
about the creeping advance of Communism and fears about Carter’s seemingly indecisive 
response to this perceived Communist advance. Left behind after the conclusion of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to prevent an American invasion, this Soviet brigade had 
never really attracted much attention from the United States because of its limited 
strategic importance. However, in the context of Cuban-led adventures in Africa and 
contentious SALT II negotiations, the public exposure of the brigade set off a minor 
crisis.71  
One concerned Christian wrote Maddox in the wake of the Soviet brigade in Cuba 
crisis that “Christians are God’s human instruments; communists are Satan’s human 
instruments,” warning Maddox and the Carter administration that Christian America must 
seek peace through strength in dealing with the Soviet Union and Cuba.72 Writing in 
reaction to the same crisis, Ezra Taft Benson of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints criticized Carter for refusing “to invoke the great Monroe Doctrine” and 
“permitting the Godless Communist encirclement of our country.”73 
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 The Christian Right also heavily criticized Carter for his response to the Iranian 
revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis, condemning his measured approach to the 
developing situation and urging him to retaliate. Many urged Carter to strike back at Iran, 
one even claiming that “excessive passiveness invites aggression, even the greatest 
pacifist of all time, our Lord Jesus Christ, showed us that line must be drawn at some 
point when he physically disbursed [sic] the merchants from the Temple.”74 Some saw 
the emergence of the fundamentalist Islamic government in Iran as a sign of the end 
times in which Khomeini’s Iran would ally with the Soviets to attack Israel, conveniently 
ignoring the Islamic opposition to Soviet communism, especially after the invasion of 
Afghanistan.75 Others saw the hostage crisis as just the latest consequence of America’s 
moral degradation, linking the Iranian situation to debates about social issues such as gay 
rights.76  
 As the Christian Right lined up behind Reagan’s campaign and a series of 
international crises occurred at the end of 1979, Carter pursued the most significant 
outreach campaign to evangelical and fundamentalist leaders since his presidency began. 
At the advice of Maddox, Carter accepted an invitation to speak at the National Religious 
Broadcasters (NRB) annual convention. In his speech to the NRB, Carter initially kept 
his remarks light, “I have been very excited ever since I accepted the invitation to come 
here to have a chance to meet all you famous people.” He further joked, “I decided on the 
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way over here that I’m going to turn over to you one of the tremendous responsibilities 
that I had in 1976. This year I’m going to let you spend your full time explaining what it 
means to be born again.” Even though it did not seem that way at the time, his joke was 
ironic because of the disparity of definitions held by Carter and the more conservative 
pastors. Later, as the speech turned more serious, Carter warned the audience of how 
religious faith “can be distorted into terrible acts,” invoking the ongoing Iranian hostage 
crisis and turmoil of Khomeini’s Islamic revolution.77 However, the Christian Right 
leaders present did not see a similar potential in their own fusion of religion and politics.  
 In evaluating the president’s address, Maddox offered Carter nothing but praise, 
citing the speech as being “exactly on target” and the reception as “universally 
appreciative.” Playing up the advantages of the religious campaign strategy that he 
strongly advocated, Maddox noted that the speech would be broadcast on Rex Humbard’s 
television program and on other programs on religious networks.78  
However, Carter’s speech proved too little, too late as he largely ignored the 
evangelical and fundamentalist community in the first two years of his administration. 
With hindsight, Maddox wrote in his memoirs that Carter might have received an even 
stronger reception had he spoken to the NRB a year earlier. As it was, Carter’s 1980 NRB 
speech received skepticism among some of those in attendance because it seemed to them 
“more political and less presidential.”79  
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 Maddox also finally succeeded in scheduling the long-awaited private meeting 
between Carter and conservative evangelical and fundamentalist leaders. Since the NRB 
convention was in Washington DC, Maddox invited fourteen of the more prominent 
ministers attending the convention to a private breakfast with the president.80  
To make the meeting run more smoothly, Maddox worked with these ministers to 
formulate a list of questions in advance with topics including abortion, FCC regulations 
of Christian broadcasting, and national defense. The first question, asked by James 
Kennedy, pastor of Coral Ridge Presbyterian Church in Florida, concerned national 
defense:  
Mr. President, we are worried about our state of military preparedness. 
From many retired generals and admirals we have heard how terribly 
vulnerable the United States is to Soviet attack both in terms of military 
capability and civil defense. Would you tell us about our national defense 
capability? Would you also address yourself to your personal and our 
national will to strike if necessary?81 
 
The question on national defense that began the breakfast meeting indicated the 
importance of foreign and defense policy issues to Christian conservatives. Although 
there was not the same direct connection with moral issues, the threat of communist 
triumph and resulting persecution made national defense and foreign policy key concerns 
in the minds of these evangelical leaders. Only scheduled to stay twenty minutes, Carter 
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enjoyed the frank conversation so much that he stayed for an hour. Oral Roberts led a 
closing prayer and Carter posed for photographs with the pastors.82 
 Carter and Maddox left the meeting with generally positive impressions of its 
outcome, further illustrating the gaps in their understanding of the politicization of 
evangelical and fundamentalist Christians. In his diary, Carter wrote of the meeting, “In 
spite of all these negative opinions [about administration policies], they are basically 
supportive of what I’m trying to do.”83 In a report to Anne Wexler, Maddox remarked 
that “Jerry Falwell and several other of the participants have called to say how profitable 
the breakfast was for them. ‘The President was candid and up front,’ they say. I hope the 
flack is over and the fallout will be good for the President and all concerned.”84 However, 
Maddox probably exaggerated the optimism because by the end of 1980, he recalled the 
ill will displayed by some of the breakfast participants began almost as soon as the 
meeting concluded. In fact, Falwell held a press conference to comment on the meeting 
and, according to Maddox, began to distort the facts right away.85 
 Most of the participants had mixed feelings about the meeting and retained their 
opinion of Carter or his policies. Jimmy Allen remained the staunchest Carter supporter 
present, but most of the other participants either definitely opposed or were on-the-fence 
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about Carter. Some left the meeting even more determined to oppose Carter’s re-election. 
Tim LaHaye recalled, 
I stood there and I prayed this prayer: ‘God, we have got to get this man 
out of the White House and get someone in here who will be aggressive 
about bringing back traditional moral values.’ And little did I know that 
several others prayed essentially the same prayer. We got into this 
limousine, and here were some of the leading ministers of America, and 
they were stone silent. It was just like depression had settled on all of us. 
We all had made a commitment to God that day that, for the first time in 
our lives, we were going to get involved in the political process and do 
everything we could to wake up the Christians to be participating citizens 
instead of sitting back and letting other people decide who will be our 
government leaders.86 
 
Despite Carter’s best attempt to reach out to these pastors, the relationship 
between the Reagan campaign and the Christian Right grew ever closer as the primaries 
concluded and both groups turned their focus to the general election. At the 1980 
Republican convention in Detroit, Reagan privately met with Falwell, Weyrich, and 
Phillips to discuss his vice-presidential running mate, giving them a place in his inner 
circle.87 Despite claims of nonpartisanship, Falwell spoke in glowing terms about the 
Republican platform statement, “There is no question that the recent platform adopted in 
Detroit could easily be the constitution of a fundamental Baptist church…I can’t say the 
same thing for the Democratic platform.”88 In closing his nomination acceptance speech, 
Reagan made a plea that resonated with the Christian Right, “I'll confess that I've been a 
little afraid to suggest what I'm going to suggest--I'm more afraid not to--that we begin 
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our crusade joined together in a moment of silent prayer.” After a brief pause, Reagan 
concluded the prayer with, “God bless America.”89 
 The Reagan campaign successfully cultivated support among the Christian Right 
to further excite potential voters already predisposed to vote for him. In August, the 
Reagan campaign solidified its deep connections with the burgeoning Christian Right by 
hiring Robert Billings, executive director of the Moral Majority, and William Chasey, 
executive vice-president of governmental and political affairs for the Religious 
Roundtable, to coordinate the Christian outreach program for the campaign and explain 
to evangelical and fundamentalist voters that the “Reagan-Bush ticket is the Christian 
ticket.”90  
 Moreover, the Reagan campaign planned a concerted media strategy to 
communicate directly with conservative Christian voters. Using brochures comparing 
Reagan with Carter and independent candidate John B. Anderson on issues important to 
Christian voters, the Reagan campaign hoped to utilize tracts, a traditional evangelistic 
tool, to mobilize Christian voters without Reagan himself having to make these 
comparisons.91 The Reagan campaign also ran a series of religiously-themed campaign 
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commercials during evangelical television programs on Sunday mornings in key 
Southern battleground states, a well-planned move since practically the entire viewing 
audience would be evangelical or fundamentalist and given the inexpensive costs of 
airtime on Sunday mornings.92 
 As part of his larger religious outreach strategy, Reagan chose to participate in the 
National Affairs Briefing, an event sponsored by the Religious Roundtable, a decision 
that would prove to be perhaps the most important overture the campaign made to the 
Christian Right. The National Affairs Briefing provided campaign training to church 
leaders for registering voters as well as preaching on America’s moral decay and 
informational briefings on foreign policy topics such as SALT II.93 To maintain a 
semblance of nonpartisanship, the Religious Roundtable also invited President Carter and 
independent candidate John Anderson to address the audience, but both men declined. 
Although his staff urged him to reject the invitation as well, Reagan decided that this 
gathering of 14,000 evangelical and fundamentalist leaders was too important to miss.94  
 Throughout his campaign, Reagan effectively used a “god strategy” in his 
speeches that included well-known public religious references and more subtle references 
that only evangelical or fundamentalist insiders would understand. Reagan’s campaign 
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advisors fine tuned his public speeches to make sure his rhetoric enthralled evangelical 
voters, but still appealed to the broader American audience.95  
His speech at the National Affairs Briefing truly exemplified that strategy. In a 
memo to senior advisors Ed Meese and Mike Deaver about the Dallas speech, 
speechwriter Bill Gribbin wrote, “there are an awful lot of code words, religious 
allusions, and whatnot built into this, which might be missed if one is not close to 
evangelical religion. It is not important, however, for the speaker to understand each and 
every one of them. His audience will. Boy, will they ever!”96 In his speech, Reagan 
declared, “in a struggle against totalitarian tyranny, traditional values based on religious 
morality are among our greatest strengths.”97 Reagan’s relationship with the Christian 
Right and use of other coded language in his campaign provided clarity to what he meant 
when he said “traditional values based on religious morality.”  
Historian Andrew Preston argued that Reagan transformed the rhetoric of 
American civil religion from broadly including diverse audiences to the narrower purpose 
of rallying his partisan supporters.98 While Carter had used his personal faith to be 
inclusive of different groups, Reagan employed the historically broad language of 
American civil religion to energize his own supporters and portray a conflict with the 
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president’s allies. For his part, Carter normally shied away from functioning as a “priest” 
of American civil religion, preferring to serve as a “prophet” issuing jeremiads warning 
the nation about its transgressions and excesses.99 
 Just as important as Reagan’s speech to the National Affairs Briefing was his 
decision to attend James Robison’s sermon that immediately preceded his keynote 
address. Governor Connally urged Reagan to sit on the stage during Robison’s sermon, 
“I’d like you to hear James. You’re going to really like this. And it will say a lot to 
people to watch how you respond to the values he’s going to emphasize.”100 Reagan’s 
body language during Robison’s sermon encouraged those in attendance as he applauded 
at different points throughout the sermon. With Reagan behind him on the stage, Robison 
boldly preached, “I’m sick and tired of hearing about all the radicals and the perverts and 
the liberals and the leftists and the Communists coming out of the closet. It’s time for 
God’s people to come out of the closet.”101 To recognize the nominally nonpartisan 
nature of the event and to verbally affirm Robison’s sermon, Reagan told the audience, “I 
know you can’t endorse me, but I endorse you.”102 
 The hostile atmosphere of the National Affairs Briefing convinced Carter’s 
political advisors that they could not win over many Christian Right voters. Instead, they 
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decided the campaign should go on the offensive against the Christian Right, painting 
Reagan as beholden to a Christian Right intolerant of pluralism in America. In a meeting 
with Carter campaign advisor Tim Smith, Maddox suggested that they make light of the 
deep connections between Reagan’s campaign staff and Christian Right organizations.103   
Several Carter administration officials likened the Christian Right and its leaders 
to the Islamic fundamentalist government in Iran that had been holding a number of 
Americans hostage since November 1979. Speaking at Princeton University in mid-
September 1980, Secretary of Health and Human Services Patricia Harris commented, “I 
am beginning to fear that we could have an Ayatollah Khomeini in this country, but that 
he will not have a beard, but he will have a television program.”104 She further 
elaborated, 
To argue that there is a single “Christian” viewpoint or even a religious 
point of view on every issue in foreign and domestic policy is to say no 
debate is necessary or desirable—that all that is required is unquestioning 
obedience to “God’s will” as revealed to a single individual.105 
 
Regardless of their accuracy, Harris’ comments mirrored the thinking of other 
administration officials and journalists.106 
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 Even average citizens wrote letters to both Carter and Reagan about their 
concerns with the hardline rhetoric of the Christian Right. Eulah Eubank of Richmond, 
Virginia asked, “Are we going to become puppets to American type ayatollahs?”107 A 
Georgia Republican writing to Reagan compared the Christian Right not only to 
Khomeini’s Islamic revolution, but also to the Spanish Inquisition.108 A United Methodist 
minister warned the local Tallahassee Lion’s Club about the Christian Right and its 
similarities to Khomeini’s followers.109 The media also picked up on this comparison as 
Anthony Lewis wrote that James Robison “used a favorite word of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s, satanic, to justify political ministries” in his sermon at the National Affairs 
Briefing.110 
 Harris’s comments provoked outrage among the leaders of the Christian Right, 
who did not consider their movement to be representative of the global emergence of 
religious nationalism. Jim Bakker, still considering supporting Carter, responded 
negatively and put out feelers to the Reagan campaign.111 Falwell delivered a rebuttal to 
Harris’ remarks in front of the Department of Health and Human Services building, 
arguing the Christian Right resulted from years of conservative suppression. He deemed 
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her comparison between the Christian Right and the Islamic government in Iran as 
“nonsense” and “ridiculous.”112 In another venue, Falwell remarked, “We’re not religious 
fanatics who have in mind a Khomeini-type religious crusade to take over the 
government…We support the separation of church and state…We want influence, not 
control.”113 
 This counterattack on the Christian Right signified a larger strategy as Carter 
campaign officials consistently tried to paint a stark contrast between Carter and Reagan 
as a choice between prudence and dangerous extremism, especially because the ongoing 
hostage crisis in Iran and the faltering economy at home made Carter appear weak.114 
This strategy of contrast helped Carter close the polling gap by mid-October.115 
 The Carter campaign kept up the heat on Reagan’s association with the Christian 
Right through a press conference by former SBC President Jimmy Allen. In a line that 
would soon be adopted as part of Carter’s stump speech, Allen declared that attempting 
to mix religion and partisan politics “damages the churches by creating a political test for 
religious fellowship” and “damages the states by producing a religious test for public 
office.”116 
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 Reagan’s speech at a Lynchburg meeting seemed less religious in its content and 
rhetoric than his speech at the National Affairs Briefing. The Carter campaign’s effort to 
portray Reagan as beholden to Falwell and the Christian Right seemed to be working, so 
Reagan’s staff wanted to show that their candidate was no religious extremist in front of 
an evangelical and fundamentalist audience. The speech focused primarily on the issue of 
world peace, seeming to mainly address Carter’s criticism of Reagan being inclined to 
start a war.  
In crafting the speech, his team sought to avoid having Reagan appear as a tool of 
the Christian Right. Bill Gavin wrote, “It is absolutely imperative that RR stay away from 
a discussion of his own spiritual life. His answer should seek to place him in a long line 
of Presidents who have sought Divine guidance, thereby putting his views in a historic 
context.”117 In a memo preparing talking points for Reagan for a Q&A period, William 
Chasey noted that “RR may wish to expand his answers to include his personal 
commitment to Jesus (example John 3:16).” However, the staffer reading Chasey’s memo 
wrote an emphatic “No!!” next to that particular suggestion.118  
 In the aftermath of the Lynchburg meeting, Falwell gave the Carter campaign an 
opportunity to continue its tactics of painting the Christian Right as an extremist group. 
During a press conference, a reporter asked Falwell whether he agreed with SBC 
President Bailey Smith’s earlier statement that “God Almighty does not hear the prayer 
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of a Jew.”119 Falwell responded, “I believe God…does not hear the prayers of 
unredeemed Gentiles or Jews.” 120 Coupled with other seemingly anti-Semitic remarks 
such as Jews “are spiritually blind and desperately in need of their Messiah and Savior” 
and “a Jew can make more money accidentally than you can on purpose,” Falwell’s 
response at the press conference created significant controversy because of his stature in 
the new Christian Right and his ardent support of Israel.121  
 After a week of considerable criticism and accusations of anti-Semitism, Falwell 
recanted with a statement through the American Jewish Committee, “God is a respecter 
of all persons. He loves everyone alike. He hears the heart cry of any sincere person who 
calls on Him.”122 Under intense criticism about his remarks, Falwell claimed that the 
Moral Majority respected American pluralism, “We’re not trying to jam our moral 
philosophy down the throats of others…We’re simply trying to keep others from 
jamming their amoral philosophies down our throats.”123 Moreover, Falwell explained 
that the Moral Majority sought to elect candidates based on principles regardless of 
religious affiliation rather than merely electing other evangelical or fundamentalist 
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Christians.124 Given his special relationship with Reagan, Falwell tried to sound moderate 
to shield Reagan from accusations of extremism due to his association with him. 
 Falwell also reiterated his unconditional support for Israel, pointing to the pro-
Israel and Jewish-friendly nature of the Moral Majority, “one cannot belong to the Moral 
Majority Inc. without making the commitment to support the state of Israel in its battle 
for survival…No anti-Semitic influence is allowed in Moral Majority Inc.” In an ABC 
News interview shortly after the election, Falwell declared, “You can’t belong to Moral 
Majority without being a Zionist.”125 Elsewhere, Falwell explained, “God has blessed 
America because America has blessed the Jew. If this nation wants her fields to remain 
white with grain, her scientific achievements to remain notable, and her freedom to 
remain intact, America must continue to stand with Israel.”126  
 The entire controversy surrounding Smith and Falwell’s statements provided 
more ammunition for Carter to attack Reagan. Maddox surmised that, “lurking right 
beneath the religious and political far right is racism, anti-Semitism, war mentality. These 
rightists are neo-fascist.”127 Al Moses, Carter’s advisor on Jewish affairs, wrote, “By 
forcing Reagan to avow or disavow these statements, you create a frightening sphere of 
doubt around him.”128 Despite Falwell’s intent to make the Moral Majority an ecumenical 
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Judeo-Christian group, his theological statements and distasteful jokes cast a shadow of 
anti-Semitism over his political efforts and gave credence to the Carter campaign’s 
portrayal of the Christian Right as intolerant.  
 Despite earlier warnings from advisor Stu Eizenstat about accusations of 
“meanness” in Carter’s attacks on Reagan, Carter hammered away at Reagan’s ties to the 
Christian Right and some of its darker, exclusionary tendencies.129 During a speech at a 
Democratic fundraiser in Chicago, Carter proclaimed, “You'll determine whether or not 
this America will be unified or, if I lose the election, whether Americans might be 
separated, black from white, Jew from Christian, North from South, rural from urban.”130 
The Reagan campaign, the Christian Right, and the mainstream and religious press 
criticized Carter’s remarks that linked Reagan to statements about whether or not God 
heard the prayers of Jews. Reagan himself concluded that Carter was now at “a point of 
hysteria.”131  
 Brushing off the criticism, Carter continued in his attacks, especially after a town 
hall meeting in Yatesville, Pennsylvania where Avi Leiter, a young Jewish boy, asked 
Carter, “Do you agree with the head of the [Southern Baptist] churches who said that God 
does not listen to Jewish prayers?” Carter responded that the Camp David agreements 
provided proof that God heard everyone’s prayers because all the major protagonists 
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prayed together for their success.132 The next day, in another speech, Carter told the story 
of Leiter’s question, declaring, “It’s a question no American child should ever have to 
ask. In our zeal to strengthen the moral character of this Nation, we must not set 
ourselves up as judges of whom God might hear or whom He would turn away.”133 
 The Carter campaign also included a healthy dose of rhetoric about religious 
pluralism and the freedom of speech in Carter’s stump speech. In a number of addresses, 
Carter affirmed the rights of Falwell and others to express their views.134 However, 
Carter, echoing Allen’s remarks following the Lynchburg meeting, frequently said, “I’m 
not in favor of a religious definition of an acceptable politician, and I’m not in favor of a 
political definition for Christian fellowship or for religious fellowship.”135 In another 
speech, Carter expressed the same sentiment with different wording, “But when you start 
putting a measuring stick on a political figure and saying he is or is not an acceptable 
person in the eyes of God, I remember the admonition in the New Testament: ‘Judge not 
that ye be judged’ and ‘God is love.’"136  
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In a subtle attack on the Christian Right’s political positions, Carter reminded 
audiences, “the Bible doesn't say whether there's one or two Chinas, and the Bible doesn't 
say how you balance the Federal budget, and the Bible doesn't say what causes pollution, 
and the Bible doesn't say whether or not we could have a B-1 bomber or whether we 
could have air-launched cruise missiles.”137 However, Andrew Preston noted that Carter’s 
analysis ignored the Protestant Left and the Catholic Church and that “to them as to the 
Religious Right, the Bible was in fact pretty clear on whether the United States should 
develop the B-1.”138 While Carter made these speeches to deflect the Christian Right’s 
criticism, he also desperately wanted to preserve the American religious pluralism 
protected by the separation of church and state, one of the doctrinal issues he cherished 
most from his Southern Baptist heritage.  
 As the general election reached its final month, the Christian Right stepped up its 
activities to get evangelicals and fundamentalists mobilized to vote through direct mail 
and other media campaigns. The Moral Majority sent out several mailers to its 
membership list, encouraging people to vote, contribute to the organization, and write 
their leaders. In a mailer entitled “Is Our Grand Old Flag Going Down the Drain?” 
Falwell slammed the Carter administration over issues of homosexuality, pornography, 
and abortion, but spent more time discussing foreign policy and national defense issues. 
Falwell excoriated Carter for being afraid and not upholding a sense of American pride or 
nationalism:  
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I repeat: Our grand old flag is going down the drain. And not just here in 
America—we have broken our word with Taiwan because we are afraid of 
China. We are giving away the Panama Canal, so we won’t “offend” a 
leftist government! And besides all that, our President has signed a SALT 
II treaty with Russians that will make us a second-rate power in three 
years…and one day the Russians may pick up the telephone and call 
Washington DC, and dictate the terms of our surrender to them.139 
 
Falwell’s mailer further demonstrates the intense link between national defense issues 
and social issues in terms of defining the moral crisis that conservative Christians thought 
was confronting the United States.   
 While Falwell had become the most high-profile figure of the Christian Right and 
the leader most associated with Reagan, Christian Voice’s electioneering activities 
probably had more impact in turning out the evangelical and fundamentalist vote.140 
Christian Voice’s moral report cards compared the policy stances of candidates on issues 
including abortion, SALT II, and a balanced budget amendment and then gave grades on 
the morality of candidates’ various positions. In a strategy paper, Christian Voice 
operatives claimed, “One reason our report cards are so effective, is that they are seen as 
a non-partisan, educational effort rather than as campaign propaganda…We can say the 
same thing as the challenger and have much greater credibility since the challenger’s 
comments will be dismissed by many as self-serving rhetoric.”141 
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 Inspired by Christian Voice’s report cards, David Balsiger’s “Presidential Biblical 
Scorecard” clearly articulated the Christian Right’s general position on national defense 
policy. Using a series of scriptures about city fortifications from the Old Testament, 
many Christian Right activists claimed a scriptural mandate for its emphasis on a strong 
national defense.142 Carter’s move to reinstitute draft registration in peacetime was also a 
major point of contention for fear that women might be drafted into the armed services, a 
clear departure from conservative Christian norms about gender roles. The voters’ guide 
included grim reports that the United States only has “1,000 days as a free nation before 
the Soviets make their military superiority and influence known against our interests here 
and abroad” with an admonition that “it’s important that we elect national leaders who 
take the strongest national defense positions if we are even to have any hope of surviving 
as a free nation during the decade of the 80s.”143 Drawing on his belief in America’s role 
in biblical prophecy, Hal Lindsey echoed Balsiger’s sentiment for a strong national 
defense, “I believe that the Bible supports building a powerful military force. And the 
Bible is telling the United States to become strong again.”144 
 Christian Voice’s contributions extended beyond their moral report cards and also 
included the Christians for Reagan PAC, financial assistance to conservative 
congressional candidates, rallies at churches on the Sunday before Election Day, and 
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other television and radio ads.145 In a retrospective report about the 1980 election, 
Christian Voice leaders Colonel Doner and Gary Jarmin claimed, “While [Reagan] comes 
in the ‘front door’ to sell/motivate this vast constituency, we…come in the back door to 
register, educate, and turnout the Christian vote.”146 
 The Christian Right’s prolonged campaign of media advertisements, direct mail, 
pastor training, and congregational voter registration successfully trickled down to the 
rank-and-file evangelical and fundamentalist voters. Rosalynn Carter remembered Moral 
Majority activists holding signs at her campaign stops that read “You Don’t Love 
Jesus.”147 Numerous evangelical and fundamentalist Christians wrote Carter himself or 
Maddox to express their dismay with the administration’s stands on a variety of domestic 
and foreign policy issues, frequently citing Falwell, Robison, or other Christian Right 
leaders as their source for information for issues such as national defense to which those 
pastors could claim little expertise.148  
Many sent the Moral Majority form letter questionnaires to the White House, 
asking Maddox to mark yes or no on where Carter stood on important moral issues.149 
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Others expressed their anger at the Carter campaign’s attempt to portray the Christian 
Right as a group of extremists. One letter writer told Maddox that Falwell, Robison, and 
LaHaye were “God’s anointed” and that he was “positive they would never intentionally 
lie.”150 Still others resorted to insults such as “You don’t even deserve to be called 
Baptists” or calling Carter “a master of deceit, a phony Christian and a betrayer of all true 
citizens of this country!” and accusing him of doing “more than any previous president to 
advance communism around the world.”151  
 Other Christian Right voters wrote to Carter and his administration about their 
disgust with his treatment of Israel. Both Christian Right activists and American Jews 
feared that Carter had struck a deal with the Arabs in which the US would favor the 
Arabs in peace negotiations with Israel in a second Carter term.152 One constituent told 
Maddox that Carter was “not afraid to turn his back on God” in his policies toward Israel 
that encouraged land concessions to achieve peace.153 Another voter wrote, “I want to 
strongly and vehemently protest your immoral attempts to intimidate and coerce Israel,” 
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and added, “Can this be the same Jimmy Carter whose support of Israel in 1976 sounded 
so sincere?”154  
 The Christian Right also inspired evangelical and fundamentalist Christians to 
write Reagan and express their support for him and their disappointment with Carter. 
Brad Gish’s letter to Reagan demonstrated the ways in which the Christian Right had 
links to other causes: “The liberal, humanist, communist, integrationist, evolutionist, 
atheist fools seek to lead us all to ruin and damnation because they are not God…Mr. 
Carter is not a Christian. He is a traitor.”155 Another writer criticized Carter’s foreign 
policy toward China and the Soviet Union noting that, “The real snake in the grass is 
Satan, and those who serve Satan (Red China, Russia, and ungodly people throughout 
God’s Earth).”156 A different writer saw communism’s advance through domestic issues, 
claiming that ERA and abortion “are two of Russia’s greatest tools to strip us of all our 
morals.”157 The new partisan activities of the Christian Right certainly mobilized and 
excited evangelicals and fundamentalists who had never engaged in the political process 
before to this degree. 
 Under withering criticism from Christian Right mailers and advertisements as 
well as in receipt of numerous letters from angry evangelical and fundamentalist 
constituents, Carter did not directly respond to these attacks in his speeches and 
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continued to tout his strong views on the separation of church and state until Election 
Day.158 Maddox had suggested a more comprehensive religious outreach strategy, but the 
campaign staff largely ignored or forgot about his plans until it was far too late.159  
However, the Carter campaign finally launched one last-ditch effort to portray 
Carter’s faith in a favorable light with a television commercial:  
Though he clearly observes our historic separation of church and state, 
Jimmy Carter is a deeply and clearly religious man. He takes the time to 
pray privately with Rosalynn each day. Under the endless pressure of the 
presidency, where decisions change and directions change, and even the 
facts change, this man knows that one thing remains constant—his faith. 
President Jimmy Carter.160 
 
In addition to this sole religious advertisement produced by the campaign, Maddox 
recalled that a group of religious lay leaders distributed 250,000 pamphlets about Carter’s 
faith to ministers across the country, the only piece of religious mail favoring Carter’s 
campaign.161  
Election Day came and Reagan defeated Carter in a landslide in both the popular 
and electoral vote. According to political scientist Andrew Busch, Reagan received 2/3 of 
the white evangelical and fundamentalist vote while Carter’s share of that vote dropped 
by twenty-five percent from 1976. Some contended that evangelical and fundamentalist 
                                                 
158 Jimmy Carter, “Abilene, TX Remarks at a Rally with Area Residents,” November 1, 1980. in Peters and 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project [online]. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45436. 
 
159 Maddox, Preacher in the White House, 170. 
 
160 As cited in Hogue, “1980: Reagan, Carter, and the Politics of Religion in America,” 302. 
 




voters provided Reagan with the necessary margin to win several southern states, but 
Reagan would have won the election without these states.162  
While the Christian Right succeeded in registering and mobilizing new voters, a 
combination of the poor economy and the Iranian hostage crisis played a more significant 
role in Carter’s defeat. In his assessment of the impact of the Christian Right, sociologist 
William Martin concluded that “the election represented rejection of Jimmy Carter as 
much as approval of Ronald Reagan,” especially since “Reagan was elected with the 
highest negative ratings of any successful presidential candidate in the nation’s 
history.”163 Carter biographer Burton Kaufman argued that Carter’s strategy to portray 
Reagan as an extremist or as ill-equipped for office backfired as voters ultimately 
questioned Carter’s abilities rather than those of Reagan.164  
 Whatever the extent of the Christian Right’s actual role in the 1980 election, the 
movement’s leaders claimed considerable credit for Reagan’s victory. The day after the 
election, Falwell arrived at his Liberty Baptist College with “Hail to the Chief” playing 
prominently in the background.165 Falwell declared that the election was “the greatest day 
for the cause of conservatism and American morality in my adult life” while Christian 
Voice leader Gary Jarmin proclaimed that Reagan’s election “points to the beginning of a 
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new era.”166 In a retrospective piece on the 1980 election, Tim LaHaye remarked, 
“Personally, I believe our Heavenly Father looked down and saw our plight. He saw 
thousands of us working diligently to awaken His sleeping church to its political 
responsibilities, and He gave us four more years of religious freedom.”167 James Robison 
summed up the effectiveness of the Christian Right to Ed Meese, “For we proved we had 
the channels of communication which would bypass much of the distortion of the liberal 
media and go directly to the people who identify with [Reagan’s] stands.”168  
 Maddox, the person in Carter’s camp with the most perspective on the Christian 
Right’s role in the 1980 election, concluded that religious outreach efforts on Carter’s 
behalf were too little, too late because his staff had taken the support of the religious 
community for granted for far too long. Maddox recognized that he, Carter, and the rest 
of the staff did not do an adequate job of explaining Carter’s faith and its role in his 
presidency to a religious audience that had exceedingly high expectations of his 
administration, especially because Carter defined his evangelical faith differently from 
those in the Christian Right.169 In his book, Maddox still seemed puzzled why 
conservative Christians could support Reagan on “moral and spiritual grounds,” rather 
than just “political grounds.”170  
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Ultimately, Carter’s adversarial relationship with the emergent Christian Right 
resulted from raised evangelical expectations about Carter’s born-again presidency, the 
differences in what being an evangelical Christian meant to Carter and the Christian 
Right, and Carter’s decision to largely ignore the religious community in his first two 
years in office. Domestic turmoil in the United States and international crises contributed 
to the rise of a religious nationalist movement among conservative evangelical and 
fundamentalist Christians concerned with moral degradation at home and weakened 
American power abroad. However, the Christian Right was appalled by attempts to 
explain their movement in terms of the broader global phenomenon of religious 
nationalism, particularly comparisons to Khomeini’s Iran. The Christian Right especially 
opposed many of Carter’s foreign policy decisions including the Panama Canal treaties, 
support of majority rule in Rhodesia, the SALT II Treaty, and his more measured 
approach to Middle East peace negotiations. As religious studies scholar Martin Marty 
observed, “Somehow, in their eyes [the Christian Right], decisions like the Panama treaty 
deal made [Carter] ‘unborn again.’”171
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Chapter 7 
"BLESSED IS THE PEACEMAKER": JIMMY CARTER'S CONTINUED 
ENTANGLEMENT IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
 In a 2007 speech at Mansfield College, former president Jimmy Carter joked 
about the intractable nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “Pope John Paul II,” he 
said, “once declared that two solutions were possible to the Palestine-Israel conflict—the 
realistic and the miraculous. The realistic would involve a divine intervention, from 
heaven; the miraculous would be a voluntary agreement between the two parties!”1  
 Since leaving office, Carter failed to work any miracles between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. He hoped to see the emergence of an independent Palestinian state on the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between 
Israel and the rest of the Arab world. However, the President who had brought about the 
Camp David Accords allowed his public statements to compromise his own professed 
role as an honest broker and peacemaker in the conflict. Carter damaged his status as an 
impartial mediator when he scolded Israel for its policies on the Palestinian issue. Carter 
became more critical of Israel in part because he no longer had to seek votes from 
American Jews or other strongly pro-Israel voters. His views also changed as a result of 
spending spent more time in the Middle East meeting with different parties in the conflict 
with widely varied perspectives. Moreover, as the Southern Baptist Convention became 
more politically and theologically conservative, Carter condemned the fundamentalist 
trend in American Christianity while his own faith moved in more progressive directions, 
                                                 




loosening his fond attachment to Israel and increasing his sensitivity to Palestinian human 
rights concerns.2 
 In any solution to the Middle East conflict, Carter reserved an important role for 
the United States and private citizens like himself as third party mediators. Carter 
contended that the United States constitutes the only third party that remains acceptable 
to both the Israelis and the Palestinians that can garner international support for the 
execution of a peace plan.3 The motivation for US involvement in the peace process 
transformed over time as international circumstances changed. During Carter’s 
administration, the Cold War and the threat of nuclear war in the region of Armageddon 
and Megiddo from biblical prophecy loomed as the main motivation for US involvement 
in the peace process. In the post-Cold War world, threats of Soviet subversion and 
nuclear war between the superpowers subsided, but the Middle East remained a 
flashpoint.4 In fact, Carter argued that the Arab resentment of the Palestinian situation 
was one of the leading causes in the rapid rise of terrorism in the Middle East, so a less 
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objectionable US involvement in the region would help reduce the number of potential 
terrorists.5  
 Along with an American commitment to serving as a mediator, Carter long 
emphasized the potential of his own role as an honest broker. While president, Carter 
could not meet with PLO leader Yasser Arafat because the State Department deemed him 
a terrorist, but as a private citizen, Carter touted both his ability to meet with individuals 
whom high-level US officials may be forbidden to meet and his access to important 
government officials from all sides.6 
 Carter’s detractors criticized the former president not only for his decisions to 
meet with pariahs, such as Arafat and the leaders of Hamas, but also for the religious and 
theological language he used in explaining the conflict between the Israelis and 
Palestinians and the possible solutions to the dispute. Even during his presidency, Carter 
never quite championed Israel like Harry Truman. Recalling the image of the Persian 
emperor Cyrus who permitted the Jews to return to Israel after seventy years of 
Babylonian captivity, history professor Paul Charles Merkley argued that Carter began a 
paradigm shift in American presidents not presenting themselves as “the heirs of Cyrus 
but as champions of the peace process.”7  
 Unlike Truman, Carter dabbled in reading liberal mainline Protestant theologians, 
such as Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, who did not share the evangelical conviction 
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about Israel’s importance in the end times. Carter often cited Niebuhr as a major 
influence in his religious thinking because of Niebuhr’s attempts to address the tension 
between individual agape love and social justice.8 Traditionally, evangelicals such as 
those in the Southern Baptist Convention have been more pro-Israel than mainline 
Protestants such as Tillich and Niebuhr because the latter view the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict through the lens of human rights rather than a millennial reading of the 
scriptures.9  Carter’s evangelical background and his studies in mainline theology led to 
an unusual mixture of the two regarding Israel: a tension between supporting Israel on 
biblical terms and protecting human rights and social justice in the occupied territories.10 
 In addition to his evolving religious convictions, the legacy of the Camp David 
Accords and the conditions surrounding those negotiations in 1978 decisively shaped 
Carter’s post-presidential peacemaking ventures. On one occasion, Carter asserted that he 
did not have “any particular affinity” for the Camp David Accords being used as a label 
for the continuation of the peace process.11 However, it quickly became clear that Carter 
sought to protect and extend the legacy of the Camp David Accords after leaving office 
as a third-party negotiator in the conflict. Later in his life, Carter regretted that the spirit 
of the Camp David Accords produced little follow-through in terms of other Arab nations 
                                                 
8 See Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man & Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932). 
 
9 Samuel Freedman, “Carter and the Christians,” The Jerusalem Post, January 26, 2007. 
 
10 Mainline Protestants were actually devoted supporters of Israel in its early years for humanitarian reasons 
because they believed Christian anti-Semitism drove the Holocaust and the historic persecution of the Jews. 
See Caitlin Carenen, The Fervent Embrace: Liberal Protestants, Evangelicals, and Israel, (New York: 
New York University Press, 2012). 
 




extending diplomatic recognition to Israel in the thirty years since Menachem Begin and 
Anwar Sadat signed the Accords (Jordan was the only other state since Camp David to do 
so).12 He recalled that he anticipated a domino effect in Middle East peace, “I left office 
believing that Israel would soon realize the dream of peace with its other neighbors, 
becoming a small nation no longer beleaguered. It would exemplify the finest ideals 
based on the Hebrew scriptures I have taught on Sundays since I was eighteen years 
old.”13 
 However, the legacy of Camp David was not entirely positive because Carter’s 
increasing criticism of Israel reflected a grudge against Begin and the Israelis for failing 
to withdraw from the occupied territories and move forward on the Palestinian question 
after 1980. Carter believed that Begin betrayed him on the Palestinian question. At the 
beginning of his administration, only a few hundred settlers lived in the West Bank and 
Gaza, but the number of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories rapidly expanded 
during subsequent Likud governments after Carter lost the presidency to Ronald 
Reagan.14 In a 1984 lecture delivered at Macon University on the topic of negotiation, 
Carter accused Israel of constructing more settlements to impede the peace by creating 
“facts in the occupied territories, which later will be difficult to change.”15 In his 
memoirs, he recalled disputes with Begin during his presidency and observed that, 
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…the Camp David accords had now become almost like the Bible, with 
the words and phrases taking on a special importance. When we got into 
an argument, we would flip the pages of the accords, searching for a way 
to authenticate our own opinions. The problem was that the actual 
words—such as ‘autonomy,’ ‘security,’ ‘Palestinian rights,’ and even 
‘West Bank’—had different meanings for each of us and those we 
represented.”16  
 
Carter and Begin had a frosty relationship from the beginning because Begin lacked the 
president’s commitment to swapping land for peace and instead desired Israeli security 
while holding as much territory as possible. After leaving office, Carter frankly noted his 
strained relationship with Begin, stressing that “it might be good to let the future 
president deal with [Begin] and the Middle East…There were a few positive things about 
losing the election.”17  
 Despite his relationship with Begin, Carter strongly believed that a 
comprehensive settlement to the conflict might have occurred only if he had won a 
second term in 1980.18 Kenneth Stein, a history professor at Emory University and the 
first executive director of the Carter Center, wrote that Carter had a “missionary zeal” 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, Stein explained that “Carter is 
convinced that he himself was the essential ingredient to enable the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace.”19 
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 With this perception of his own importance in the peace process, Carter stayed 
heavily involved in the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after 1981. After 
Islamic extremists assassinated Sadat in October 1981 for his role in negotiating peace 
between Israel and Egypt, Carter attended the funeral as part of the American delegation 
along with former presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Carter had forged a very 
close friendship with Sadat, still counting him as one of his best friends. Initially, Jimmy 
and Rosalynn planned to attend the funeral as private citizens and to stay with the Sadat 
family in Cairo at the invitation of Sadat’s widow. However, the State Department 
convinced Carter to attend as part of the formal delegation for security concerns. While 
traveling to and from Egypt, Carter and Ford let go of the animosity left over from the 
1976 election and formed a partnership and friendship to aid one another in their post-
presidential initiatives. In fact, Carter and Ford issued a joint statement on their return to 
the United States, calling for the Reagan administration to begin a dialogue with the PLO 
to move the peace process forward.20 
 One of the earliest fruits of the Carter-Ford collaboration was a consultation on 
Middle East peace, co-chaired by the former presidents, which brought leaders and 
scholars from across the region together to discuss the prospects for peace in a less 
formal setting. As the Carter Center took shape, Kenneth Stein encouraged Carter to host 
a meeting in 1983 to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Camp David Accords, 
examining its strengths and weaknesses and exploring the possibilities for the future of 
the peace process. Carter recruited Ford to co-chair the consultation to make it a 
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bipartisan event and create support for the event across the American political 
spectrum.21 
 To prepare the meeting, Carter planned a trip to visit all the major leaders of the 
Middle East to gain their varying perspectives and invite them to send participants to the 
Carter Center consultation. On this regional tour, he met with leaders and ordinary people 
in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip to 
hold conversations about the path toward peace. The conversations from this trip would 
not only provide insight for the upcoming consultation, but also function as the narrative 
backbone for Carter’s first book on Middle East policy, The Blood of Abraham. In 
addition to his travels, Carter immersed himself in the religious issues that made the 
conflict more complicated. He spent a considerable amount of time with scholars 
specializing in Islam and Judaism and studying the Qur’an and the Torah to further 
understand the positions of Muslims and Jews in their dispute over the Holy Land. 
Although his relationship with Begin sparked animosity, before this course of study 
Carter had not openly sympathized with the Palestinians. As he researched the roots of 
the conflict and met with leaders and ordinary people from around the region, he 
empathized with their cause.22  
 Following his tour of the Middle East, Carter delivered a speech to the Council on 
Foreign Relations in which he bluntly stated “Israel is the problem toward peace.” Stein 
advised the former president that his rhetoric would undermine the consultation’s 
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potential for success.23 His warning proved prophetic. No high-profile Israeli leaders 
participated, whether due to Carter’s rhetoric or, more likely, due to the presence of 
Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi, whom Israelis claimed was a member of the PLO.24 
The consultation proceeded with a few bumps along the way as the Syrian and Jordanian 
delegates refused to speak to one another, the Syrians attacked US foreign policy in the 
region, and one of the Jordanians chose to ignore direct questions from the Israeli 
scholars.25 During the meeting, both Carter and Ford shared their frustration with the 
participants about Congress overriding presidential directives to reduce aid to Israel as a 
means to persuade them to withdraw from Lebanon or the West Bank.26 The consultation 
produced a substantial dialogue on the issues that had to be addressed in the peace 
process and got the different parties in the same room to at least listen to one another. 
However, the lack of official Israeli government participation in the meeting indicated 
that there was still a long way to go in achieving peace.27 
 After his Middle East trip and the Carter Center consultation in November 1983, 
the former president and Stein collaborated to write The Blood of Abraham, a book 
drawing largely upon the conversations Carter had with Middle East leaders in their 
countries and in Atlanta. Carter described the book as a “labor of love” and in a moment 
                                                 
23 Brinkley, The Unfinished Presidency, 116. Carter delivered the speech on March 24, 1983 to the Council 
on Foreign Relations in New York City. The entire transcript is available in Carter’s post-presidential 
papers which researchers do not have access to yet. 
 
24 “Israel to Shun Conference,” New York Times, October 26, 1983. 
 
25 “Catching Up on the Middle East,” Time, November 21, 1983. 
 
26 William F. Schmidt, “Mideast Conference in Atlanta Draws Arab and US Officials,” New York Times, 
November 9, 1983. 
 
27 Brinkley, The Unfinished Presidency, 117-119. 
 
240 
of self-promotion, proclaimed, “I wish I had this book when I was first elected 
president.”28  
While Stein, an American Jew, counseled Carter to take a big picture view of the 
region’s tangled religious history, Carter boldly called for more progress in the peace 
process by making an appeal in religious terms: “The blood of Abraham, God’s father of 
the chosen, still flows in the veins of Arab, Jew, and Christian, and too much of it has 
been spilled in grasping for the inheritance of the revered patriarch in the Middle East. 
The spilled blood in the Holy Land still cries out to God—an anguished cry for peace.”29 
However, Carter’s views on the conflict went beyond the shared ancestry among the three 
different world religions. Instead, he recognized that religion frequently obstructed the 
quest for Middle East peace: “Tragically, for ‘the People of the Book’ who profess to 
worship the same God, the scriptures are a source of more difference than agreement.”30  
 Carter’s use of theological language in The Blood of Abraham ensured more 
embroilment in this conflict already fraught with religious symbolism. While many 
Israelis assert their right to the land based on God’s covenant with the Hebrew patriarch 
Abraham, a few Palestinians respond with a biblical claim of their own, arguing their ties 
to the ancient Canaanites.31 In his chapter on the Palestinians, Carter wrote, “The 
Palestinians, like the Jews, claim to be driven by religious conviction based on the 
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promises of God, and they consider themselves to have comprised the admixture of all 
peoples including the ancient Hebrews who dwelt in Palestine, their homeland, since 
earliest biblical times.”32 Merkley later observed that this passage proved Carter accepted 
a flawed historical theory that the Palestinians descended from the ancient Canaanites, 
Amorites, Hittites, Perizzites, Hivites, Jebusites, and Philistines who inhabited the land 
when the Israelites arrived. This assumption gives equality to the claims of the Jews and 
Palestinians seeking rights for the territory of the Holy Land.33 
 In a later interview, Carter recalled how intensely he studied the Bible in 
preparation for writing The Blood of Abraham. He reflected on Pauline writings meant to 
encourage first century Jewish Christians, “Paul made a very strong distinction that 
Abraham was rewarded not for his race, but for his faith…And this is the explanation that 
Paul gave, that we Christians who share Abraham’s faith, regardless of our race, are also 
children of Abraham.”34 Based on his study of Paul, Carter justified Christian claims to 
the Holy Land, not only for Palestinian Christians who had been evicted from their 
property, but also for American Christians like himself who believed they had an intimate 
stake in the outcome of Middle East peace talks. 
 Although tame compared to the criticism reserved for his more recent books on 
the Middle East conflict, many Jewish critics quickly pointed to the shortcomings in 
Carter’s The Blood of Abraham. Famed Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis pointed to 
Carter’s tremendous use of understatement in the book when it came to topics such as 
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“authoritarian leadership” in Arab countries.35 Novelist Mark Helprin described Carter’s 
work as “a travel memoir with a biblical head and a thrashing polemical tail” and “so 
poorly presented that a reader would do far better to consult the Europa Guide to ‘The 
Middle East and North Africa.’”36 Journalist Bernard Gwertzman portrayed the book as 
“hastily put together.” He also questioned Carter’s evenhandedness because the former 
president demonstrated “sympathy for the Palestinian and Arab causes,” but “impatience 
with…Israeli leaders.”37 Columnist Stephen Rosenfeld noted that Carter’s attempt to be 
evenhanded in the book had “a strained clenched-teeth quality” and that the book 
contained “a scarcely concealed onesidedness” favorable to the Arabs and Palestinians.38 
 As he became more knowledgeable about the Middle East conflict through his 
regional trip, the Carter Center consultation, and writing The Blood of Abraham, Carter 
experienced profound anguish about mistakes he made while negotiating the Camp David 
Accords. Due to an American promise to Israel to not engage with PLO representatives, 
Carter had no contact with PLO leader Arafat or any of his subordinates while in office. 
He regretted trying to negotiate Palestinian issues with Begin and Sadat without 
Palestinian representation at Camp David.39 Free of those obligations, Carter actively 
sought to meet Arafat face-to-face and build a relationship with him through intermediary 
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Mary King.40 He believed that he could “coach” Arafat to become a respectable political 
leader and a conciliatory peacemaker, transforming him from terrorist to statesman, 
following Begin’s example.41  
 Carter finally met Arafat in Paris in April 1990, and almost instantly established a 
connection resembling the one the former president shared with Sadat. To legitimize the 
PLO in the peace process, Carter pressed Arafat to accept the terms of the Camp David 
Accords dealing with Palestinian autonomy and renouncing language in the PLO charter 
that refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist. After their formal meeting, Jimmy and 
Rosalynn prayed with Arafat for peace and justice in the Middle East in a more private 
setting.42 The French Jewish community protested the meeting while the Israeli 
ambassador to France noted, “The problem is that Arafat was in Baghdad two days ago 
with [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein at his side, and he said he will fight Israel with the 
Iraqi missile.”43 However, in public statements following the meeting, Carter commended 
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Arafat as “one of those key leaders who’s done everything he can in recent months to 
promote the peace process.”44  
 Unfortunately, the goodwill toward the PLO generated by the Arafat-Carter 
meeting quickly dissipated with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. While many 
Arab countries supported the US effort to convince Saddam Hussein’s forces to leave 
Kuwait, Arafat backed the Iraqi leader, much to Carter’s chagrin. However, Carter 
criticized the George H.W. Bush administration’s decision to send troops to the Persian 
Gulf and the use of force, preferring a diplomatic solution.45 Fearful that the Gulf War 
would further stall the peace process, Carter advocated using the crisis as an occasion to 
hold an international conference to resolve regional issues including Kuwait and the 
Palestinian territories. He argued, “Linked or not, there is no way to separate the crisis in 
the Persian Gulf from the Israeli-Palestinian question.”46 Carter even sent letters to the 
leaders of the other UN Security Council countries and Arab members of the US coalition 
pleading with them to spend more time seeking a diplomatic solution, a move that 
infuriated the Bush administration.47 
 After the conclusion of the Gulf War, the Bush administration launched a round 
of peace talks in Madrid in late October 1991, bringing Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, 
and the Palestinians to the table to discuss a variety of contentious issues. Two major 
landmarks came out of the Madrid talks: the Oslo Accords of 1993, an agreement to 
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permit a limited degree of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 
the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of 1994. In fact, Arafat arranged an urgent meeting with 
Carter in Yemen to inform him of the momentous developments that took place in the 
secret Oslo negotiations that would lead to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. 
He met with Arafat again the day before the signing ceremony at the White House. The 
former president counseled the Palestinian leader to create democratic political 
institutions and avoid authoritarian rule. Carter and former President Bush had front row 
seats at the signing ceremony, witnessing history that they helped create. Although Carter 
did not play an instrumental role in these major advances in the peace process, many 
commentators acknowledged his role in making the present agreements possible with his 
initial achievement at Camp David in 1978.48  
 As a result of the Oslo Accords, Arafat asked his new friend to monitor the first 
elections for the new Palestinian Authority that would have limited governing powers in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Carter readily agreed because he felt the Palestinian 
elections represented one of the last steps to a final status agreement that would end the 
decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, his hopes quickly faded once he 
arrived in the territories and learned of the numerous obstacles preventing successful 
elections. Carter immediately realized that Israeli security measures that curtailed 
Palestinians’ freedom of movement would hinder the success of the elections. He 
successfully pleaded with Prime Minister Shimon Peres and General Uri Dayan to open 
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up security checkpoints along key roads to ensure that voters could reach their polling 
places and to keep Israeli soldiers away to avoid voter intimidation.49  
 Problems also abounded on the Palestinian side as the Central Election 
Commission changed procedures and regulations for campaigning and voting until right 
before the election. The overwhelming influence of the Fatah-dominated PLO in the 
transitional administration reduced opportunities for candidates running in opposition to 
the secular nationalists in Fatah.50 Hamas, a Palestinian religious nationalist organization, 
decided to boycott the presidential and legislative elections because the Palestinian 
Authority arose from the Oslo Accords, an agreement they vehemently opposed. 
Nevertheless, some Hamas members ran as Islamist candidates for the legislature under 
the Salvation Party banner and the organization pledged to contest municipal elections.51 
At Arafat’s request, Carter met with Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar to convince 
Hamas to accept the election results and to not violently disrupt the first-ever Palestinian 
elections.52 
 How to handle the Palestinian voters in East Jerusalem was more problematic 
than any other issue, and the issue would plague all subsequent Palestinian elections. The 
Israelis maintained that Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem must vote by absentee 
ballots because Jerusalem constituted part of the State of Israel. Of course, Palestinians 
                                                 
49 Carter, Beyond the White House, 116. 
 
50 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, second 
edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 137-138. 
 
51 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 140; Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Malden: Polity Press, 2010), 231-232. 
 
52 Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 144. 
 
247 
considered East Jerusalem as the national capital of their future state and wanted voters to 
participate in the same fashion as voters deep within the West Bank or Gaza Strip. In fact, 
the controversy over East Jerusalem threatened the entire election process. To save the 
Palestinian elections from being cancelled, Carter negotiated a compromise acceptable to 
both the Israelis and Palestinians: “to have the slots in the top edges of the ballot boxes! 
Palestinians could claim they were dropping in their ballots vertically as on-site votes 
while Israelis could maintain that the envelopes were being inserted horizontally as letters 
to be mailed.” Moreover, the East Jerusalem polling places would be located in post 
offices to placate the Israelis.53  
 Carter’s penchant for detail produced a compromise that allowed the elections in 
East Jerusalem to proceed, but voter turnout in the city was very low. The former 
president noted that only about 1,600 Palestinian voters in East Jerusalem participated in 
the elections due to a variety of obstacles such as Israeli police officers videotaping 
voters who entered the polling places.54 However, total voter turnout among the 
Palestinians hovered around 75 percent of all registered voters and international 
observers reported problems in only two of the 1,696 polling places outside East 
Jerusalem.55  
 The Palestinian people elected Arafat as their first president with 88 percent of the 
vote and gave Arafat’s Fatah Party about 75 percent of the seats in the Palestinian 
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Authority’s Legislative Council.56 Carter was satisfied with the election process despite 
many of the obstacles it faced. He remained hopeful for Palestinian success in 
governance. In his previous meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Peres, Carter had 
extracted assurances that the newly elected Palestinian legislators would have freedom of 
movement between the West Bank and Gaza Strip to conduct business for the new 
Palestinian Authority.57   
 However, not everyone agreed with Carter’s optimistic assessment of the 
openness and fairness of the Palestinian elections. In the weeks before the election, Carl 
Lidbom, chief of the European Electoral Unit monitoring the election alongside the 
Carter Center, complained that Arafat kept changing the rules too close to election day. 
The organization Reporters Without Borders issued a statement criticized Arafat’s 
election commission for not permitting equal press time for opposition candidates.58  
Edward Abington Jr., the US consul general in Jerusalem, echoed the organization’s 
objection, “the Palestinian media is slavishly devoted to Arafat. There is no policy of fair 
coverage.”59 When one critic told Carter of the rampant fraud he perceived in the 
elections, Carter responded, “If you really want to see election fraud, let me take you to 
Chicago.”60 
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 Carter believed the prospects for peace seemed promising in the wake of the Oslo 
Accords and the Palestinian elections. Despite criticism about the conduct of the 
elections, Carter believed Arafat was the only Palestinian leader able to achieve a lasting 
peace. However, shortly after President Clinton’s attempt to negotiate a final status 
agreement between Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak failed in July 2000, a 
second intifada erupted in the territories and spilled over into Israel. The second intifada 
was more violent than the first intifada that began in 1987, especially because Hamas 
introduced suicide bombing tactics by militant members who wanted an Islamist 
Palestinian state encompassing all the land of Palestine. In addition to the pessimism after 
Clinton’s failed Camp David Summit, the second intifada began a response to Likud 
leader Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to the Temple Mount (site of Islamic holy sites of 
the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque) along with a large number of armed 
Israeli police.61 The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon also inspired Hamas in the second 
intifada because many leaders believed that the Shi’ite militant group Hezbollah pushed 
the Israelis out of Lebanon.62 
 As Carter became an increasingly controversial figure in the first decade of the 
new century, the former president decided to sever his lifelong ties with the Southern 
Baptist Convention in October 2000, a step representing Carter’s theological evolution. 
Citing the “increasingly rigid Southern Baptist Convention creed, including some 
provisions that violate the basic premises of my Christian faith,” Carter’s decision 
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reflected a reaction to the Convention’s decision to prohibit the ordination of female 
pastors or deacons within the denomination as part of a continuing trend toward biblical 
literalism.63 Carter had grown distant from the SBC since the beginning of the 
conservative takeover in 1979, but he retained his ties to the convention. In fact, in 1997 
and 1998, Carter brought the liberal and conservative Baptist factions to the Carter 
Center, hoping to heal the rifts. Just like he did at Camp David in 1978 and with the 
Israelis, Arabs, and Palestinians in more recent years, Carter went back and forth between 
the two groups that would not meet together.  
 Carter tried again in 2008 to reconcile the divisions among Baptists, including 
northern Baptists and black Baptists in a meeting boycotted by the SBC, whose President 
Frank Page condemned the gathering’s “smoke-screen left-wing liberal agenda.”64 
Despite his efforts at reconciliation, Carter’s theology and convictions bore more 
similarity to those of Jim Wallis, the most well-known progressive evangelical leader, 
than any Southern Baptist leader. Not surprisingly, Carter’s convictions led him to 
sympathize more with the Palestinians on the basis of social justice and God’s care for 
the poor and oppressed rather than favoring Israel on the grounds of a literal reading of 
Genesis 12:3 or a premillennial reading of Revelation.65 
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 To the now ex-Southern Baptist Carter, prospects for peace seemed very dim as 
George W. Bush took office. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon portrayed Palestinians participating in the second intifada as part of the 
larger enemy in the global war on terrorism proposed by Bush. As a result, Bush and 
Sharon agreed to force a “regime change” of sorts on the Palestinians by isolating Arafat. 
Bush proclaimed, “Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a 
Palestinian state can be born.” In the same speech, Bush proposed a “road map for peace” 
that would lead to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a step-by-step 
fashion.66  
 While former president Carter supported the limited efforts to restart peace talks 
in the wake of the September 11 attacks in mid-2002, he criticized the step-by-step 
formula of the road map, “Israel has been able to use it as a delaying tactic with an 
endless series of preconditions that can never be met, while proceeding with plans to 
implement its unilateral goals.”67 Reflecting his presidential style that preferred 
comprehensive plans on issues, Carter sought a wide-ranging peace settlement that 
forgoes the step-by-step approaches of plans such as the “Road Map for Peace,” 
programs easily subverted by violence by either side.68 Negotiations based on the road 
map framework progressed slowly or not at all even after Arafat appointed Mahmoud 
Abbas as prime minister to replace him as the Palestinian representative in the peace 
talks. In the midst of this deadlock, Carter helped former Israeli and Palestinian 
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government officials negotiate an informal final status agreement proposal that would 
settle all the controversial questions of settlements, Jerusalem, and territorial swaps. 
Neither the Israeli government nor the Palestinian Authority endorsed the resulting 
Geneva Initiative, but it demonstrated that such an agreement was possible when both 
sides decided to make difficult concessions.69 
 Upon Arafat’s death in November 2004, the Palestinian Authority called upon 
Carter to help monitor the first election since 1996 to determine Arafat’s successor. Like 
the first elections, the process went smoothly except in East Jerusalem where numerous 
irregularities occurred. In these polling places, the Israelis permitted no Palestinian 
observers or election officials, so Israeli officials supervised the voting process. However, 
issues arose with discrepancies in the voter lists and Israeli clerks prevented practically 
every Palestinian voter from participating. Carter threatened to call a press conference to 
reveal the Israeli obstruction. The Israelis bent under the pressure, but turnout remained 
very low in East Jerusalem while it mirrored 1996 patterns elsewhere.70 
 Mahmoud Abbas, the moderate Fatah candidate and Arafat’s natural successor, 
won the presidential election in a landslide victory. Carter met with Abbas the day after 
the election to advise him on future peace talks with the Israelis.71 However, trouble 
developed for the secular nationalists of the Fatah Party as Hamas wielded increasing 
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influence due to the corruption among Fatah officials and the lack of improvement in 
material conditions in PA-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas 
boycotted the presidential election protesting the president’s job description that required 
negotiations with Israel. Since Hamas denied Israel’s right to exist and wanted an 
expansive Palestinian state, officials in the organization decided that entering the 
evolving field of Palestinian politics through the presidency would be inappropriate.72  
 While Arafat appointed municipal councils to run cities and towns in PA-
controlled territory, Abbas opened up municipal government offices to elections, which 
allowed Hamas to win a series of stunning victories, even winning control in Fatah 
strongholds. Drawing on almost three decades of experience of participating in elections 
for professional, student, and labor unions during the Israeli occupation, Hamas 
successfully appealed to disgruntled Palestinian voters tired of Fatah corruption as well as 
those who benefitted from the numerous social services, such as kindergartens and 
clinics, that Hamas provided in local communities.73 
 Although Hamas boycotted the 1996 elections due to the Oslo Accords, Hamas 
members participated in the parliamentary elections in January 2006, arguing the events 
of the past ten years demonstrated their failure.74 As in the previous two elections, Carter 
served as an election observer as part of an international team of monitors. However, the 
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participation of Hamas in the elections created fears among Israelis about the rising 
Islamist militant group’s power and among Fatah party members fearful of losing power. 
Rumors abounded that the Israelis and Fatah would cancel the elections with Israel 
prohibiting voting in East Jerusalem and Fatah calling off the entire election in 
response.75  
 Regardless, the elections proceeded on schedule in an “orderly and peaceful” 
fashion according to Carter’s report, except for the usual complications in East 
Jerusalem.76 While many commentators expected significant gains for Hamas, the 
organization exceeded expectations and won a majority of the parliamentary seats. Thus 
it confronted the need to form a cabinet as the governing party. Scholars and journalists 
attributed the stunning victory to Fatah candidates who ran as independents and took 
votes away from the official Fatah candidates, as well as to voters’ dismay at a decade of 
rampant corruption among Fatah officials.77   
 After the voting concluded, Carter emphasized that “the elections were 
completely honest, completely fair, completely safe, and without violence.”78 Despite 
fears among Israelis and Fatah party members about the involvement of Hamas, Carter 
seemed optimistic about their participation as “a demonstration of the commitment of 
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most Palestinians to democracy…My hope is that this will moderate their position and 
lead to their transformation to a non-violent organization.”79  
 Hamas, however, had few opportunities to moderate its positions after an 
international boycott of Hamas arose due to its previous statements refusing to recognize 
Israel’s right to exist and its coordination of suicide bombings in the second intifada. On 
behalf of Palestinians living in the territories, Carter urged the international community 
not to boycott or to at least provide food and needed aid through NGOs and UN agencies, 
fearing a humanitarian disaster.80 Carter argued that the Palestinian people voted to have 
a two-party democracy instead of a one-party Fatah-run state to cut down on corruption, 
not to escalate tensions.81 He also cited polling data that showed only 1 percent of 
Palestinians voted for Hamas to implement Islamic law in the territories.82 Carter 
prophetically warned that isolating the new Hamas government would “alienate the 
already oppressed and innocent Palestinians, to incite violence, and to increase the 
domestic influence and international esteem of Hamas. It will certainly not be an 
inducement to Hamas or other militants to moderate their policies.”83 As Carter predicted, 
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the Hamas government turned to Iran and Hezbollah for money, supplies, and arms 
because it had few options due to its isolation by the international community.84 
 Following the 2006 elections that resulted in Hamas taking control, Carter 
established a permanent presence in the occupied territories with an office for his Carter 
Center in Ramallah.85 Carter focused even more on working with the Palestinians through 
this new office because his influence and credibility with the Israelis continued to 
diminish because of his friendship with Arafat and his encouragement of Hamas to 
participate in the 2006 elections. Carter and his associates even attempted to teach the 
concept of nonviolence to the leaders of Hamas based on the experiences of Mahatma 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. However, Hamas rebuffed these efforts toward 
nonviolence, claiming that Israel would respond violently and continue to build new 
settlements.86  
 Carter’s observations of life in the occupied territories during his time monitoring 
the 2005 presidential election and 2006 parliamentary elections led him to conclude that 
“it’s almost a miracle that the Palestinians have been able to orchestrate three elections 
during the past 10 years, all of which have been honest, fair, strongly contested, without 
violence, and with the results accepted by winners and losers.”87 To push his own 
proposed solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and report on the conditions he 
observed in the occupied territories during his time as an election monitor in 2005 and 
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2006, Carter wrote Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, his first book on the Middle East 
since the publication of The Blood of Abraham twenty years earlier. 88  
 While the first half of the book primarily recaps his earlier work, the new parts of 
the book proved very provocative. In essence, the former president argues in Palestine: 
Peace Not Apartheid that,  
In this diplomatic vacuum, Israeli leaders have embarked on a series of 
unilateral decisions, bypassing both Washington and the Palestinians. 
Their presumption is that an  encircling barrier will finally resolve the 
Palestinian problem. Utilizing their political and military dominance, they 
are imposing a system of partial withdrawal, encapsulation, and apartheid 
on the Muslim and Christian citizens of the occupied territories. The 
driving purpose for the forced separation of the two peoples is unlike that 
in South Africa—not racism, but the acquisition of land.89 
 
In the book, Carter highlighted his first visit in 1973 as governor of Georgia as well as his 
most recent trips to observe the Palestinian elections in 2006. From his travels over the 
years, Carter observed that Palestinians faced increasing oppression in the West Bank and 
Gaza under Israeli rule.90 To resolve the conflict, Carter called on Israel to comply with 
international law (citing UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as the most prominent examples) 
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and accept its pre-1967 borders as the foundation for a two-state solution. Furthermore, 
he emphatically stated that to be an impartial mediator, the United States must take a 
more active role in discouraging the construction of any additional Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank.91 
 In Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, Carter placed almost the entire burden of 
responsibility squarely on Israel to solve this intractable conflict, claiming that the 
important decisions about the negotiations over the land “will be made in Jerusalem, 
through democratic processes involving all Israelis who can express their views and elect 
their leaders.”92 Many of his remarks in the book drew on earlier statements where he 
focused his attention on the question of settlements, noting that the Israeli decision to 
dismantle settlements on the Sinai peninsula helped the success of the Camp David 
Accords.93  Carter lamented his own failure to secure in writing Begin’s verbal 
commitment to freeze Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories during future 
peace talks. In retrospect, he believes that,  
For Menachem Begin, the peace treaty with Egypt was the significant act 
for Israel, while solemn promises regarding the West Bank and 
Palestinians would be finessed or deliberately violated. With the bilateral 
treaty, Israel removed Egypt’s considerable strength from the military 
equation of the Middle East and thus it permitted itself renewed freedom 
to pursue the goals of a fervent and dedicated minority of its citizens to 
confiscate, settle, and fortify the occupied territories.94  
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 Throughout Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, Carter pointed to the settlement 
issue as an obstacle to negotiations because the Israelis took such severe measures to 
protect their settlers from terrorism. Carter highlighted Palestinians living in territories 
cut up by roads accessible only to Israelis and security fences. He denounced the Israelis 
for denying Palestinians freedom of movement and prohibiting Palestinian goods from 
entering Israel or crossing the border into Jordan. The Plains Sunday school teacher even 
put the situation in the occupied territories in theological terms: 
It became increasingly clear that there were two Israels. One encompassed 
the ancient culture and moral values of the Jewish people, defined by the 
Hebrew Scriptures with which I had been familiar since childhood and 
representing the young nation that most Americans envisioned. The other 
existed within the occupied Palestinian territories, with policies shaped by 
a refusal to acknowledge and respect the basic human rights of the 
citizens.95 
 
The theological critiques of Israel in Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid also stretch back to 
Carter’s interaction with Israel dating back to 1973. Carter again highlighted the story of 
his encounter with Meir on his 1973 trip to Israel and his reminder to her that the 
Israelites faced great trials when they proved unfaithful to God.96 
 Recalling the brutal regime of racial segregation in South Africa as well as his 
own experiences of growing up in the Jim Crow South, the book’s title quickly became 
the primary flashpoint of controversy. The former president claimed that the provocative 
title sought to rouse debate in the United States over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
because of the “extraordinary lobbying efforts of the American-Israel Political Action 
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Committee” to stifle any criticism of Israeli policy, a position also held by some scholars 
including John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt.97  
 However, the publication of Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid was not the first time 
that he considered the apartheid analogy. In The Blood of Abraham, Carter quoted an 
Israeli Peace Now activist who accused Israel of apartheid during an interview. In their 
conversation, the activist stated, “I am afraid that we are moving toward a government 
like that of South Africa, with a dual society of Jewish rulers and Arab subjects with few 
rights of citizenship. The West Bank is not worth it.”98  
 The book’s controversial title and Carter’s willingness to identify Israel as the 
primary obstacle to peace in the Middle East quickly came under fire from critics, 
ranging from Jewish hardliners such as Alan Dershowitz to former Clinton administration 
Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, who cited factual errors in the book, accused Carter of 
potential plagiarism, and even called the former president anti-Semitic.99 Critics attacked 
one of the central premises of Carter’s plan for peace: that UN Resolution 242 (1967) 
stipulated that the boundaries from the 1949 armistice served as the legal boundaries of 
the State of Israel. Instead, they argued that Resolution 242 called for the negotiation of 
any permanent boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Critics claimed that 
Arab states have consistently rejected potential Israeli territorial concessions.100  
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 Furthermore, scholars and commentators have criticized Palestine: Peace Not 
Apartheid for not providing a full explanation of the apartheid comparison and for 
generally being poorly written and lacking in analytical nuance.101 According to them, 
some of the differences between Israel and South Africa include claims that the 
Palestinian leaders deserve blame for the oppression of their own people and the lack of a 
Palestinian equivalent of Nelson Mandela.102 Five years after the book’s publication, 
several Jewish readers filed a lawsuit against Carter and the book’s publisher for 
disseminating false information about Israel.103 
 The critics focused on one particular sentence in the book: “It is imperative that 
the general Arab community and all significant Palestinian groups make it clear that they 
will end the suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism,” Carter wrote, “when 
international laws and the ultimate goals of the Roadmap for Peace are accepted by 
Israel.”104 They argue the statement accepts that Palestinians have a legitimate right to 
continue acts of violence against Israelis until the Israeli government accepts a pro-
Palestinian interpretation of international law such as UN Resolution 242.105 Such an 
impression frightens many in the Jewish community, especially the hardliners, who are 
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very sensitive to threats of violence and refusing Israel’s right to exist due to the massive 
psychological impact of the Holocaust on the Jewish consciousness. One of the leading 
scholars and activists on the Holocaust, Deborah Lipstadt, explains, “When an 
Ahmadinejad or Hamas threatens to destroy Israel, Jews have historical precedent to 
believe them. Jimmy Carter either does not understand this or considers it irrelevant.”106 
In a speech to the Zionist Federation in London, Lipstadt continued her Holocaust-related 
criticism of Carter, “When a former president of the United States writes a book on the 
Israeli-Palestinian crisis and writes a chronology at the beginning of the book in order to 
help them understand the emergence of the situation and in that chronology lists nothing 
of importance between 1939 and 1947, that is soft-core denial.”107 
 Carter’s perceived insensitivity to the Holocaust and prior Jewish oppression led 
some critics to call him anti-Semitic. In an article in the Jerusalem Post, David Forman, 
founder of Rabbis for Human Rights, explains several definitions of anti-Semitism in 
relation to the state of Israel: 
if you erase Israel’s modern historical narrative thereby denying Israel’s 
right to exist; if you hold Israel responsible for the unrest in the entire 
Middle East; if you accuse Israel of fostering dual loyalties among 
American Jews to the extent that their support for Israel is perceived as 
undermining the security and well-being of the United States; and if you 
do not judge Israel by universal standards of moral behavior and political 
conduct.108 
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According to Forman’s definition, Carter was anti-Semitic under the second and fourth 
criteria he identifies because Carter places a lot of responsibility for the conflict on the 
Israelis and because his religious background leads him to hold Israel to different biblical 
standards. Some commentators have noted that Carter seems to have a “religious 
problem” with Israel because it is “not the reincarnation of ancient Judea but a modern, 
largely temporal democracy.”109 Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg accused the former president 
of treating the modern state of Israel as “a lineal descendant of the Pharisees” who 
mistreat the neighboring Palestinians as poorly or worse as the first century Jewish 
Pharisees treated the Samaritans of the New Testament.110 Columnist Samuel Freedman 
recalled the story Carter first told in The Blood of Abraham where “the scolding holier-
than-thou Carter, the one who took it upon himself to instruct Golda Meir in Old 
Testament theology” illustrated the former president’s tendency to set moral standards for 
the state of Israel that differ greatly from the criteria set for any other ethnic group or 
community seeking national self-determination.111 
 Many critics addressed the issue of Carter’s supposed anti-Semitism. Alan 
Dershowitz wrote that “Carter frowns upon Israel’s liberal, tolerant society; it falls short 
of his biblical ideal” and that “he cannot accept contemporary Israel or Israeli Jews for 
what they are.”112 Abraham Foxman, president of the Anti-Defamation League, feared 
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that Carter’s use of loaded terms like apartheid, references to the power of the Israeli 
lobby, and accusations of Jewish control of the media all contributed to anti-Semitic 
conspiracy theories similar to the ones that fueled the Holocaust.113 In rather blunt terms, 
Jerusalem Post columnist Shmuley Boteach clarified that “Jimmy Carter is not so much 
anti-Semite as anti-intellectual, not so much a Jew-hater as a boor. The real explanation 
behind his limitless hostility to Israel is a total lack of any moral understanding…He is, 
and always has been, a man of good intentions bereft of good judgment.”114 
 Jewish critics of Carter also pointed out that the former president lacks 
impartiality in evaluating the conflict because the Carter Center received so many Arab 
donations.115 Furthermore, they have noted Carter’s hypocrisy in criticizing human rights 
abuses in Gaza and the West Bank while he remains relatively silent on abuses in Arab 
countries.116 Carter acknowledged the financial support from Arabs and remains very 
transparent about his fundraising. In fact, Carter frequently noted in his trip reports to the 
Middle East that he sought to raise funds for the Guinea worm eradication program in 
Africa and raised millions of dollars in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and 
elsewhere in the Middle East.117 In a 2009 meeting with Knesset leaders, one of the MKs 
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accused Carter “of being an agent of Arab states” because he had so many Arab donors 
for the Carter Center, but Carter shrugged off the accusation, noting that the number of 
American Jewish donors outnumbered Arab donors.118 
 The book’s controversial claims of Jewish control of the media and politics as 
well as interpretations of UN resolutions that seemed pro-Palestinian prompted the 
resignation of Kenneth Stein as a Carter Center Middle East fellow as well as the 
departure of many Jewish members of the Carter Center’s advisory board.119 Stein, the 
first executive director of the Carter Center, collaborated with Carter in writing The 
Blood of Abraham in 1985.120 Recalling that collaboration, Stein explained that the 
former president never considered the longstanding forces of history, culture, religion, 
and ideology as major obstacles to his ability to negotiate a pragmatic and comprehensive 
settlement to the problem. Stein remembered frequently arguing with Carter over how 
much history to include in each chapter and over word choice and specific claims. After 
one particular heated argument, Carter reminded the Emory history professor, 
“Remember Ken, only one of us was president of the United States.”121 Other scholars 
echoed Stein’s complaints of Carter’s ahistorical writing style, claiming that Carter does 
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not understand the “much older and more complicated” roots of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.122  
 Commentators have explained that Carter is generally naïve about the Middle 
East crisis because “behind conflicts he sees not real political differences but failures of 
negotiations.”123 In his review of the book, the New York Times bureau chief in 
Jerusalem, Ethan Bronner, slammed Carter for a “Rip Van Winkle feel” to the book for 
not recognizing changes in the Middle East since his presidency such as the rise of al 
Qaeda, Iranian nuclear ambitions, and the rise of the Taliban in the Afghanistan. 
Moreover, according to Bronner’s review, Carter failed to recognize how changes in the 
region at the end of his presidency such as the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein’s assumption of the presidency in Iraq, complicated 
the Middle East peace process and contributed as much to regional instability as Israeli 
policies toward the occupied territories.124 
 Other detractors argued that Carter wrote Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid not just 
to alter perceptions among policymakers and the general public, but also to change the 
minds of American evangelicals about their firm support of Israel. They accused Carter 
of not only using his credentials as a former president, but also using the respect he 
garners as a devout Christian as an asset in appealing to the evangelical community.125 
Jeffery Goldberg accused Carter of trying to “scare” evangelicals out of their allegiance 
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to the Jewish state by making “specious” allegations against Israel’s conduct of the 
occupation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.126 Even though Carter failed to share a pre-
millennial dispensationalist eschatology in his evangelical Christianity, it seemed to some 
Jewish observers that Carter “regards the Jewish homeland as contingent on the 
faithfulness of its people and leaders to the rules that come with God’s promise of land 
outlined in the Hebrew scriptures.”127 However, if these critics were correct and Carter’s 
goal was to change evangelical minds about Israel, the book ultimately failed because 
conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists remained steadfast in their support of 
Israel while mainline Protestants and progressive evangelicals continued their advocacy 
of Palestinian human rights.128 
 Even though the critics dominated much of the discussion, Carter had a few 
supporters such as longtime political ally and Christian Century editor James Wall, 
former National Security Council staffer William Quandt, and a number of academics 
tired of any criticism of Israel being labeled as anti-Semitic.129 In a letter to the editor, 
journalist Geoffrey Gray noted that the apartheid analogy is “commonplace among 
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informed commentators,” even in Israel.130 Philosophy professor John Berteaux believed 
that Carter did not go far enough in his book, arguing that Israel’s restrictions on 
Palestinians in the territories actually represented a “web of racial projects, which are an 
obstacle in the path of peace.”131 Chris Hedges, a senior fellow at The Nation Institute, 
echoed the sentiment that Carter soft-pedaled his criticism of Israel, “if there is a failing 
in Carter’s stance, it is that he is too kind to the Israelis, bending over backward to assert 
that he is only writing about the occupied territories.”132 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s 
national security advisor, agreed with his former boss’s general assessment of the region 
and denounced the “objectionable” media campaign that he believed was “designed to 
intimidate an open public discussion” of the situation.133 Carter Center advisor Robert 
Pastor and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Harold Saunders 
publicly supported Carter, fielding questions in venues with largely Jewish audiences.134 
 Not surprisingly, many of the book’s defenders were of Palestinian or Arab 
descent. Arab-American columnist George Hishmeh praised Carter’s book because it 
showed the other side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the United States, where the 
Israeli voice is dominant.135 Palestinian-American journalist Ali Abunimah lauded 
Carter’s courage for providing a voice for the dignity of Palestinians while listing a series 
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of Israeli discriminatory measures in the territories.136 Saree Makdisi, an English 
professor of Palestinian and Lebanese ancestry, attacked Carter’s detractors for 
“defending the indefensible.”137 
 Even some Jewish commentators praised Carter’s book, fondly remembering the 
former president’s negotiation of the Camp David Accords and admitting some of the 
harsh realities of Palestinian life in the West Bank and Gaza. While uncomfortable with 
the term “apartheid” to describe the current conditions in the territories, Knesset member 
Yossi Beilin agreed with Carter that apartheid might be in Israel’s future unless they 
achieve a lasting peace agreement with the Palestinians.138 Rabbi Michael Lerner 
commended Carter for “doing a great service to the Jews” while attacking the extremism 
among the president’s critics and the preponderant influence of the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in American politics.139 Jewish-American journalist 
Henry Siegman also came to Carter’s defense, decrying the “pettiness” of Dershowitz 
and the book’s other critics.140 
 Carter also defended himself by clarifying his argument and claiming that he 
applied the term apartheid only to the Palestinians of the occupied territories, not the 
Palestinians within Israel. Moreover, the acquisition of land rather than race drove the 
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apartheid in the occupied territories.141 Even commentators within Israel such as the 
editorial board of Ha’aretz, one of Israel’s leading newspapers, used the apartheid 
comparison themselves, citing instances of Palestinians being deprived of basic human 
rights, such as the freedom of movement. Carter acknowledged this as well, stating 
“[Israelis] have all used and explained the word ‘apartheid’ in much harsher words than 
mine.”142 On several occasions, Carter speculated that most Americans agreed with him 
as well as many Jews.143 During the book tour, he met with Jewish rabbis on a number of 
stops to discuss the book and even prayed with some rabbis after a book signing in 
Phoenix.144 However, Carter expressed regret for the controversy he caused by 
introducing the debate over the term apartheid because it took any potential attention 
away from the “almost nonexistent discussion of the Palestinian issue” in the United 
States.145 
 To mend relations with the American Jewish community, Carter spoke at 
Brandeis University to explain his position. He urged the Brandeis students to visit the 
occupied territories and see the conditions for themselves. The former president remained 
steadfast regarding his use of the word apartheid, asserting that prominent South African 
leaders (and former victims of the apartheid regime) such as Nelson Mandela and 
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Archbishop Desmond Tutu had observed the conditions in Gaza and the West Bank and 
employed the same terms. Furthermore, he explained, somewhat condescendingly, that 
Israel’s most ardent supporters in the United States came from among “Christians like me 
who have been taught since I was three years old to honor and protect God’s chosen 
people from among whom came our own Christian savior, Jesus Christ.” In his Brandeis 
speech, Carter also cited the number of times Old Testament writers used the words 
“justice” and “righteousness” to support his plan for the Middle East peace process.146 
Dershowitz accused the former president of being disingenuous, claiming the “talk at 
Brandeis bore little resemblance to his book and to his many television and radio 
interviews. It was conciliatory in tone and compromising in substance. It had all the 
hallmarks of having been drafted by Stuart Eizenstat [Carter’s former domestic policy 
advisor and an American Jew].”147 
 In the midst of the storm surrounding Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, Carter 
found himself embroiled in more controversy over his decision to meet with Khaled 
Mashaal, leader of the Hamas political bureau in Damascus. Carter joined with other 
distinguished former international leaders such as Kofi Annan, Nelson Mandela, Mary 
Robinson, and Desmond Tutu in The Elders, an organization dedicated to push for 
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resolution and reconciliation in global conflicts. The Elders planned a Middle East trip to 
meet with the major parties involved in the conflict, but Israeli leaders claimed they had 
no time due to the sixtieth birthday celebration of the State of Israel.148  
 However, Carter decided to travel to Israel anyway under the auspices of the 
Carter Center. His memory of the failure to meet with Arafat during his administration 
heavily influenced Carter’s quest to act as a backchannel contact with Hamas for the 
United States and Israel.149 The former president wanted to assess Hamas’ willingness to 
negotiate, urge them to reject violence against Israeli civilians, and convince them to 
form a coalition government with Fatah. Continuing his tradition of requesting freedom 
for political prisoners and unjustly imprisoned individuals, Carter asked Hamas to free 
kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Carter defended his decision to meet with the 
Hamas leader, “I think there’s no doubt in anyone’s mind that, if Israel is ever going to 
find peace with justice concerning the relationship of their next-door neighbors, the 
Palestinians, that Hamas will have to be included in the process.”150 
 Most high-ranking Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, 
refused to meet with Carter because they feared his meeting with Hamas would help 
legitimize the organization. They were also apprehensive that a Carter-Olmert meeting 
would indicate that Carter was serving as a third-party mediator for secret negotiations 
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between Hamas and Israel.151 Even Fatah officials in the West Bank worried that Carter’s 
meeting with Hamas might hurt Abbas’s credibility with the Palestinian people and his 
efforts to negotiate with Israel.152  
 After Carter met with Mashaal in Damascus, he announced that Hamas would 
consider a peace deal as long as Palestinians had a chance to vote on the agreement in a 
referendum.153 However, just as the Israelis and Fatah officials feared, Hamas spokesmen 
touted their meeting with Carter as a sign of their legitimacy as representatives of the 
Palestinian people. Moreover, they stressed that a peace deal approved in a referendum 
did not “mean that Hamas is going to accept the result of the referendum.”154 
 To answer his critics and report on the developments in the region since the 
publication of Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, Carter wrote We Can Have Peace in the 
Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work. Instead of easing problems, it only provided new 
fodder for Carter’s most vehement critics and did not silence accusations of anti-
Semitism. Echoing his Christian Zionist declarations during the 1976 presidential 
election, Carter affirmed in this book that “this homeland for the Jews was compatible 
with the teachings of the Bible” and that “Jewish survivors of the Holocaust deserved 
their own nation.”155 He also explained that Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza 
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Strip resulted in the land’s limited religious or strategic value. Carter described Gaza’s 
control in ancient times by the Philistines as part of the reason why Sharon willingly 
dismantled Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip.156 
 Carter’s “plan that will work” only rehashed his previous proposals of Israel 
returning to its pre-1967 borders with some adjustments to account for new demographic 
realities. Carter’s conclusion about the consequences of not moving forward on a peace 
process revolving around a two-state solution represented the most important difference 
in this new book from Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. He argued that eventually 
Palestinians would accept being second-class citizens in Israel in a one-state solution  
rather than continue living in an occupation-style setting in the West Bank or in an 
impoverished community cut off from the rest of the world in Gaza. Carter called the 
single-state outcome unacceptable because world opinion would not tolerate Palestinians 
being treated as second-class citizens in Israel when they would eventually form the 
majority of the population (and voters). Such a result would lead to “either the end of a 
Jewish state or the legal deprivation of voting rights among second-class Palestinians.”157 
Nathan Stock, assistant director of the Conflict Resolution Program at the Carter Center, 
confirmed Carter’s assessment of the need to move forward in the peace process because 
further delays likely ensured additional radicalization of the Palestinian population, like 
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the emergence of Hamas from the Israeli refusal to negotiate with the PLO in the 
1980s.158 
 Many of the book’s critics rehashed their complaints about Palestine: Peace Not 
Apartheid while others such as Dershowitz and Stein did not bother to respond as 
vociferously as they had to his previous book. Some resorted to vicious ad hominem 
attacks. One detractor described the book as “a tedious and depressing political diary of 
an elderly man who can’t quite remember where and when he misplaced his clout” and 
one that “may well have more errors and inaccuracies than pages.”159 Another opponent 
called the book “what a golfer might call a mulligan—a do-over of his 2006 book.”160  
 Even non-Jewish critics piled on. Self-proclaimed Middle East expert and 
Christian Zionist Mike Evans, a writer who connects end times prophecy to modern 
Middle East politics, claimed that Carter did not “understand the prophetic implications 
of the strategy he is trying to impose on Israel.”161 In a review for The Jerusalem Post, 
Evans avoided his usual prophecy language and ventured into offering more secular 
political commentary according to a very pro-Israeli version of events. He accused Carter 
of only applying the term “radical” to Israelis while lavishing praise on “peace-loving 
organizations such as Hizbullah and Hamas and states like Iran and Syria.”162  
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 In a departure from the other critics, former Lebanese presidential candidate 
Chibli Mallat took Carter to task about his pessimism about a single state and his 
insistence on a two-state solution, “How can dividing the land be preferable to a state of 
equality and civil rights?” Mallat extolled a future nonviolent quest for civil rights in a 
single state in the mode of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson 
Mandela.163 
 After the controversy over his books and his meeting with Hamas leaders, 
Carter’s credibility with Israelis and many in the American Jewish community dissipated. 
As president, Carter was more cautious in his statements and actions toward the Middle 
East due to the considerable political influence of American Jews in the Democratic 
Party. After leaving office, Carter became less cautious and increasingly bold with his 
comments about the peace process not because he was anti-Semitic, but because he faced 
no electoral consequences for his frank comments. Furthermore, he sympathized with the 
human rights plight of the Palestinians as his theology increasingly emphasized social 
justice and uplifting the poor and oppressed. As his access and influence with Israelis and 
American Jews declined, Carter drew closer to Palestinian and Arab leaders who 
welcomed relationships with the former president and to the people of these lands where 
he wanted to bring social justice.  
 Despite the deterioration in his relationship with Israelis and American Jews, 
Carter did not want to be so estranged from Israel, a country that he still maintained a 
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great affinity for because of his love for the Bible and the modern descendants of the 
ancient Israelites. To begin repairing that relationship, he sought to repent for potentially 
hurtful statements to Jewish people everywhere. In December 2009, he used the language 
of the al het, a Jewish prayer for forgiveness on Yom Kippur, to attempt to atone for 
some of his past brazen statements about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Carter wrote in a 
statement, “We must recognize Israel’s achievements under difficult circumstances, even 
as we strive in a positive way to help Israel to continue to improve its relations with its 
Arab populations, but we must not permit criticisms for improvement to stigmatize 
Israel.”164 
 Despite his attempts to repair his broken relationships with leaders in Israel and in 
the American Jewish community, most of Carter’s recent activism in the region focused 
on resolving conflict among the Palestinians themselves. Hamas and Fatah had been 
fighting since Hamas won the 2006 parliamentary elections and failed to cooperate in 
issues of governance. The former president negotiated a compromise where the PA 
would be run by a unity government of nonpartisan technocrats until new presidential and 
parliamentary elections could be held.165 Although both sides continued fighting for two 
more years, Carter’s plan provided the framework for the Egyptian-mediated 
reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas. Carter lauded the reconciliation 
agreement as part of the larger “Arab spring” sweeping the region.166  
                                                 
164 “Jimmy Carter to US Jews: Forgive me for stigmatizing Israel,” Ha’aretz, December 22, 2009. 
 
165 Farah Stockman, “Carter reprises peacemaker role,” Tehran Times, February 1, 2009. 
 
166 Jimmy Carter, “A partnership that could bring Mideast peace,” The Star (Amman, Jordan), May 9, 2011. 
 
278 
 In addition to his work as a negotiator, Carter frequently made humanitarian pleas 
on behalf of Palestinians in Gaza effectively cut off from the rest of the world, claiming 
that the “citizens of Gaza are being treated more like animals than human beings” and 
that assistance would enable Gazans “to be a bridge between modern political life and 
traditions that date back to the Biblical era.”167 
 As of this writing, the Palestinians, weary from the stalled peace process, have 
sought admission to the United Nations as a full-fledged independent state, a prospect 
opposed by Israel and the United States. Carter called on the Obama administration not to 
veto Palestine’s bid in the UN Security Council vote on the matter and permit the UN 
recognition of Palestine as an independent state in the General Assembly. He counseled 
Obama that such a decision would have political consequences with American Jewish 
voters, noting “but I think it’s a price worth paying.”168 He further urged the 
administration to use the UN situation as an opportunity to bring the peace process to a 
conclusion and negotiate the final status issues that will result in an Israeli and a 
Palestinian state living side-by-side.169 
 However, Carter has not really played a significant role in the Obama 
administration’s attempt to mediate a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict outside of writing books and op-eds. Carter has become such a controversial and 
polarizing figure in the Middle East that the Obama administration hesitated to draw on 
the former president’s experience and mediation skills. The Obama administration is not 
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the only party that believes Carter may have outlived his usefulness as a negotiator. One 
Israeli journalist noted that Carter is interfering in the peace process that is now moving 
through mediators in Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey.170 
 Former president Jimmy Carter, praised for his post-presidential humanitarian 
accomplishments, lost much of his credibility as an honest broker in the Middle East 
peace process over the thirty years since he left office. Several factors account for the 
evolution of Carter’s views on Middle East peace that led him to hurt his status as an 
impartial negotiator: 1) his open sympathy with the Palestinian plight as part of his 
progressive theological evolution and his opportunities to meet with people he could not 
meet while president; 2) the absence of political consequences from upset American Jews 
and other pro-Israel voters; and 3) a lingering feeling of betrayal by Begin on the 
settlements issue from the Camp David Accords. This chapter also suggests some of the 
limitations of private actors in diplomacy because Carter relies entirely on persuasion in 
negotiations and cannot use carrots or sticks to move the process along. Carter himself 
admits that his advocacy for the peace process and publications like Palestine: Peace Not 
Apartheid “did hurt my nonexistent ability to be a mediator in the Middle East.”171 In an 
interview, Carter claimed “I have moral authority—as long as I don’t destroy it,” but his 
actions and writings intended to bring peace to Israel and Palestine seem to have 
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damaged whatever “moral authority” that the former president relied on so much and 
severely limited his most important tool as a private diplomatic actor: persuasion.172 
                                                 




Twenty-five years after leaving office, Carter wrote a short book entitled Our 
Endangered Values about the contemporary moral and spiritual crises facing the United 
States. In the book, he examined the roots of the crisis, explaining, “The most important 
factor is that fundamentalists have become increasingly influential in both religion and 
government, and have managed to change the nuances and subtleties of historic debate 
into black-and-white rigidities and the personal derogation of those who dare to 
disagree.”1 The former president discussed the Christian Right in the United States as 
well as Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East to illustrate his argument.  
Although he employed the word fundamentalism throughout the book, Carter 
really identified the phenomenon of religious nationalism described by Mark 
Juergensmeyer in the mixture between religion and politics. During Carter’s presidency, 
the rise of religious nationalism in different regions around the world foreshadowed the 
future conflicts of the post-Cold War world. Religious conflicts and civil wars replaced 
the American-Soviet superpower competition as the source of international crises.  
After many years spent reflecting on his presidency, Carter finally understood and 
explained the common bonds among the Christian Right in the United States, the Shia 
supporters of Khomeini’s Islamic republic in Iran, the religious elements of the Likud 
coalition, and the Muslim fighters of the Afghan mujahidin. In an interview following his 
Nobel Peace Prize lecture, Carter described the tremendous dangers of fundamentalism: 
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Increasingly, true believers are inclined to begin a process of deciding: 
“Since I am aligned with God, I am superior and my beliefs should 
prevail, and anyone who disagrees with me is inherently wrong,” and the 
next step is “inherently inferior.” The ultimate step is “subhuman,” and 
then their lives are not significant.2 
 
Despite his description of the danger of mixing fundamentalist religion and 
politics, Carter admitted, “my own religious beliefs have been inextricably entwined with 
the political principles I have adopted.”3 Longtime friend and biographer Peter Bourne 
described that Carter’s religious background made the “globalization of his personal 
concern” seem “natural.”4 While serving as president, Carter proactively used his faith 
with some success in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel. However, he did not find 
the same success in applying his religious convictions in reacting to the outbreak of 
religious nationalist conflicts and tensions in Iran, Afghanistan, and the United States.  
Scholars pointed to a variety of reasons for Carter’s difficulties and failures in 
applying his religion to his policymaking. Political scientist Gary Scott Smith explained, 
“[he] initially underestimated the extent to which moral values clash, advisors disagree, 
facts are unclear, and events occur that even a powerful nation has little ability to 
control.”5 Religion scholar Richard Hutcheson emphasized three major religious themes 
of Carter’s presidency that carried negative political consequences in the post-Watergate, 
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post-Vietnam United States: “a consciousness of sin and humility,” “sacrifice,” and “an 
ethical awareness which saw the complexities of all moral decisions.”6 
Carter also had trouble articulating to American and international audiences how 
his religious values translated into a coherent policy vision. Reverend Theodore 
Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University, wrote following Carter’s defeat, “I have 
always had the feeling that he is a good man, but somehow was not able to bring his 
vision to reality. That is not unusual on this earth.”7 Compared to other presidents, Carter 
may not have called upon the tradition of American civil religion as often, but the words 
of the Bible and his faith deeply permeated his worldview. Historian Leo Ribuffo 
explained, “Perhaps because he was so pious, Carter felt little need for official 
declarations of piety.”8  
Rather than serving as a priest for the American civil religion, Carter frequently 
employed religious rhetoric in jeremiads, such as the famous “Crisis of Confidence” 
speech.9 As a result, many Americans misunderstood or rejected Carter’s faith and the 
role it played in his politics. Religious liaison Robert Maddox later told an interviewer, 
“[Carter’s] humility translated as weakness.” He continued, “[Carter] could say, ‘I made 
a mistake,’ and feel as he would when personally confessing a sin to God. He could 
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confess to the American people, ‘I made a mistake,’ but the American people perceived 
that as weakness and wishy-washiness.”10 
Without the restraints of the American political system, Carter’s extensive and 
sometimes controversial post-presidential activism provided a window into what matters 
most to the former president such as making peace, fighting disease, and alleviating 
poverty. Hendrik Hertzberg, a former Carter speechwriter, remarked, “What a post-
presidency can do though is to illuminate which aspects of a president’s character were 
real and which were phony. All of [Carter’s] strengths: perseverance, dedication, 
integrity, those have all turned out to be very, very real.”11 Journalist Chris Matthews, 
another former Carter speechwriter, reflected, “Carter is like the patient investor who sits 
on the same portfolio for years and suddenly finds himself rich. Carter’s stocks have 
names like ‘human rights’ and ‘Camp David’ and ‘environment’ marked on them.”12 
Carter’s post-presidential humanitarian efforts illustrate how his strong belief in 
the separation of church and state and his Christian realism tempered his strong 
evangelical convictions in his policymaking calculus during his presidency. Carter 
explained the differences between his presidential policymaking and post-presidential 
activism in Niebuhrian terms, “When I was president of the United States I could not deal 
with foreign countries on the basis of sacrificial love. I would have been impeached had I 
always exhibited as president that high a standard.”13  
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The religious nationalist issues Carter faced as president persist in different guises 
in the present. The former president remained actively involved in seeking a 
comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors, with mixed results. Even after gaining a retrospective understanding of 
fundamentalism, Carter still found himself embroiled in controversy with his decision to 
meet with the leaders of Hamas, a Palestinian religious nationalist group.  
Compared to his ongoing involvement in Israel and the Palestinian territories, 
Carter remained largely uninvolved in Iran and Afghanistan. However, the conflicts and 
crises in these countries from the years of his presidency still reverberate. Many 
Americans still perceive Iran through the lens of the Carter years and the 444-day long 
hostage crisis. The Afghan mujahidin, with CIA support, served as a training ground for 
the future leaders of al Qaeda and other contemporary Islamist terrorist organizations. 
Following Carter’s loss in the 1980 election, the Christian Right became an even 
more influential fixture in Republican politics over the course of the next three decades. 
In fact, the public prominence of the Christian Right narrowed the definition of 
evangelicalism so that it precluded an identity of evangelical liberalism.14 
Much like Job, Jimmy Carter displayed remarkable patience in enduring 
challenges from religious nationalists at home and abroad as well as a host of other crises. 
His religious convictions not only provided stability and comfort in these times of trial, 
but they also clearly affected his worldview and decision-making, even if his strong 
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belief in separation of church and state made its effect seem more subtle. Former Carter 
Press Secretary Jody Powell recalled,  
There were no times when I recall that he invoked his religious beliefs as 
reasons for a decision, and I would have been not only surprised but 
shocked and put off if he had. But…my view of him is that his religion 
and his faith were so much an integral part of him, and how he viewed the 
world and how he viewed other people and how he viewed his 
responsibilities, both as a citizen and as a president, that it’s a seamless 
thing.15 
 
Carter’s religious beliefs helped him achieve a stunning diplomatic success at Camp 
David. However, his success there raised expectations among his advisors and the general 
public when it came to negotiating with the Ayatollah to release the hostages or pursuing 
a sufficiently anticommunist and pro-Israel foreign policy to please members of the 
Christian Right. In his Bible classes before and after his presidency, Carter often 
reminded his listeners of Jesus’ teachings on humility, a lesson he learned in his failures 
coping with religious nationalists in Israel, Iran, Afghanistan, the United States, and the 
Palestinian territories.16  
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